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  1. Spatial models of heterogeneous switching costs
    Author: Siciliani, Paolo; Beckert, Walter
    Published: November 2017
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 689
    Subjects: Switching costs; unengaged ‘sticky’ customers; spatial linear model; uniform pricing; history-based price discrimination; ‘leakage’
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. History-based price discrimination with imperfect information accuracy and asymmetric market shares
    Author: Colombo, Stefano; Graziano, Clara; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy.... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    The paper considers a duopoly model in which firms inherited asymmetric market shares and history-based price discrimination is viable. However, firms can identify only a share of their own consumers depending to the degree of information accuracy. We derive the pricing strategies and we analyze the relationship between information accuracy and asymmetric market shares, showing under which circumstances there exists an equilibrium in pure strategies. We show that history-based price discrimination makes the dominant firm’s profits always lower than those of the rival, with an ambiguous effect of the information accuracy on industry profits. Moreover, we prove that the level of information accuracy has a decreasing effect on social welfare, while it affects consumer surplus non-monotonically, according to the size of asymmetry in the inherited market shares.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235419
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9049 (2021)
    Subjects: history-based price discrimination; information accuracy; asymmetric market shares
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen