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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Minimal balanced collections: generation, applications and generalization
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    VS 832
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Version of October 10, 2022
    Series: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2023, 01
    Subjects: minimal balanced collection; cooperative game; core; stable set; hypergraph; algorithm
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Sign properties and axiomatizations of the weighted division value
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider... more

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    DS 432
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    In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of the class of weighted division values. Firstly, while keeping efficiency, additivity and the nullifying player property from the original axiomatization of the equal division value, we consider relaxations of symmetry in line with Casajus (2019) to characterize the class of (positively) weighted division values. Secondly, we show that the class of weighted division values can also be characterized by replacing linearity in three axiomatizations of B'eal et al. (2016) with additivity. Finally, we show how strengthening an axiom regarding null, non-negative, respectively nullified players in these three axiomatizations, provides three axiomatizations of the class of positively weighted division values.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248786
    Series: Array ; TI 2021, 104
    Subjects: cooperative game; weighted division values; axiomatization; sign properties
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  3. Core stability and other applications of minimal balanced collections
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers on economics ; no. 2022, 4
    Subjects: Core; stable set; minimal balanced collections; cooperative game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  4. Stable source connection and assignment problems as multi-period shortest path problems
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers on economics ; no. 2022, 8
    Subjects: shortest path; demand over multiple periods; cooperative game; core; total-balancedness; source-connection; assignment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Algorithmic aspects of core nonemptiness and core stability
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2021, 28
    Subjects: Core; stable sets; balanced collections; core stability; cooperative game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  6. Player-centered incomplete cooperative games
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, Paris

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Documents de travail du Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ; 2023, 06
    Subjects: cooperative game; incomplete game; Shapley value; core; tau-value
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  7. On weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative games
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based... more

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    We propose and characterize weighted-egalitarian values for cooperative transferable utility games. Each weighted-egalitarian value divides the worth of the grand coalition into two parts and allocates them through equality and proportionality based on exogenous player weights. We characterize the family of all weighted-egalitarian values by employing the standard axioms of efficiency and linearity, in addition to two novel axioms: ω-ratio invariance for symmetric players and symmetry in weights. We then show that relaxing linearity to additivity and adding coalitional monotonicity results in a subfamily of affine combinations of equal division and weighted division values. Furthermore, using an axiom called monotonicity in weights, we characterize the family of convex combinations of equal division and weighted division values.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; TI 2024, 021
    Subjects: cooperative game; axiomatization; equal division value; weighted division value; equality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)