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Displaying results 1 to 12 of 12.

  1. Tradable climate liabilities
    a thought experiment
    Author: Billette de Villemeur, Étienne; Leroux, Justin
    Published: Decembre 2018
    Publisher:  CIRANO, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations, Montréal

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Scientific series / CIRANO, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en analyse des organisations ; 2018s, 43
    Subjects: Climate Liability; Market Instruments; Pigovian Tax; Risk Sharing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten)
  2. Trust in risk sharing
    a double-edged sword
    Author: Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; Park, Yena
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Center for Financial Studies, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term "trust". We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/268899
    Series: CFS working paper series ; no. 697
    Subjects: Coalitions; Limited Enforcement; Risk Sharing
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 90 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Limited commitment, social control and risk-sharing coalitions in village economies
    Author: Hernandez, Daniel J.; Jaramillo, Fernando; Kempf, Hubert; Moizeau, Fabien; Vendryes, Thomas
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  [Centre de recherche en économie et management], [Rennes]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 613
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Centre de recherche en économie et management, UMR 6211 ; WP 2023, 02 (mars 2023)
    Subjects: Risk Sharing; Informal Insurance; Group Formation; Social Control; Risk Heterogeneity; Homophily; Dyadic Models; Thailand
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Die Zählung sollte lauten: WP 2023, 03 (mars 2023)
  4. The feasible gains from international risk sharing
    Author: Eijffinger, Sylvester C. W.
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    W 32 (2691)
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    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
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    wrc 10.06:i/d55-2691
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    Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 2691
    Subjects: Portfolio-Management; Vermögensverwaltung; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; G7-Staaten; Risk Sharing; Country risk; Economic policy; Financial crises; Interest rate risk
    Scope: 19 S.
  5. International risk-sharing and the exchange rate
    re-evaluating the case for flexible exchange rates
    Author: Devereux, Michael B.
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, Londen

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (2900)
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    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
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    wrc 10.06:i/d55-2900
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    Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften Speyer, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QM 331
    Series: Array ; 2900
    Subjects: Wechselkurssystem; Flexibler Wechselkurs; Fester Wechselkurs; Theorie; Risk Sharing; Foreign exchange rates
    Scope: 34 S., graph. Darst.
  6. Risk-sharing and contagion in networks
    Author: Cabrales, Antonio; Gottardi, Piero; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
    Published: December 2014
    Publisher:  FEDEA, Madrid

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Documento de trabajo / FEDEA ; 2014, 18
    Subjects: Firm networks; Contagion; Risk Sharing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 71 Seiten)
  7. Volatility (dis)connect in international markets
    Author: Colacito, Riccardo; Croce, Mariano M.; Liu, Yang; Shaliastovich, Ivan
    Published: 10 March 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17101
    Subjects: volatility risk; foreign exchange disconnect; Risk Sharing
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. The trade-off between public health and the economy in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic
    Author: Jaccard, Ivan
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    How does contagion risk affect the business cycle? We find that the presence of contagion risk significantly alters the transmission of standard macroeconomic shocks. Relative to the first-best equilibrium, the contagion externality significantly... more

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    How does contagion risk affect the business cycle? We find that the presence of contagion risk significantly alters the transmission of standard macroeconomic shocks. Relative to the first-best equilibrium, the contagion externality significantly reduces the response of output to a technology shock. We also argue that the magnitude of the trade-off between health and the economy crucially depends on how the proba-bility of infection is specified. If the probability of infection only depends on agents' endogenous choices, a weaker trade-off emerges. In such a framework, and relative to the laissezfaire equilibrium, suboptimal policies such as zero COVID strategies, health insurance, or mandatory testing substantially attenuate recessions that are caused by epidemics. Therefore, policies primarily aimed at preserving public health do not necessarily come at the cost of deeper recessions.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289952743
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/269097
    Series: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2690 (July 2022)
    Subjects: Contagion Externality; Lockdown Policies; Risk Sharing; IncompleteMarkets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Squaring the circle
    how to guarantee fiscal space and debt sustainability with a European Debt Agency
    Author: Amato, Massimo; Saraceno, Francesco
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  OFCE, Paris, France

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    Media type: Book
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    Series: Sciences Po OFCE working paper ; no 2022, 02
    Subjects: European Debt Agency; Fiscal Space; EMU Fiscal Governance; Growth and Stability Pact; Fiscal Rules; Risk Sharing; Public Debt; Debt Management
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Squaring the circle
    how to guarantee fiscal space and debt sustainability with a European debt agency
    Author: Amato, Massimo; Saraceno, Francesco
    Published: January 19, 2022
    Publisher:  Luiss SEP, Rome, Italy

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / Luiss School of European Political Economy ; 2022, 1
    Subjects: European Debt Agency; Fiscal Space; EMU Fiscal Governance; Growth and Stability Pact; Fiscal Rules; Risk Sharing; Public Debt; Debt Management
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Risk sharing and monetary policy transmission
    Author: Hauptmeier, Sebastian; Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric; Renault, Théodore
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main, Germany

    Using regionally disaggregated data on economic activity, we show that risk sharing plays a key role in shaping the real effects of monetary policy. With weak risk sharing, monetary policy shocks trigger a strong and durable response in output. With... more

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    Using regionally disaggregated data on economic activity, we show that risk sharing plays a key role in shaping the real effects of monetary policy. With weak risk sharing, monetary policy shocks trigger a strong and durable response in output. With strong risk sharing, the response is attenuated, and output reverts to its initial level over the medium term. The attenuating impact of risk sharing via credit and factor markets concentrates over a two-year horizon, whereas fiscal risk sharing operates over longer horizons. Fiscal risk sharing especially benefits poorer regions by shielding them against persistent output contractions after tightening shocks.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789289953948
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278221
    Series: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; no 2746 (November 2022)
    Subjects: Monetary Policy; Risk Sharing; Regional Heterogeneity; Local Projections; Quantile Regressions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Social capital: a double-edged sword
    Author: Cole, Harold L.; Krueger, Dirk; Mailath, George J.; Park, Yena
    Published: February 2021
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in future... more

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    We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when coalitions may deviate. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any deviating coalition rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term \social capital". We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviating coalitions symmetrically and show that higher social capital tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates both the formation of the original as well as a deviating coalition. As a consequence, although social capital facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of social capital and equilibrium allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: social capital is indeed a double-edged sword.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/231489
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 064
    Subjects: Financial Coalition; Limited Enforcement; Risk Sharing; Coalition-Proof Equilibrium
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen