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  1. Platform oligopoly with endogenous homing
    implications for mergers and free entry
    Published: March 2022
    Publisher:  Graduate School of Economics, Kyoto University, Kyoto City, Japan

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 814
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; no. 21, 009
    Subjects: Two-sided markets; Indict network externalities; Multi-homing; Platform entry; Platform mergers
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. YouTube “Adpocalypse”
    the Youtubers' journey from ad-based to patron-based revenues
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany

    In the past decade, the Creator Economy has witnessed unprecedented growth. This dynamic ecosystem thrives on a multi-sided business model, connecting content creators, users, and advertisers. However, matching the needs of different stakeholders is... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 15
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    In the past decade, the Creator Economy has witnessed unprecedented growth. This dynamic ecosystem thrives on a multi-sided business model, connecting content creators, users, and advertisers. However, matching the needs of different stakeholders is a complex challenge, as evidenced by the impact of the YouTube “Adpocalypse” in 2017, when major advertisers fled Youtube due to concerns about their ads appearing alongside objectionable content. This paper explores the response by content creators that use both Youtube and Patreon to YouTube’s content moderation policies following the “Adpocalypse”. We find that these content creators shift their efforts toward Patreon which uses a subscription fee model instead of an ad-based model; as a result, consumers subsequently increase their use of Patreon through memberships, comments, and likes. However, we also find that Youtube’s content moderation, and the shift by content creators and consumers that follows, results in an increase in toxicity on Patreon.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283579
    Series: Discussion paper / ZEW ; no. 23, 059 (12/2023)
    Subjects: Patreon; Platform Competition; Multi-homing; Content Creators
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Control and Regulation on Online Service Platforms
    Published: 2023

    In recent years, new regulations have been proposed in different parts of the world to re-define the relationship between online service platforms and their workers. These regulations aim to give gig economy workers flexibility in how they conduct... more

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    In recent years, new regulations have been proposed in different parts of the world to re-define the relationship between online service platforms and their workers. These regulations aim to give gig economy workers flexibility in how they conduct their work, and put a limit on how much control platforms can impose over them.Focusing specifically on control over workers’ ability to set their prices and their ability to work across multiple platform apps, this dissertation aims to understand the key operational trade-offs platforms face when choosing how much flexibility to give to its workers.In the first chapter Pricing Control and Regulation on Online Service Platforms, I build a model of a monopolistic service platform to identify when it is in the best interest of a platform to give pricing control to its workers. Taking a mechanism design approach, I identify the optimal fee structure that a platform can adopt to maximize its profits.In the second chapter Multi-homing Across Platforms: Friend or Foe?, I build a model of two platforms where each can control the monetary terms it offers to its users and also decide whether to allow its workers to accept work from the competing platform. I find that some platforms benefit from letting their workers use the competing platform. In markets that exhibit economies of scale, workers’ flexibility to use multiple platforms reduces each platforms’ ability to differentiate themselves through service quality, dampening price competition between platforms.In the third chapter Centralized or Decentralized Pricing With Platform Competition, I build a model of two competing service platforms that can individually choose whether to give pricing control to its workers or not. I identify a key trade-off: when platforms take charge of the prices in the market, they can control for the adverse effects of competition among servers, but they expose themselves to price competition with other platforms. Giving pricing control to the servers makes platforms susceptible to server competition, but dampens the competition between platforms.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9798379751685
    Series: Dissertations Abstracts International
    Subjects: Decentralization; Gig economy; Multi-homing; Pricing and revenue management; Two-sided platforms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (191 p.)
    Notes:

    Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 84-12, Section: B. - Advisor: Cachon, Gerard P.;Tsoukalas, Gerry

    Dissertation (Ph.D.), University of Pennsylvania, 2023