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  1. Compellingness in Nash implementation
    Author: Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Salles Ramos, Paulo Daniel
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  Singapore Management University, Singapore

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 850
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    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: SMU economics and statistics working paper series ; paper no. 2022, 10
    Subjects: implementation; compelling equilibria; ordinality; mixed strategies; Nash equilibrium
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten)
  2. Disequilibrium play in tennis
    Author: Anderson, Axel; Rosen, Jeremy; Rust, John; Wong, Kin-Ping
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  SSRN, [S.l.] ; Georgetown University, Department of Economics, Washington, DC

    Are the serves of the world’s best tennis pros consistent with the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies? We analyze their serve direction choices (to the receiver’s left, right or body) with data from an online database... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
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    Are the serves of the world’s best tennis pros consistent with the theoretical predictions of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies? We analyze their serve direction choices (to the receiver’s left, right or body) with data from an online database called the Match Charting Project. Using a new methodology, we test and decisively reject a key implication of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, namely, that the probability of winning a service game is the same for all serve directions. We also use dynamic programming (DP) to numerically solve for the best-response serve strategies in models of the service game of tennis estimated for individual server-receiver pairs, such as Novak Djokovic serving to Rafael Nadal. We show that for most elite professional servers, the DP serve strategy significantly increases their service game win probability compared to the mixed strategies they actually use, which we estimate using flexible reduced-form logit models. Stochastic simulations verify that our results are robust to estimation error

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Working papers / Georgetown University, Department of Economics ; 23-23-03
    Subjects: tennis; games; Nash equilibrium; Minimax theorem; constant sum games; mixed strategies; dynamic directional games; binary Markov games; dynamic programming; structural estimation; muscle memory; magnification effect
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 84 Seiten)
    Notes:

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments March 9, 2023 erstellt
  3. Disequilibrium play in tennis
    Author: Anderson, Axel; Rosen, Jeremy; Rust, John; Wong, Kin-Ping
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Georgetown University, Department of Economics, Washington, DC

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 545
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Georgetown University, Department of Economics ; 21, 07
    Subjects: tennis; games; Nash equilibrium; Minimax theorem; constant sum games; mixed strategies; dynamic directional games; binary Markov games; dynamic programming; structural estimation; muscle memory
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 63 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Compellingness in Nash implementation
    Author: Chatterji, Shurojit; Kunimoto, Takashi; Ramos, Paulo
    Published: February 2024
    Publisher:  Singapore Management University, Singapore

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 850
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This Version: February 2024
    Series: SMU economics and statistics working paper series ; paper no. 2024, 02
    Subjects: implementation; ordinality; mixed strategies; Nash equilibrium; uncompelling mixed strategy equilibria
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 62 Seiten)