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  1. A criterion to compare mechanisms when solutions are not unique, with applications to constrained school choice
    Author: Decerf, Benoit; Linden, Martin van der
    Published: [2016]
    Publisher:  CORE, [Louvain-la-Neuve]

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 203 (2016,33)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/177308
    Series: CORE discussion papers ; 2016, 33
    Subjects: Multiple solutions; School choice; Stability; Boston mechanism; Deferred acceptance mechanism; Nash equilibrium; Undominated strategy
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten)