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Displaying results 1 to 10 of 10.

  1. Envy and compassion in tournaments
    Published: Nov. 2002
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Bonn

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: [Elektronische Ressource]
    Series: Bonn econ discussion papers ; 2002,32
    Subjects: Erwerbsverlauf; Wettbewerb; Spieltheorie; Leistungsmotivation; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie; Tournament; inequity aversion
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 25 p., text, ill
  2. Express yourself: the price of fairness in a simple distribution game
    Author: Nicklisch, Andreas
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  Max-Planck-Inst. for Research into Economic Systems, Strategic Interaction Group, Jena

    Location:
    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
    Signature:
    2005 SB 83
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 1433 (2004.36)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Papers on strategic interaction ; 2004,36
    Subjects: Verhandlungstheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Experiment; inequity aversion
    Scope: 20 Bl
    Notes:
  3. Urban income inequality and social welfare
    Author: Koster, Paul
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    When income inequality increases when average income levels increase, rises in average income levels might result in inequality costs. This paper develops marginal social welfare measures that account for the possibility that income inequality... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 432
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    When income inequality increases when average income levels increase, rises in average income levels might result in inequality costs. This paper develops marginal social welfare measures that account for the possibility that income inequality changes when average income levels change. Applications are given for the city of Amsterdam, The Netherlands. For this city, the income elasticity of the Gini is estimated in the range 0.25-0.48. Estimates of marginal welfare changes vary greatly with model choice. For plausible cases, estimates can be negative, raising doubts whether average income increases are beneficial in rich urban areas with high valuations of equality where income inequality increases in income.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273820
    Edition: Version: March 2023
    Series: Array ; TI 2023, 009
    Subjects: Social welfare; income inequality; inequity aversion; post-growth
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  4. Social reference points and real-effort provision
    Author: Maus, Patrick; Montero, María; Sefton, Martin
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  CeDEx, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, University of Nottingham, Nottingham

    We report a laboratory experiment testing whether social reference points impact effort provision. Subjects are randomly assigned the role of worker or peer and the worker observes the peer's earnings before participating in a real-effort task.... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 175
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    We report a laboratory experiment testing whether social reference points impact effort provision. Subjects are randomly assigned the role of worker or peer and the worker observes the peer's earnings before participating in a real-effort task. Between treatments, we exogenously manipulate peer earnings. We find that the workers recall the earnings of their peer and are less satisfied with their own earnings when their peer earns more. Despite this, we do not observe a treatment effect in effort choices. Thus, although our subjects appear to care about income differentials, this does not translate to a change in behavior in our incentivized environment. We relate our results to recent studies of inequality and effort provision.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/284278
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2023, 03
    Subjects: social comparisons; reference-dependent preferences; real-effortprovision; inequity aversion; relative income concerns
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Envy and compassion in tournaments
    Author: Grund, Christian
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1194 (647)
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    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
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    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    Signature:
    98/464 B-647
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 647
    Subjects: Erwerbsverlauf; Wettbewerb; Spieltheorie; Leistungsmotivation; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie; Tournament; inequity aversion
    Scope: 25 S., graph. Darst.
  6. Burden sharing emissions and climate change
    a theoretic welfare approach
    Author: Osmani, Dritan
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  [Univ., Forschungsstelle Nachhaltige Umweltentwicklung], [Hamburg]

    Location:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Working paper / FNU] ; [172]
    Subjects: Klimaschutz; Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Nord-Süd-Beziehungen; Einkommenselastizität der Nachfrage; Gerechtigkeit; Theorie; inequity aversion
    Scope: Online-Ressource (26 S.), graph. Darst.
  7. Meta-analysis of inequality aversion estimates
    Author: Nunnari, Salvatore; Pozzi, Maximilian Joseph
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We conduct an interdisciplinary meta-analysis to aggregate the knowledge from empirical estimates of inequality aversion reported from 1999 to 2022. In particular, we examine 85 estimates of disadvantageous inequality aversion (or envy) and... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    We conduct an interdisciplinary meta-analysis to aggregate the knowledge from empirical estimates of inequality aversion reported from 1999 to 2022. In particular, we examine 85 estimates of disadvantageous inequality aversion (or envy) and advantageous inequality aversion (or guilt) from 26 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience and computer science that structurally estimate the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model of social preferences. Our meta-analysis supports the presence of inequality concerns: the mean envy coefficient is 0:426 with a 95% probability that the true value lies in the interval [0:240; 0:620]; the mean guilt coefficient is 0:290 with a 95% probability that the true value lies in the interval [0:212; 0:366]. Moreover, we observe high levels of heterogeneity, both across studies and across individuals, with estimated parameters sensitive to the experimental task and the subject population.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263781
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9851 (2022)
    Subjects: social preferences; inequality aversion; inequity aversion; envy; guilt; meta-analysis; multi-level random-effects model; Bayesian hierarchical model
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
    Author: Bester, Helmut
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 553
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    This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/244327
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 287 (October 18, 2021)
    Subjects: Fairness; inequity aversion; bargaining; ultimatum game; matchingmarket; search costs; competitive equilibrium
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Estimating social preferences using stated satisfaction: novel support for inequity aversion
    Author: Diaz, Lina; Houser, Daniel; Ifcher, John; Zarghamee, Homa S.
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In this paper, we use stated satisfaction to estimate social preferences: subjects report their satisfaction with payment-profiles that hold their own payment constant while varying another subject's payment. This approach yields significant support... more

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    DS 4
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    In this paper, we use stated satisfaction to estimate social preferences: subjects report their satisfaction with payment-profiles that hold their own payment constant while varying another subject's payment. This approach yields significant support for the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). This model is among the most renowned in behavioral economics, positing a generalized aversion to inequality that is stronger when one's own payoff is lower - rather than higher - than others'; i.e., "envy" is stronger than "guilt." While aggregate-level estimates based on revealed preferences in laboratory games have supported the model, the assumption that guilt is stronger than envy is often violated at the individual level. This paradox may be due to limitations of the revealed-preference approach. An advantage of avoiding games is that eliciting stated satisfaction is relatively easy to implement and is less prone to being confounded with motives like reciprocity; also the absence of tradeoffs between own and others' payoffs is cognitively less demanding for subjects. Our unstructured approach does not limit the expression of social preferences to inequity aversion, yet our methodology yields significant support for it. At the individual level, 86% of subjects exhibit at least as strong envy as guilt, and 76% (65%) of subjects weakly (strongly) adhere to the model. Our individual-level estimates are robust to changing the value of one's own constant payment and to changing the range of the other subject's payments. Methodologically, eliciting satisfaction can be an easy-to-implement complement to choice-based preference-measures in contexts other than social preferences that are of interest to economists

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236378
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14347
    Subjects: inequity aversion; social preferences; stated satisfaction; laboratory experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
    Author: Bester, Helmut
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin

    This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 79
    Inter-library loan:
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    This paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches theWalrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235647
    Series: Array ; 2021, 11
    Subjects: Fairness; inequity aversion; bargaining; ultimatum game; matching market; search costs; competitive equilibrium
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen