Skip to main navigation Skip to main content
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 15 of 15.

  1. Majority judgment and strategy-proofness
    Author: Vannucci, Stefano
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  [Università di Siena], [Siena]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Quaderni del Dipartimento di economia politica e statistica ; n. 730 (marzo 2016)
    Subjects: Strategy-proofness; bounded distributive lattice; single peakedness; majority rule; majority judgment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 21 Seiten)
  2. Coordinated strategic manipulations and mechanisms in school choice
    Author: Shirakawa, Ryo
    Published: June 7, 2022
    Publisher:  Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1634 (2022,25)
    Inter-library loan:
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University ; DP 2022, 25
    Subjects: Matching; School choice; Strategy-proofness; Group strategy-proofness; Monotonicity; Deferred acceptance; Efficiency adjusted deferred acceptance
    Scope: 36 Seiten
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  3. Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
    Author: Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 503
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This draft: November 2021
    Series: Boston College working papers in economics ; 1044
    Subjects: Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Arrovian preference aggregation; auditability; non-bossiness; voting; house allocation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Incentives in three-sided markets
    Author: Arenas, Jorge; Torres-Martínez, Juan Pablo
    Published: noviembre de 2022
    Publisher:  [Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía], Santiago

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 407
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Serie de documentos de trabajo / Universidad de Chile, Facultad Economía y Negocios, Departamento de Economía ; SDT 538
    Subjects: Three-sided Matching Markets; Stability; Strategy-proofness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  5. How to choose a delegation for a peace conference?
    Author: Can, Burak; Csóka, Péter; Ergin, Emre
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Business and Economics, Maastricht

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 285 (2017,8)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: [Research memorandum] / Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE) ; RM/17, 008
    Subjects: Aggregation Rules; Committee Selection; Conflict Management; Kemeny Distance; Strategy-proofness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. A characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices for an arbitrary number of agents and objects
    Author: Wakabayashi, Yuya; Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the economy consisting of n agents and m heterogenous objects where the seller benefits v from objects. Our study focuses on the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). In the situation with arbitrary n, m and v, we show that the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices adjusted to v on the classical domain is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, strategy- proofness, individual rationality and no-subsidy. Our result is an extension of that of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), and so we can consider more general situation than them. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness and two-sided individual rationality.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263298
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1161
    Subjects: Multi-object allocation problem; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Mini-mum price Walrasian rule; Non-quasi-linear preference; Heterogeneous objects; Reserveprices
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. No price envy in the multi-unit object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences
    Author: Shinozaki, Hiroki
    Published: February 2022
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among a set of agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and has a (possibly) non-quasi-linear preference on the set of (consumption) bundles. We assume that preferences exhibit both nonincreasing marginal valuations and nonnegative income effects. We propose a new property of fairness: no price envy. It extends the standard no envy test (Foley, 1967) over bundles to prices (per-unit payments), and requires no agent envy other agents' prices to his own in the sense that if he has a chance to receive some units at other agents' prices, then he gets better off than his own bundle. First, we show that a rule satisfies no price envy and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is an inverse uniform-price rule. Then, we identify the unique maximal domain for no price envy, strategy-proofness, and no subsidy for losers: the domain with partly constant marginal valuations. We further establish that on the domain with partly constant marginal valuations, a rule satisfies no price envy, strategy-proofness, and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is a minimum inverse uniform-price rule. Our maximal domain result implies that no rule satisfies no price envy, strategyproofness, and no subsidy for losers when agents have preferences with nonincreasing marginal valuations. Given this negative observation, we look for a minimally manipulable rule among the class of rules satisfying both no price envy and no subsidy for losers in the case of preferences with nonincreasing marginal valuations. We show that a rule is minimally manipulable among the class of rules satisfying no price envy and no subsidy for losers if and only if it is a minimum inverse uniformprice rule. Our results provide a rationale for the use of the popular minimum uniform-price rule in terms of fairness and non-manipulability.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263301
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1164
    Subjects: No price envy; No envy; Strategy-proofness; Maximal domain; Minimalmanipulability; Nonincreasing marginal valuations; Constant marginal valuations; Uniform-price rule; Multi-unit auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten)
  8. Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with interval constraints
    Author: Adachi, Tsuyoshi; Ishibashi, Yuki
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Waseda INstitute of Political EConomy, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 820
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; no. 21, 24 (March 2022)
    Subjects: Matching; Interval constraints; Stability; Strategy-proofness; Cumulative offer process
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten)
  9. When can we design efficient and strategy-proof rules in package assignment problems?
    Author: Kazumura, Tomoya
    Published: January, 2022
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto City, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 814
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; no. 21, 008
    Subjects: Strategy-proofness; efficiency; non-quasi-linear preferences; partially quasi-linear preferences; generalized Vickrey rule; maximal domain
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 82 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Incentives and efficiency in matching with transfers
    towards nonquasilinear package auctions
    Author: Tierney, Ryan
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Faculty of Business and Social Sciences, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 571
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers on economics ; no. 2022, 6
    Subjects: Assignment game; Package auctions; Strategy-proofness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten)
  11. Ambiguous social choice functions
    Author: Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

    Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 263
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Call a mechanism that associates each profile of preferences over candidates to an ambiguous act an Ambiguous Social Function (ASCF). This paper studies the strategy-proofness of ASCFs. We find that an ASCF is unanimous and strategyproof if and only if there exists a nonempty subset of voters, called the set of top voters, such that at each preference profile, the range of the selected act equals the set of top-ranked candidates of top voters. We provide a full characterization of the class of unanimous, strategyproof, and anonymous ASCFs, and provide a large subclass of ASCFs that satisfy the additional property of neutrality.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249883
    Edition: This version: December 22, 2021
    Series: Working papers / Center for Mathematical Economics ; 660 (December 2021)
    Subjects: Social Choice Function; Ambiguity Aversion; Ellsberg Urns; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Anonymity; Neutrality
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten)
  12. Arrovian efficiency and auditability in discrete mechanism design
    Author: Pycia, Marek; Ünver, M. Utku
    Published: 10 January 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Access:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16872
    Subjects: Strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; Arrovian preference aggregation; auditability; non-bossiness; voting; house allocation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. A characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule in object allocation problem for an arbitrary number of objects
    Author: Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro
    Published: June 2021
    Publisher:  The Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

    We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness.... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 198
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

     
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248594
    Series: Discussion paper / The Institute of Social and Economic Research ; no. 1134
    Subjects: Multi-object allocation problem; Strategy-proofness; Efficiency; Minimumprice Walrasian rule; Non-quasi-linear preference; Heterogeneous objects
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  14. Strategy-proof aggregation rules in median join-semilattices and arrowian social welfare functions
    Author: Savaglio, Ernesto; Vannucci, Stefano
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  Università di Siena, [Siena]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 444
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Quaderni del Dipartimento di economia politica e statistica ; n. 834 (luglio 2020)
    Subjects: Strategy-proofness; single peakedness; median joinsemilattice; social welfare function
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 13 Seiten)
  15. Sequential dictatorship rules in multi-unit object assignment problems with money
    Author: Kawasaki, Masahiro; Sakai, Ryosuke; Kazumura, Tomoya
    Published: December 2023
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto City, Japan

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 814
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; no. 23, 007
    Subjects: Consistency; Strategy-proofness; sequential dictatorship rule; serial dictatorship rule; weakly object monotonic preferences; single-peaked preferences; acyclicity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen