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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Incentives, pro-social preferences and discrimination
    Author: Soubeyran, Raphaël
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  HAL CCSD

    In this paper, I study how a principal can provide incentives, at minimal cost, to a group of agents who have pro-social preferences in order to induce successful coordination in the presence of network externalities. I show that agents' pro-social... more

     

    In this paper, I study how a principal can provide incentives, at minimal cost, to a group of agents who have pro-social preferences in order to induce successful coordination in the presence of network externalities. I show that agents' pro-social preferences - specifically a preference for the sum of the agents' payoffs and/or for the minimum payoff - lead to a decrease in the implementation cost for the principal, a decrease in the payoff of each agent and an increase in discrimination. The model can be applied in various contexts and it delivers policy implications for designing policies that support the adoption of new technologies, for motivating a group of workers or for inducing successful coordination of NGOs.

     
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    Source: BASE Selection for Comparative Literature
    Language: English
    Media type: Report
    Format: Online
    Parent title: https://hal.umontpellier.fr/hal-02056347 ; 2019
    Subjects: principal; agents; pro-social preferences; incentives; externality; Knowledge; JEL: O - Economic Development; Innovation; Technological Change; [SHS.ECO]Humanities and Social Sciences/Economics and Finance
    Rights:

    info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
  2. Social preferences and the distribution of rewards
    Author: Soubeyran, Raphaël; Quérou, Nicolas; Gueye, Mamadou
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  CEE-M, Center for Environmental Economics, Montpellier

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 643
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: June 2022
    Series: CEE-M working paper ; 2022, 06
    Subjects: incentives; coordination; principal; agents; social comparisons
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten)
  3. Pro-social motivations, externalities and incentives
    Author: Soubeyran, Raphaël
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  CEE-M, Center for Environmental Economics, Montpellier

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 643
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: April 2021
    Series: CEE-M working paper ; 2021, 06
    Subjects: incentives; externality; principal; agents; coordination; pro-social preferences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten)
  4. Inequality aversion and the distribution of rewards in organizations
    Author: Gueye, Mamadou; Quérou, Nicolas; Soubeyran, Raphaël
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  CEE-M, Center for Environmental Economics, Montpellier

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 643
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: February 1, 2021
    Series: CEE-M working paper ; 2021, 02
    Subjects: incentives; coordination; principal; agents; social comparisons
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten)