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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Competitors' reactions to big tech acquisitions
    evidence from mobile apps
    Author: Affeldt, Pauline Luise; Kesler, Reinhold
    Published: 9. Dezember 2021
    Publisher:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target... more

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    Bundesverfassungsgericht, Bibliothek
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    Online-Ressource
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 14
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Since 2010, Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, and Microsoft (GAFAM) have acquired more than 400 companies. Competition authorities did not scrutinize most of these transactions and blocked none. This raised concerns that GAFAM acquisitions target potential competitors yet fly under the radar of current merger control due to the features of the digital economy. We empirically study the competitive effects of big tech acquisitions on competitors in a relevant online market. We identify acquisitions by GAFAM involving apps from 2015 to 2019, matching these to a comprehensive database covering apps available in the Google Play Store. We find that competing apps tend to innovate less following an acquisition by GAFAM, while there seems to be no impact on prices and privacy-sensitive permissions of competing apps. Additionally, we find evidence that affected developers reallocate innovation efforts to unaffected apps and that affected markets experience less entry post-acquisition.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249161
    Series: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1987
    Subjects: mergers and acquisitions; digital markets; GAFAM; apps; innovation; privacy; event study
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (39 Seiten), Diagramme
  2. All-pay competition with captive consumers
    Author: Foucart, Renaud; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, Munich, Germany

    We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 553
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study a game in which two firms compete in quality to serve a market consisting of consumers with different initial consideration sets. If both firms invest below a certain threshold, they only compete for those consumers already aware of their existence. Above this threshold, a firm is visible to all and the highest investment attracts all consumers. On the one hand, the existence of initially captive consumers introduces an anti-competitive element: holding fixed the behavior of its rival, a firm with a larger captive segment enjoys a higher payoff from not investing at all. On the other hand, the fact that a firm’s initially captive consumers can still be attracted by very high quality introduces a pro-competitive element: a high investment becomes more profitable for the underdog when the captive segment of the dominant firm increases. The share of initially captive consumers therefore has a non-monotonic effect on the investment levels of both firms and on consumer surplus. We relate our findings to competition cases in digital markets.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233492
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 268 (January 12, 2021)
    Subjects: consideration set; regulation; all-pay auction; endogenous prize; digital markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Big tech mergers
    Author: Motta, Massimo; Peitz, Martin
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 541
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1198
    Subjects: Merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten)
  4. Shelving or developing?
    the acquisition of potential competitors under financial constraints
    Author: Fumagalli, Chiara; Motta, Massimo; Tarantino, Emanuele
    Published: July 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 541
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1197
    Subjects: Merger policy; digital markets; potential competition; conglomerate mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten)