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  1. Rationalizing the Dodd-Frank clawback
    Published: 09/2016
    Publisher:  Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA

    On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives'... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    No inter-library loan

     

    On July 1, 2015, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) proposed an excess-pay clawback rule to implement the provisions of Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act. I explain why the SEC's proposed Dodd-Frank clawback, while reducing executives' incentives to misreport, is overbroad. The economy and investors would be better served by a more narrowly targeted “smart” excess-pay clawback that focuses on fewer issuers, executives, and compensation arrangements

     

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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: Discussion paper / Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business ; no. 876
    European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper ; No. 314/2016
    ECGI working paper series in law ; 314 (May 2016)
    Subjects: Executive pay; Dodd Frank; clawback; excess pay; securities regulation; misreporting; recovery; erroneously awarded compensation; restatement; accounting; financial reporting; financial results; manipulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 76 Seiten)
  2. Disclosure deregulation of quarterly reporting
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In this article, we investigate the deregulation efforts resulting from the 2015 transposition of the EU’s Transparency Directive into German law and analyze whether a reduction in the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting increases... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 63
    No inter-library loan

     

    In this article, we investigate the deregulation efforts resulting from the 2015 transposition of the EU’s Transparency Directive into German law and analyze whether a reduction in the minimum content requirements for quarterly reporting increases information asymmetries and decreases firm value. Using a novel dataset of firms that are listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, our results reveal that over the period from 2012 to 2019, lower quarterly reporting levels on average have increased information asymmetry and reduced firm value. We find that this effect is stronger for second-tier stocks and firms with low media coverage. Our results are robust to potential selection effects regarding firms’ choice of quarterly reporting content levels.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248889
    Edition: This version: October 5, 2021
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9344 (2021)
    Subjects: quarterly reporting; disclosure deregulation; financial reporting; interim management statement; transparency directive
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen