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  1. Bank competition and stability in the United Kingdom
    Published: August 2018
    Publisher:  Bank of England, London

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Staff working paper / Bank of England ; no. 748
    Subjects: Bank competition; bank stability; Boone indicator; Lerner index
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Public money as a store of value, heterogeneous beliefs, and banks
    implications of CBDC
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The bulk of euro-denominated cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 534
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    The bulk of euro-denominated cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic prefer to hold cash. In our model, the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value that is superior to cash leads to bank disintermediation as some depositors opt for switching to CBDC based on their beliefs. While CBDC partially replaces deposits, long-term lending decreases less than proportionally as remaining depositors are, on average, more optimistic about bank stability and banks re-balance their portfolio accordingly. The appropriate calibration of CBDC design features such as remuneration and quantity limits can mitigate these effects. We study the individual and social welfare implications of introducing CBDC as a store of value.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289959971
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278477
    Series: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2801 (March 2023)
    Subjects: Cash; central bank digital currency; bank disintermediation; bank stability; welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Firm subsidies, financial intermediation, and bank stability
    Published: [26. Oktober 2022]
    Publisher:  Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, Halle (Saale), Germany

    We use granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study whether government subsidies to firms affect the quantity and quality of bank lending. We combine the universe of recipient... more

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
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    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 13
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    We use granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development program in German history to study whether government subsidies to firms affect the quantity and quality of bank lending. We combine the universe of recipient firms under the Improvement of Regional Economic Structures program (GRW) with their local banks during 1998-2019. The modalities of GRW subsidies to firms are determined at the EU level. Therefore, we use it to identify bank outcomes. Banks with relationships to more subsidized firms exhibit higher lending volumes without any significant differences in bank stability. Subsidized firms, in turn, borrow more indicating that banks facilitate regional economic development policies.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265427
    Series: IWH discussion papers ; 2022, no. 24 (October 2022)
    Subjects: bank stability; financial intermediation; government subsidies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (III, 56 Seiten, 6,54 MB), Diagramme
  4. Firm subsidies, financial intermediation, and bank risk
    Published: [27. Januar 2022]
    Publisher:  Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH) - Member of the Leibniz Association, Halle (Saale), Germany

    We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional ... more

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    Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle, Bibliothek
    No inter-library loan
    Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek Sachsen-Anhalt / Zentrale
    eBook
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 13
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study whether government subsidies can stimulate bank funding of marginal investment projects and the associated effect on financial stability. We do so by exploiting granular project-level information for the largest regional economic development programme in Germany since 1997: the Improvement of Regional Eco-nomic Structures programme (GRW). By combining the universe of subsidised firms to virtually all German local banks over the period 1998-2019, we test whether this large-scale transfer programme destabilised regional credit markets. Because GRW subsidies to firms are destabilised at the EU level, we can use it as an exogenous shock to identify bank responses. On average, firm subsidies do not affect bank lending, but reduce banks’ distance to default. Average effects conflate important bank-level heterogeneity though. Conditional on various bank traits, we show that well capita-lised banks with more industry experience expand lending when being exposed to subsidised firms without exhibiting more risky financial profiles. Our results thus indicate that stable banks can act as an important facilitator of regional economic development policies. Against the backdrop of pervasive transfer payments to mitigate Covid-19 losses and in light of far-reaching transformation policies requiredto green the economy, our study bears important implications as to whether and which banks to incorporate into the design of transfer programmes.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249334
    Series: IWH discussion papers ; 2022, no. 2 (January 2022)
    Subjects: bank stability; financial intermediation; government subsidies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (III, 47 Seiten, 5,57 MB), Diagramme
  5. Public money as a store of value, heterogeneous beliefs and banks
    implications of CBDC
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  European Systemic Risk Board, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    The bulk of cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty and only a fraction of the population choosing to hoard cash. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 611
    No inter-library loan

     

    The bulk of cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty and only a fraction of the population choosing to hoard cash. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Only consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic about bank stability hold cash. The introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value lowers the storage cost of public money and induces partial bank disintermediation, which is nevertheless mitigated by an increase in relative maturity transformation. This has heterogeneous welfare consequences across the population. While cash holders always benefit by switching to CBDC, each of all other consumers may be better off or not depending on the probability of a bank run, her (and all others') belief about such probability and the degree of technological superiority of CBDC.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789294723581
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283547
    Series: Working paper series / ESRB, European Systemic Risk Board, European System of Financial Supervision ; no 146
    Subjects: Cash hoarding; central bank digital currency; disagreement; uncertainty shocks; flight-to-safety; bank stability; welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen