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  1. Austerity and elections
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, D.C.]

    Conventional wisdom holds that voters punish governments that implement fiscal austerity. Yet, most empirical studies, which rely on ex-post yearly austerity measures, do not find supportive evidence. This paper revisits the issue using action-based,... more

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    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Unter den Linden
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    Conventional wisdom holds that voters punish governments that implement fiscal austerity. Yet, most empirical studies, which rely on ex-post yearly austerity measures, do not find supportive evidence. This paper revisits the issue using action-based, real-time, ex-ante measures of fiscal austerity as well as a new database of changes in vote shares of incumbent parties. The analysis emphasizes the importance of the 'how'-whether austerity is done via tax hikes or expenditure cuts-and the 'who'-whether it is carried out by left- vs. right-leaning governments. Our main finding is that tax-based austerity carries large electoral costs, while the effect of expenditure-based consolidations depends on the political-leaning of the government. An austerity package worth 1% of GDP, carried out mostly through tax hikes, reduces the vote share of the leader's party by about 7%. In contrast, expenditure-based austerity is detrimental for left- but beneficial for right-leaning governments. We also find that the electoral cost of austerity-especially tax hikes-can be contained if it is implemented during good economic times

     

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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9781513573724
    Other identifier:
    Series: IMF working paper ; WP/21, 121
    Subjects: Austerity; Ideology; Vote share; Tax hikes; Expenditure cuts; Foreign Exchange; Informal Economy; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenues; Underground Econom
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Austerity and elections
    Published: 24 February 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    This paper revisits the conventional but unproven wisdom that voters penalize governments for adopting fiscal austerity in a sample of advanced economies. We consider the composition of the austerity package and the economic manifesto of the... more

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    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan

     

    This paper revisits the conventional but unproven wisdom that voters penalize governments for adopting fiscal austerity in a sample of advanced economies. We consider the composition of the austerity package and the economic manifesto of the implementing government and find that austerity packages consisting mostly of tax hikes have a significant electoral cost, which is larger for government parties that campaigned on a free-market manifesto. Conversely, expenditure-based austerity is costlier for government parties that did not run on a small-government platform, but may be beneficial for those that did. We show in a model that these results are an equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction between polarized voters’ mobilizers and centrist politicians. These politicians may be either unwilling or temporarily forced not to fulfil their campaign promises. Mobilizers lack information about the politicians’ types and punish them whenever they observe a deviation to the centre.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18859
    Subjects: Austerity; Elections; Ideology; Manifesto; Tax hikes; Expenditure cuts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Austerity and elections
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  International Monetary Fund, [Washington, D.C.]

    Conventional wisdom holds that voters punish governments that implement fiscal austerity. Yet, most empirical studies, which rely on ex-post yearly austerity measures, do not find supportive evidence. This paper revisits the issue using action-based,... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin - Preußischer Kulturbesitz, Haus Potsdamer Straße
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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt / Forschungsbibliothek Gotha, Universitätsbibliothek Erfurt
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    Bibliothek der Pädagogischen Hochschule Freiburg/Breisgau
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Technische Universität Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Heidenheim, Bibliothek
    e-Book Nationallizenz
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    Fachhochschule Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 301
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    Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Mosbach, Bibliothek
    E-Book Nationallizenz IMF
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    E-Book International Monetary Fund
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    e-Book International Monetary Fund eLibrary
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    Duale Hochschule Baden-Württemberg Ravensburg, Bibliothek
    E-Book IMF
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    Hochschule Albstadt-Sigmaringen, Bibliothek Sigmaringen
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    Conventional wisdom holds that voters punish governments that implement fiscal austerity. Yet, most empirical studies, which rely on ex-post yearly austerity measures, do not find supportive evidence. This paper revisits the issue using action-based, real-time, ex-ante measures of fiscal austerity as well as a new database of changes in vote shares of incumbent parties. The analysis emphasizes the importance of the 'how'-whether austerity is done via tax hikes or expenditure cuts-and the 'who'-whether it is carried out by left- vs. right-leaning governments. Our main finding is that tax-based austerity carries large electoral costs, while the effect of expenditure-based consolidations depends on the political-leaning of the government. An austerity package worth 1% of GDP, carried out mostly through tax hikes, reduces the vote share of the leader's party by about 7%. In contrast, expenditure-based austerity is detrimental for left- but beneficial for right-leaning governments. We also find that the electoral cost of austerity-especially tax hikes-can be contained if it is implemented during good economic times

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9781513573724
    Other identifier:
    Series: IMF working paper ; WP/21, 121
    Subjects: Austerity; Ideology; Vote share; Tax hikes; Expenditure cuts; Foreign Exchange; Informal Economy; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies; Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenues; Underground Econom
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Austerity and elections
    Published: 24 February 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    This paper revisits the conventional but unproven wisdom that voters penalize governments for adopting fiscal austerity in a sample of advanced economies. We consider the composition of the austerity package and the economic manifesto of the... more

    Access:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    No inter-library loan
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
    No inter-library loan
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
    No inter-library loan
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper revisits the conventional but unproven wisdom that voters penalize governments for adopting fiscal austerity in a sample of advanced economies. We consider the composition of the austerity package and the economic manifesto of the implementing government and find that austerity packages consisting mostly of tax hikes have a significant electoral cost, which is larger for government parties that campaigned on a free-market manifesto. Conversely, expenditure-based austerity is costlier for government parties that did not run on a small-government platform, but may be beneficial for those that did. We show in a model that these results are an equilibrium outcome of the strategic interaction between polarized voters’ mobilizers and centrist politicians. These politicians may be either unwilling or temporarily forced not to fulfil their campaign promises. Mobilizers lack information about the politicians’ types and punish them whenever they observe a deviation to the centre.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18859
    Subjects: Austerity; Elections; Ideology; Manifesto; Tax hikes; Expenditure cuts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 80 Seiten), Illustrationen