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Displaying results 1 to 3 of 3.

  1. Freedom
    why? a mechanism design approach
    Author: Grüner, Hans Peter
    Published: 09 July 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Access:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18281
    Subjects: Personal freedom; private sphere; rule of law; mech-anism design; participation constraints; abuse of power; vaccination; freedom of speech
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten)
  2. Efficient incentives with social preferences
    Author: Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph
    Published: June 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents' social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents' participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263714
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9784 (2022)
    Subjects: mechanism design; social preferences; Bayesian implementation; participation constraints; participation stimulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Efficient incentives with social preferences
    Author: Daske, Thomas; March, Christoph
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Bamberg Economic Research Group, Bamberg University, Bamberg

    This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 19
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This study explores mechanism design with allocation-based social preferences. Agents’ social preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information. We assume quasi-linear utility and independent types. We show how the asymmetry of information about agents’ social preferences can be operationalized to satisfy agents’ participation constraints. Our main result is a possibility result for groups of at least three agents: If endowments are sufficiently large, any such group can resolve any given allocation problem with an ex-post budget-balanced mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783949224010
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/261339
    Series: BERG working paper series ; no. 180 (June 2022)
    Subjects: Mechanism design; social preferences; Bayesian implementation; participation constraints; participation stimulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten), Illustrationen