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Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Communication and hidden action
    evidence from a person-to-person lending experiment
    Author: Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian
    Published: November 2018
    Publisher:  School of Finance, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen

    We report the results of a laboratory experiment which examines the impact of precontractualcommunication in person-to-person lending. We show that potential hiddenaction undermines the positive effect of communication on repayment behavior and... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 314 (2018,19)
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    We report the results of a laboratory experiment which examines the impact of precontractualcommunication in person-to-person lending. We show that potential hiddenaction undermines the positive effect of communication on repayment behavior and creditprovision. When strategic defaults by borrowers are revealed to lenders, pre-contractualcommunication reduces strategic default and increases credit provision. When strategicdefaults are hidden behind a veil of uncertainty, we find a substantially weaker impact ofcommunication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when theycan hide opportunistic behavior from lenders. These findings have important implicationsfor the design of lending relationships and procedures: Pre-contractual communicationand post-contractual monitoring go hand in hand

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Edition: This version: November 2018
    Series: Working papers on finance ; no. 2018, 19
    University of St.Gallen, School of Finance Research Paper ; No. 2018/19
    Subjects: Strategic Default; Communication; Trust Game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Incomplete information models of guilt aversion in the trust game
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Manzoni, Elena
    Published: [2015]
    Publisher:  IGIER, Università Bocconi, Milano, Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: January, 2015
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; n. 480
    Subjects: Psychological games; Trust Game; guilt; incomplete information
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Communication and hidden action
    a credit market experiment
    Author: Brown, Martin; Schmitz, Jan; Zehnder, Christian
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  [Study Center Gerzensee], [Gerzensee]

    We study the impact of pre-contractual communication on market outcomes when economic relationships are subject to hidden action. Our experiment is framed in a credit market context and borrowers (second movers) can communicate with lenders (first... more

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    We study the impact of pre-contractual communication on market outcomes when economic relationships are subject to hidden action. Our experiment is framed in a credit market context and borrowers (second movers) can communicate with lenders (first movers) prior to entering the credit relationship. Communication reduces moral hazard (strategic default) and increases trust (credit provision) in an environment where opportunistic behavior by borrowers is revealed ex-post to lenders. By contrast, in an environment where strategic defaults are hidden behind a veil of uncertainty, we find a substantially weaker impact of communication. Borrowers are more likely to renege on repayment promises when they can hide opportunistic behavior from lenders. As a consequence, lenders extend less credit to borrowers who promise to repay. Hidden action undermines the positive effect of communication on market outcomes. Our findings have implications for the design of contracts and how to structure relationships with a risk of hidden action: for precontractual communication to unfold its full potential it needs to go hand-in-hand with post-contractual monitoring.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278532
    Series: Working paper / Study Center Gerzensee ; 23, 02
    Subjects: pre-contractual Communication; Hidden Action; Trust Game; Credit Market
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 96 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Trust in times of AI
    Author: Bogliacino, Francesco; Buonanno, Paolo; Fallucchi, Francesco; Puca, Marcello
    Published: October 2023
    Publisher:  CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance, Department of Economics, University of Naples, Naples, Italy

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / CSEF, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance ; no. 689
    Subjects: Artificial Intelligence; Trust Game; ChatGPT; Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten)
  5. Should we trust measures of trust?
    Author: Cloléry, Héloise; Hollard, Guillaume; Perez, Fabien; Picard, Inès
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Center for Research in Economics and Statistics, Palaiseau, France

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Center for Research in Economics and Statistics ; 2022, no. 13 (July 2022)
    Subjects: Trust; Trust Game; Measurement Error; ORIV
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. On the basis of (mis)trust?
    spousal trust and trustworthiness in household decision making: experimental evidence from India
    Author: Sternberg, Henrike; Steinert, Janina; Vollmer, Sebastian
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  Courant Research Centre, Goettingen, Germany

    This paper examines the role of spousal trust in intra-household decision making through its potential of inciting the creation of information asymmetries in the presence of resource unobservability. We experimentally elicit spousal trust and... more

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    This paper examines the role of spousal trust in intra-household decision making through its potential of inciting the creation of information asymmetries in the presence of resource unobservability. We experimentally elicit spousal trust and trustworthiness by means of a binary trust game to assess heterogeneity in saving behavior among lowincome slum dwellers in urban India. 360 married couples were randomly assigned to either a control group, receiving a shared saving device (a lockbox), or a treatment group, receiving a private saving device (a zip-purse) in addition to the lockbox. We find that the supplementary receipt of the private device significantly increased the wife's savings in couples with a low level of spousal trust. In couples with higher levels of trust, the effect coefficient turned negative. While this heterogeneity is driven by the wife's mistrust in absence of her husband's trustworthiness, we provide supportive evidence of an important channel being more effective hiding of the wife's savings amounts, facilitated through the private saving device. From a policy perspective, our findings have important implications for the design and evaluation of household-based (saving) interventions by offering a novel explanation for existing discrepancies between their observed and intended effects.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/233069
    Edition: This version: April 11, 2021
    Series: Discussion papers / Courant Research Centre ; no. 279
    Subjects: Spousal Trust; Household Decision Making; Saving Interventions; Income Hiding Behavior; Trust Game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 67 Seiten), Illustrationen