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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Lending organization and credit supply during the 2008-09 crisis
    Author: Del Prete, Silvia; Pagnini, Marcello; Rossi, Paola; Vacca, Valerio
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Banca d'Italia Eurosistema, [Rom]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 450 (1108)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Temi di discussione / Banca d'Italia ; number 1108 (April 2017)
    Subjects: banking organization; lending techniques; financial crisis; bank heterogeneity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Regulatory competition in capital standards with selection effects among banks
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Maier, Ulf
    Published: August 2016
    Publisher:  Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, Oxford

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation ; wp 16, 12
    Subjects: regulatory competition; capital requirements; bank heterogeneity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Voluntary equity, project risk, and capital requirements
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Lülfesmann, Christoph
    Published: January 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporate a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporate a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In the optimum, banks with lower monitoring costs are larger, choose riskier portfolios, and have less equity. Binding capital requirements or levies on bank borrowing are shown to make higher-risk portfolios more attractive. Accounting for banks’ interior capital choices can thus explain why higher capital ratios incentivize banks to undertake riskier projects.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/252022
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9505 (2022)
    Subjects: voluntary equity; capital requirements; bank heterogeneity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Voluntary equity, project risk, and capital requirements
    Author: Haufler, Andreas; Lülfesmann, Christoph
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporates a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 553
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporates a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In this setting, banks with lower monitoring costs are larger, choose riskier portfolios, and have less equity. Moreover, binding capital requirements or levies on bank borrowing are shown to make higher-risk portfolios more attractive. Accounting for banks' interior capital choices can thus explain why higher capital ratios incentivize banks to undertake riskier projects.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282049
    Edition: This version: December 2022
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 357 (December 27, 2022)
    Subjects: voluntary equity; capital requirements; bank heterogeneity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Bank concentration and monetary policy pass-through
    Author: Gödl-Hanisch, Isabel
    Published: April 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    This paper analyzes the implications of the gradual rise in bank concentration since the 1990s for the transmission of monetary policy. I use branch-level data on deposit and loan rates to evaluate the monetary policy pass-through conditional on the... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper analyzes the implications of the gradual rise in bank concentration since the 1990s for the transmission of monetary policy. I use branch-level data on deposit and loan rates to evaluate the monetary policy pass-through conditional on the level of local bank concentration and bank capitalization. I find that banks operating in high-concentration markets and under-capitalized banks adjust short-term lending rates more. I then build a theoretical model with heterogeneous banks that rationalizes the empirical findings and explains the underlying mechanism. In the model, monopolistic competition in local deposit and loan markets, along with bank capital requirements, lead to frictions on the pass-through to the real economy. Counterfactual analyses highlight that the rise in bank concentration alters monetary policy pass-through by two channels: the market power and capital allocation channels. Both channels further strengthen monetary policy transmission to output and investment, amplify the credit cycle, and flatten the Phillips curve.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272022
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10378 (2023)
    Subjects: monetary transmission; bank heterogeneity; monopolistic competition; bank regulation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 65 Seiten), Illustrationen