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  1. Multi-unit auctions with uncertain supply and single-unit demand
    Author: Anderson, Edward J.; Holmberg, Pär
    Published: May 9, 2023
    Publisher:  Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm, Sweden

    We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 206
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study multi-unit auctions where bidders have single-unit demand and asymmetric information. For symmetric equilibria, we identify circumstances where uniform-pricing is better for the auctioneer than pay-as-bid pricing, and where transparency improves the revenue of the auctioneer. An issue with the uniform-price auction is that seemingly collusive equilibria can exist. We show that such outcomes are less likely if the traded volume of the auctioneer is uncertain. But if bidders are asymmetric ex-ante, then both a price áoor and a price cap are normally needed to get a unique equilibrium, which is well behaved.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: IFN working paper ; no. 1460 (2023)
    Subjects: Multi-unit auction; single-unit demand; uniform pricing; pay-asbid; asymmetric information; publicity effect
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 66 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Liquidity risk, market power and reserve accumulation
    Author: Claeys, Gregory; Papioti, Chara; Tryphonides, Andreas
    Published: October 2020
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 541
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 1206
    Subjects: Multi-unit auction; Liquidity risk; Reserve Accumulation; Signalling
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen