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Displaying results 1 to 23 of 23.

  1. Explaining escalating fines and prices
    the curse of positive selection
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics, University of St.Gallen, St. Gallen

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    Series: Discussion paper / University of St.Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economics ; no. 2018, 07 (June 2018)
    Subjects: Escalation; repeat offenders; behavior-based pricing; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Whistleblowing vs random audit
    an experimental test of relative effciency
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Unite de formation et de recherche d'economie, Montpellier

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    VS 333 (2017,04)
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    Series: Document de recherche / Laboratoire montpelliérain d'économie théorique et appliquée ; DR no 2017, 04
    Subjects: tax evasion; tax compliance; deterrence; detection; audit policy; denouncement; laboratory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Public law enforcers and political competition
    Published: [2015]
    Publisher:  Université de Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, Nanterre

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    VS 334 (2015,40)
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    Series: Working paper / EconomiX ; 2015, 40
    Subjects: public law enforcement; deterrence; monetary sanctions; electoral competition
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Criminal court fees, earnings, and expenditures
    a multi-state RD analysis of survey and administrative data
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  U.S. Census Bureau, Center for Economic Studies, Washington, DC

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    Series: Working papers / Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau ; 23, 06 (February 2023)
    Subjects: criminal justice; fines; deterrence; recidivism; labor market outcomes
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Nudging for prompt tax penalty payment
    evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia
    Published: December 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We conducted a randomised controlled trial in Indonesia to evaluate the effect of three intervention letters on tax penalty compliance behaviour. Over 10,000 individual taxpayers are randomly assigned to receive either a deterrence, information, or... more

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    We conducted a randomised controlled trial in Indonesia to evaluate the effect of three intervention letters on tax penalty compliance behaviour. Over 10,000 individual taxpayers are randomly assigned to receive either a deterrence, information, or simplification letter, or no letter. Our results indicate that simplification, which makes paying a penalty less burdensome administratively by providing billing codes to pay the penalties, yields the highest probability of timely settlement, increasing compliance by 32 per cent compared to the control group. Deterrence also positively impacts penalty compliance, increasing timely settlement rates by 27 per cent. The least effective intervention is the information letter. Although associated with a 12 per cent increase in tax compliance, this effect is only statistically significant at the 10 per cent confidence level. Our results suggest that strategic messaging by tax authorities in developing countries can be a cost-effective tool for improving tax penalty payment compliance.

     

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    hdl: 10419/282524
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10836 (2023)
    Subjects: tax penalties; tax compliance; RCT; simplification; deterrence; information; Indonesia
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten)
  6. Common trends in the US state-level crime
    what do panel data say?
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Venice Italy

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    Series: Working paper / Ca' Foscari University of Venice, Department of Economics ; 2016, no. 14
    Subjects: rime; deterrence; inequality; unemployment; panel cointegration; cross- section dependence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The microeconomics of corruption
    a review of thirty years of research
    Published: May 2016
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 908
    Subjects: corruption; bribes; deterrence; Bureaucracy; competition; game theory; mechanism design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 54 Seiten)
  8. Unilateral practices, antitrust enforcement and commitments
    Published: 25 March 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17140
    Subjects: Antitrust enforcement; commitment; Remedies; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Unilateral practices, antitrust enforcement and commitments
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1316
    Subjects: Antitrust enforcement; commitment; remedies; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten)
    Notes:

    Richtiger Name der ersten Verfasser:in: Michele Polo

  10. Deterrence or backlash?
    arrests and the dynamics of domestic violence
    Published: January 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    There is a vigorous debate on whether arrests for domestic violence (DV) will deter future abuse or create a retaliatory backlash. We study how arrests affect the dynamics of DV using administrative data for over 124,000 DV emergency calls (999... more

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    There is a vigorous debate on whether arrests for domestic violence (DV) will deter future abuse or create a retaliatory backlash. We study how arrests affect the dynamics of DV using administrative data for over 124,000 DV emergency calls (999 calls) for West Midlands, the second most populous county in England. We take advantage of conditional random assignment of officers to a case by call handlers, combined with systematic differences across police officers in their propensity to arrest suspected batterers. We find that an arrest reduces future DV calls in the ensuing year by 51%. This reduction is not driven by reduced reporting due to fear of retaliation, but instead a decline in repeat victimization. We reach this conclusion based on a threshold reporting model and its testable implications regarding (i) the severity of repeat DV calls and (ii) victim versus third-party reporting. Exploring mechanisms, we find that arrest virtually eliminates the large spike in re-victimization which occurs in the 48 hours after a call, consistent with arrest facilitating a cooling off period during a volatile, at-risk time. In the longer run, we estimate a sizeable deterrence effect. Substantiating this, arrest increases the probability an offender is charged with a crime. Our findings argue against recent calls for a decriminalization of domestic violence and suggest the optimal police response is to lower the threshold for arrest.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271849
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10205 (2023)
    Subjects: domestic violence; arrest; deterrence; repeat victimization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Deterrence or backlash?
    arrests and the dynamics of domestic violence
    Published: 25 January 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Language: English
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    Series: Array ; DP17851
    Subjects: Domestic violence; arrest; deterrence; repeat victimization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Deterrence or backlash?
    arrests and the dynamics of domestic violence
    Published: January 2023
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    There is a vigorous debate on whether arrests for domestic violence (DV) will deter future abuse or create a retaliatory backlash. We study how arrests affect the dynamics of DV using administrative data for over 124,000 DV emergency calls (999... more

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    There is a vigorous debate on whether arrests for domestic violence (DV) will deter future abuse or create a retaliatory backlash. We study how arrests affect the dynamics of DV using administrative data for over 124,000 DV emergency calls (999 calls) for West Midlands, the second most populous county in England. We take advantage of conditional random assignment of officers to a case by call handlers, combined with systematic differences across police officers in their propensity to arrest suspected batterers. We find that an arrest reduces future DV calls in the ensuing year by 51%. This reduction is not driven by reduced reporting due to fear of retaliation, but instead a decline in repeat victimization. We reach this conclusion based on a threshold reporting model and its testable implications regarding (i) the severity of repeat DV calls and (ii) victim versus third-party reporting. Exploring mechanisms, we find that arrest virtually eliminates the large spike in re-victimization which occurs in the 48 hours after a call, consistent with arrest facilitating a cooling off period during a volatile, at-risk time. In the longer run, we estimate a sizeable deterrence effect. Substantiating this, arrest increases the probability an offender is charged with a crime. Our findings argue against recent calls for a decriminalization of domestic violence and suggest the optimal police response is to lower the threshold for arrest.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272483
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15856
    Subjects: domestic violence; arrest; deterrence; repeat victimization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Honesty nudges
    effect varies with content but not with timing
    Published: January 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an... more

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    We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual's dishonesty strengthens the effect of the intervention. Both types of intervention are similarly effective when they take place before an individual has made any decision or after individuals have played five rounds of the mind game. Nudging an individual after they have made five decisions allows us to add personalized information based on the individual's previous response; however, this does not increase honesty. Examining the reaction to nudges based on previous behavior shows that (presumably) honest and dishonest individuals respond by reducing overreporting. The effect of the different nudge content is driven by those previously dishonest.

     

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    hdl: 10419/271865
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10221 (2023)
    Subjects: dishonesty; lying; cheating; honesty nudge; moral reminder; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Learning by litigating
    an application to antitrust commitments
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  EconomiX - UMR7235, Université Paris Nanterre, Nanterre

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    Series: Working paper / EconomiX ; 2021, 37
    Subjects: antitrust; commitments; deterrence; legal learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Addressing environmental justice through in-kind court settlements
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  [University of Calgary, Department of Economics], [Calgary]

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    Series: [Working papers] / [University of Calgary, Department of Economics] ; [2021, 01]
    Subjects: environmental justice; corporate penalties; deterrence; social welfare weights
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Do police make too many arrests?
    the effect of enforcement pullbacks on crime
    Published: December 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Do reductions in arrests increase crime? We study line-of-duty deaths of police officers, events that likely impact police behavior through increased fear but are unlikely to directly impact civilian behavior. Officer deaths cause significant... more

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    Do reductions in arrests increase crime? We study line-of-duty deaths of police officers, events that likely impact police behavior through increased fear but are unlikely to directly impact civilian behavior. Officer deaths cause significant short-term reductions in all arrest types, with the largest reductions in arrests for lower-level offenses. In contrast, we find no evidence of an increase in crime or a change in victim reporting through 911 calls. There is also no apparent threshold of arrest decline beyond which crime increases. Our findings suggest that enforcement activity can be reduced at the margin without incurring public safety costs.

     

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/250568
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14907
    Subjects: policing; crime; deterrence; broken windows; Ferguson effect; community trust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 87 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. The impact of the first professional police forces on crime
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    This paper evaluates the effect on crime of creating a fundamental modern-day institution: centralized professional police forces tasked with preventing crime. We study the 1829 formation of the London Metropolitan Police - the first professional... more

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    This paper evaluates the effect on crime of creating a fundamental modern-day institution: centralized professional police forces tasked with preventing crime. We study the 1829 formation of the London Metropolitan Police - the first professional force worldwide. Using newly digitized and geocoded crime and police data together with difference-indifferences and pre-post designs, we find evidence of a significant reduction in violent crimes (despite the possibility of off-setting increases in clearance and reporting rates). In contrast, a reduction in property crime is not visible.

     

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    hdl: 10419/228856
    Edition: This version: January 07, 2021
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 053 (January 2021)
    Subjects: police; crime; deterrence; economic history; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Environmental regulation in Mexico
    evidnece from inspections and fines of major toxic polluters
    Published: junio 2019
    Publisher:  Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas A.C., Álvaro Obregón, Ciudad de México, México

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11651/3679
    Series: [Documentos de trabajo] / Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, División de Economía ; número 616
    Subjects: deterrence; environmental compliance; inspections and fines; developing countries; global South
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  19. Crime and (a preference for) punishment
    the effects of drug policy reform on policing activity
    Published: June 25, 2021
    Publisher:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am... more

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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am able to shed light on enforcement behavior. I find that in parts of a city where drug penalties were weakened, there is a 13% decrease in drug arrests within a year; there is no displacement of non-drug offenses and majority black neighborhoods have a larger decline in drug arrests. If offenders were significantly deterred by harsher penalties, as the law intended and Becker’s (1968) model predicts, there should have been an increase in drug arrests. My results are therefore consistent with police treating enforcement effort and punishment severity as complementary. I also find that citywide crime and drug use do not increase following the weakening of drug penalties; this calls into question the "War on Drugs" view of punishment and suggests that certain types enforcement can be reduced without incurring large public safety costs

     

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    Series: ERID working paper ; number 303
    Subjects: crime; enforcement; deterrence; punishment; enhanced penalty zones
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. The impact of the first professional police forces on crime
    Published: October 2019
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Göteborg

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2077/62225
    Edition: This version: October 9, 2019
    Series: Working paper in economics ; no. 779
    Subjects: police; crime; deterrence; economic history; institutions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Optimal regulatory enforcement
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  [The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law], [New York, NY]

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    Keine Rechte
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    Series: Amsterdam Law School legal studies research paper ; no. 2023-36
    Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics working paper ; no. 2023-12
    Columbia law and economics working paper ; no. 669
    Subjects: deterrence; compliance; enforcement; participation; sanctions; rewards; carrots; sticks; administrative discretion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. How do people react to income-based fines?
    evidence from speeding tickets discontinuities
    Published: April 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper studies the impact of income-based criminal punishments on crime. In Finland, speeding tickets become income-dependent if the driver’s speed exceeds the speeding limit by more than 20 km/h, leading to a substantial jump in the size of the... more

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    This paper studies the impact of income-based criminal punishments on crime. In Finland, speeding tickets become income-dependent if the driver’s speed exceeds the speeding limit by more than 20 km/h, leading to a substantial jump in the size of the speeding ticket. Contrary to predictions of a traditional Becker model, individuals do not bunch below the fine hike. Instead, the speeding distributions are smooth at the cutoff. However, I demonstrate that the size of the realized speeding ticket has sizable but short-lived impacts on reoffending ex-post. I use a regression discontinuity design to show that fines that are 200 euros larger decrease reoffending by 15 percent in the following six months. After 12 months, the effect disappears. My empirical results are consistent with an explanation that people operate under information frictions. To illustrate this, I construct a Becker model with misperception and learning that can explain all the empirical findings.

     

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    hdl: 10419/296153
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 11064 (2024)
    Subjects: deterrence; learning; optimization frictions; regression discontinuity design; income-based fines
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 75 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. How Bayesian persuasion can help reduce illegal parking and other socially undesirable behavior
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel

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    Series: Discussion paper / The Pinhas Sapir Center for Development ; no. 2021, 8
    Subjects: Bayesian persuasion; deterrence; constrained convexification
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen