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  1. Technology beats capital sharing the carbon price burden in federal Europe
    Author: Roolfs, Christina; Gaitan Soto, Beatriz; Edenhofer, Ottmar; Lessmann, Kai
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    Passing federal environmental policy reform is a challenge as the approval of interest groups such as consumers and state-level governments is often a prerequisite. Among others, the burden sharing's progressivity has a large impact on reform... more

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    Passing federal environmental policy reform is a challenge as the approval of interest groups such as consumers and state-level governments is often a prerequisite. Among others, the burden sharing's progressivity has a large impact on reform approval. We investigate how carbon tax payments by states to a federal authority are influenced by differences in technological emission intensity and wealth and show how they can turn out to be at the expense of poor states. We show that a uniform federal carbon tax that is endorsed by all states with equal per capita transfers can theoretically put a higher burden on poorer states than richer states. The opposite applies for transfers based on historical emissions (sovereignty transfers) which reduce the burden of emissionintensive states. We test our results numerically in a general equilibrium model with a vertical federalism governance structure calibrated to the European Union. Our simulations show that a federal minimum emissions tax with sovereignty transfers is twice as high as for equal per capita transfers and also has a progressive effect.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242381
    Series: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 70
    Subjects: Emission Regulation; Federalism; Unanimity; Transfers; Pareto-improvingpolicy; European Union
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Ambiguous social choice functions
    Author: Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

    Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249883
    Edition: This version: December 22, 2021
    Series: Working papers / Center for Mathematical Economics ; 660 (December 2021)
    Subjects: Social Choice Function; Ambiguity Aversion; Ellsberg Urns; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Anonymity; Neutrality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten)
  3. Behavioral implementation without unanimity
    Author: Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Zachariassen, Julius
    Published: January 2024
    Publisher:  Aboa Centre for Economics, Turku

    Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called... more

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    Behavioral implementation studies implementation when agents' choices need not be rational. All existing papers of this literature, however, fail to handle a large class of choice behaviors because they rely on a well-known condition called Unanimity. This condition says, roughly speaking, that if all agents would select the same outcome form the set of all feasible outcomes, then this outcome should be deemed socially optimal. While Unanimity is both sensible as a property of a goal and necessary for implementation under rational behavior, with non-rational behavior it is neither. In this paper we investigate behavioral implementation under complete information without assuming Unanimity. Moreover, we give a full characterization of behaviorally implementable SCRs when the designer can use individually based rights structure.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Aboa Centre for Economics ; no. 165 (January 2024)
    Subjects: Behavioral economics; Implementation theory; Rights structure; Unanimity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten)