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  1. Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention
    Author: Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 466 (2018,13)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2018, 13 (November 2018)
    Subjects: Attention; campaign finance; interest groups; legislative voting; mass media; media attention; roll call voting; US House of Representatives
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Special interest groups versus voters and the political economics of attention
    Author: Balles, Patrick; Matter, Ulrich; Stutzer, Alois
    Published: Februar 2024
    Publisher:  University of Basel, Faculty of Business and Economics, Basel, Switzerland

    We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 523
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We investigate whether US House representatives favour special interest groups over constituents in periods of low media attention to politics. Analysing 666 roll calls from 2005 to 2018, we show that representatives are more likely to vote against their constituency's preferred position the more special interest money they receive from groups favouring the opposite position. The latter effect is significantly larger when less attention is paid to politics due to distraction by exogenous newsworthy events like natural disasters. The effect is mostly driven by short-term opportunistic behaviour than the short-term scheduling of controversial votes into periods with high news pressure.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289854
    Series: WWZ working paper ; 2024, 03
    Subjects: Attention; campaign finance; interest groups; legislative voting; mass media; roll call voting; US House of Representatives
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen