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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Stochastic petropolitics
    the dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies
    Author: Boucekkine, Raouf; Prieur, Fabien; Vasilakis, Chrysovalantis; Zou, Benteng
    Published: April, 2018
    Publisher:  Center for Research in Economics and Management, University of Luxembourg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2018, 11
    Subjects: Institutional dynamics; petropolitics; lobbying games; revenue-dependent lobbying; power; stochastic dynamic games; stochastic stability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  2. The evolution of social norms
    Author: Young, H. Peyton
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Univ. of Oxford, Dep. of Economics, Oxford

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Department of Economics discussion paper series / University of Oxford ; 726
    Subjects: evolutionary game theory; equilibrium selection; stochastic stability
    Scope: Online-Ressource (63 S.)
  3. Volume of trade and dynamic network formation in two-sided economies
    Author: Pongou, Roland; Serrano, Roberto
    Published: January 2016
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa, Ottawa

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Department of Economics, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ottawa ; 1602E
    Subjects: Two-sided economies; trade networks; pairwise stability; stochastic stability; herd behavior,fragmentation; concentration; contagion asymmetry
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. "Greedy" demand adjustment in cooperative games
    Author: Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 175
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    This paper studies a simple process of demand adjustment in cooperative games. In the process, a randomly chosen player makes the highest possible demand subject to the demands of other coalition members being satisfied. This process converges to the aspiration set; in convex games, this implies convergence to the core. We further introduce perturbations into the process, where players sometimes make a higher demand than feasible. These perturbations make the set of separating aspirations, i.e., demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, the one most resistant to mutations. We fully analyze this process for 3-player games. We further look at weighted majority games with two types of players. In these games, if the coalition of all small players is winning, the process converges to the unique separating aspiration; otherwise, there are many separating aspirations and the process reaches a neighbourhood of a separating aspiration.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261243
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2022, 05
    Subjects: demand adjustment; aspirations; core; stochastic stability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten)
  5. An adaptive model of demand adjustment in weighted majority games
    Author: Montero, María; Possajennikov, Alexandre
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 175
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    This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of other coalitions members being satisfied. This basic process converges to the aspiration set. By introducing some perturbations into the process, we show that the set of separating aspirations, i.e. demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, is the one most resistant to mutations. We then apply the process to weighted majority games. We show that in symmetric majority games and in apex games the unique separating aspiration is the unique stochastically stable one.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248297
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2021, 06
    Subjects: demand adjustment; aspirations; stochastic stability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten)
  6. Memory retrieval and harshness of conflict in the Hawk-Dove game
    Author: Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo; Ille, Sebastian; Vicario, Eugenio
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  DISEI, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Firenze (Italia)

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 650
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2021, n. 13
    Subjects: conflict; memory; hawk dove; evolution; stochastic stability
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Uncertainty-driven symmetry-breaking and stochastic stability in a generic differential game of lobbying
    Author: Boucekkine, Raouf; Prieur, Fabien; Ruan, Weihua; Zou, Benteng
    Published: May, 2021
    Publisher:  University of Luxemborg, Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance, Luxembourg

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 612
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10993/47511
    Series: Array ; 2021, 10
    Subjects: Political lobbying; symmetric versus asymmetric equilibrium; stochastic differential games; stochastic stability; social cost of lobbying
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten)