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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 36.

  1. Should they compete or should they cooperate?
    the view of agency theory
    Author: Fleckinger, Pierre; Martimort, David; Roux, Nicolas
    Published: March 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1421
    Subjects: Incentive contracts; moral hazard; teams; competition vs; cooperation; collusion; free riding; tournaments; peer effects; organizational design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 87 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Using list prices to collude or to compete?
    Author: Cussen, Diego; Montero, Juan-Pablo
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  [Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile], [Macul, Santiago, Chile]

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    Series: Documento de trabajo / Instituto de Economia, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile ; 567 (2022)
    Subjects: list prices; collusion; Nash bargaining
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten)
  3. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics and Management "Marco Fanno", University of Padova, Padova

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    Edition: This version: December, 2022
    Series: Marco Fanno working papers ; 295 (December 2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Coordination in the fight against collusion
    Author: Iossa, Elisabetta; Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.; Rey, Patrick
    Published: June 2023
    Publisher:  [Toulouse School of Economics], [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1441
    Subjects: collusion; cartel; auction; procurement; reserves; sustainability and initiation of collusion; coordinated effects
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. How costly are cartels?
    Author: Moreau, Flavien; Panon, Ludovic
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Banca d'Italia Eurosistema, [Rom]

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    Series: Temi di discussione / Banca d'Italia ; number 1413 (June 2023)
    Subjects: competition; cartels; collusion; productivity; welfare; misallocation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 85 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Manufacturer collusion and resale price maintenance
    Author: Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht, Fachgebiet Volkswirtschaftslehre, Siegen, Germany

    We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product.... more

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    We provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance (RPM). In a model with two manufacturers and two retailers, we show that RPM facilitates manufacturer collusion when retailers have alternatives to selling a manufacturer's product. Because of the alternatives, manufacturers can only ensure that retailers sell their products by leaving sufficient retail margins. This restricts the wholesale price level even when the manufacturers collude. RPM allows colluding manufacturers to establish higher prices. The use of renegotiation-proof RPM stabilizes collusion whereas otherwise RPM can decrease the range of discount factors which enable stable collusion.

     
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    Series: Discussion papers in economics ; no. 197, 23 (August 2023)
    Subjects: resale price maintenance; collusion; retailing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten)
  7. Choosing between explicit cartel formation and tacit collusion
    an experiment
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning... more

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    Numerous studies investigate which sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation but little is known as to how these sanctions work. We contribute to understanding the inner workings of cartels by studying experimentally the effect of sanctioning institutions on firms’ communication. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are significantly less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication.

     
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    Edition: This version: August 3, 2020
    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; No. 19
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (55 Seiten, 843 KB), Illustrationen, Diagramme
    Notes:

    Literaturverzeichnis: Seite 26-31
  8. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    Author: Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Andres, Maximillian; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

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    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 53 (October 2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten; 1115 KB), Tabellen, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices
  9. Merchant guilds, taxation and social capital
    Author: Dessí, Roberta; Piccolo, Salvatore
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  TSE, Toulouse

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; 581
    Subjects: merchant guild; social capital; collusion; political economy; trade; taxation
    Scope: Online-Ressource (36 S.)
  10. Health care insurance payment policy when the physician and patient may collude
    Author: Wu, Yaping; Bardey, David; Li, Sanxi
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  TSE, Toulouse

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    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; 572
    Subjects: collusion; falsification; health care insurance; physician payment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (29 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Gender and collusion
    Author: Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A.
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal... more

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    Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms, they largely ignore individual heterogeneity, such as gender differences. We experimentally analyze gender differences in prisoner's dilemmas, where collusive behavior harms a passive third party. In a control treatment, no externality exists. To study the influence of social distance, we compare subjects' collusive behaviour in a within-subjects setting. In the first game, subjects have no information on other players, whereas they are informed about personal characteristics in the second game. Results show that guilt-averse women are significantly less inclined to collude than men when collusion harms a third party. No gender difference can be found in the absence of a negative externality. Interestingly, we find that women are not sensitive to the decision context, i.e., even when social distance is small they hardly behave collusively when collusion harms a third party.

     
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    hdl: 10419/252131
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9614 (2022)
    Subjects: collusion; cartels; competition policy; antitrust; gender differences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash
    a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
    Author: Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 15 February 2022
    Publisher:  CentER, Tilburg University, [Tilburg]

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    Series: Discussion paper / CentER ; no. 2022, 003
    Subjects: Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Colluding against environmental regulation
    Author: Alé-Chilet, Jorge; Chen, Cuicui; Li, Jing; Reynaert, Mathias
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research, Cambridge, MA, USA

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    Series: Working paper series / MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research ; 2022, 002 (January 2022)
    Subjects: collusion; regulation; pollution; automobile market; noncompliance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. How do sanctions work?
    the choice between cartel formation and tacit collusion
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: January 22, 2021
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication... more

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    This paper analyzes the inner workings of cartels. To understand how sanctioning institutions prevent cartel formation we study their effect on firms' communication in a laboratory experiment. Using machine learning to organize the chat communication into topics, we find that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing when sanctioning institutions are present. At the same time, average prices are lower when communication is less explicit. A mediation analysis suggests that sanctions are effective in hindering cartel formation not only because they introduce a risk of being fined but also by reducing the prevalence of explicit price communication

     
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    Series: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 66
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. A theory of partitioned pricing
    Author: Chen, Zhiqi
    Published: March 2, 2022
    Publisher:  Carleton University, Department of Economics, Ottawa, Ontario

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    Series: Carleton economics working papers ; CEWP 22, 02
    Subjects: partitioned pricing; surcharges; duopoly; strategic delegation; collusion
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten)
  16. How should we think about employers' associations?
    Author: Bryson, Alex; Willman, Paul
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We maintain that employer associations are a specific form of employer collusion that is overt, formal and labour market focused which encompasses but is by no means confined to collective bargaining. We consider the conditions under which this form... more

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    We maintain that employer associations are a specific form of employer collusion that is overt, formal and labour market focused which encompasses but is by no means confined to collective bargaining. We consider the conditions under which this form of collusion might emerge, and how it might develop. Since the context is the decline of employers' associations in collective bargaining, we look at how collective bargaining involvement (and its disappearance) might relate to the growth or decline of other forms of collusion in areas such as product and financial markets, and political influence. Our central contention is that employers' associations continue to perform an important role in helping employers set the terms of trade, albeit one that has adapted to the demise of sectoral bargaining.

     
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    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15467
    Subjects: employers' associations; collusion; collective bargaining
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  17. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    a machine learning approach
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  DIW Berlin, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel... more

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    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

     
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    hdl: 10419/251797
    Series: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 2000
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Collusion by algorithm: the role of unobserved actions
    Author: Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the... more

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    We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question. Moreover, our analysis reveals a dual role of improving forecasting ability when actions are not observable. Deviations become more tempting, reducing profits, but also uncertainty concerning deviations is increasingly eliminated. This results in a u-shaped relationship between profits and prediction ability. When prediction ability is perfect, the ‘observable actions’ case emerges.

     
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    hdl: 10419/252146
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9629 (2022)
    Subjects: algorithm; collusion; demand forecasting; unobservable actions; secret price cutting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    Author: Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Andres, Maximillian; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Universität Potsdam, Potsdam

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    Series: CEPA discussion papers ; no. 53 (October 2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; experiment; machine learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (67 Seiten; 1115 KB), Tabellen, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices
  20. Artificial collusion
    examining supracompetitive pricing by Q-learning algorithms
    Author: Boer, Arnoud V. den; Meylahn, Janusz M.; Schinkel, Maarten-Pieter
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    We examine recent claims that a particular Q-learning algorithm used by competitors 'autonomously' and systematically learns to collude, resulting in supracompetitive prices and extra profits for the firms sustained by collusive equilibria. A... more

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    We examine recent claims that a particular Q-learning algorithm used by competitors 'autonomously' and systematically learns to collude, resulting in supracompetitive prices and extra profits for the firms sustained by collusive equilibria. A detailed analysis of the inner workings of this algorithm reveals that there is no immediate reason for alarm. We set out what is needed to demonstrate the existence of a colluding price algorithm that does form a threat to competition.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265843
    Series: Array ; TI 2022, 067
    Subjects: collusion; Q-learning; algorithm; pricing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 50 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Collusion sustainability with a capacity constrained firm
    Author: Madio, Leonardo; Pignataro, Aldo
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive... more

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    We study an infinitely repeated oligopoly game in which firms compete on quantity and one of them is capacity constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little incentive to deviate from a cartel. We also present conditions for the emergence of a partial cartel, with the capacity constrained firm being excluded by the large firms or self-excluded. In the latter case, we show under which circumstances the small firm induces a partial conspiracy that is Pareto-dominant. Implications for cartel identification and enforcement are finally discussed.

     
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    hdl: 10419/271814
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10170 (2022)
    Subjects: antitrust; capacity constraints; collusion; partial cartel
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. The sociology of cartels
    Author: Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on... more

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    Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop structures that allow them to establish trust and ensure cooperation. We analyze 15 German cartels, focusing on the individual participants, the communication and internal structures within the cartels as well as their breakup. Our results indicate that cartel members are highly homogeneous and often rely on existing networks within the industry. Most impressively, only two of the 156 individuals involved in these 15 cartels were female, suggesting that gender also plays a role for cartel formation. We further identify various forms of communication and divisions of responsibilities and show that leniency programs are a powerful tool in breaking up cartels. Based on these results we discuss implications for competition policy and further research.

     
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    hdl: 10419/265949
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9914 (2022)
    Subjects: cartels; collusion; social networks; trust; antitrust
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Optimal influence sale
    Author: Yoo, Seung Han
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Institute of Economic Research, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 787
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / [The Institute of Economic Research, Korea University] ; no. 20, 02 (April, 2020)
    Subjects: Sale of influence; collusion; optimal mechanism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Human-algorithm interaction
    algorithmic pricing in hybrid laboratory markets
    Author: Normann, Hans-Theo; Sternberg, Martin
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf, Germany

    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player... more

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    This paper investigates pricing in laboratory markets when human players interact with an algorithm. We compare the degree of competition when exclusively humans interact to the case of one firm delegating its decisions to an algorithm, an n-player generalization of tit-for-tat. We further vary whether participants know about the presence of the algorithm. When one of three firms in a market is an algorithm, we observe significantly higher prices compared to human-only markets. Firms employing an algorithm earn significantly less profit than their rivals. (Un)certainty about the actual presence of an algorithm does not significantly affect collusion, although humans do seem to perceive algorithms as more disruptive.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783863043919
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265530
    Series: Discussion paper / Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ; no 392
    Subjects: algorithms; collusion; human-computer interaction; labora-tory experiments
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion
    a machine learning approach
    Author: Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana
    Published: October 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel... more

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    DS 63
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    This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly about price fixing and more likely to use indirect messages when sanctioning institutions are present. This effect of sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach and sustain without an explicit agreement. Indirect messages have no, or even a negative, effect on prices.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/267257
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10024 (2022)
    Subjects: cartel; collusion; communication; machine learning; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 69 Seiten), Illustrationen