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  1. Guilt aversion in (new) games
    does partners' payoff vulnerability matter?
    Author: Attanasi, Giuseppe; Rimbaud, Claire; Villeval, Marie-Claire
    Published: February 2023
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former... more

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    We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability. To this goal, we introduce new variations of a three-player Trust game in which we manipulate payoff vulnerability and endowment vulnerability. The former is the traditional vulnerability which arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action (e.g., recipient's payoff in a Dictator game). The latter arises when a player's initial endowment is entrusted to another player (e.g., trustor's endowment in a Trust game). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of a co-player who is payoff-vulnerable and/or endowment-vulnerable, or not vulnerable at all, and the decision rights of the vulnerable player. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to the dimension of the co-player's vulnerability and to the decision rights of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of the co-player whose beliefs are disappointed. It is triggered by the willingness to respond to the co-player's beliefs on his strategy, regardless of whether this strategy concerns this player or a third player's vulnerability, that is, indirect vulnerability.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/272587
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15960
    Subjects: guilt aversion; vulnerability; psychological game theory; Dictator game; Trust game; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Do strict egalitarians really exist?
    Author: Kwon, Hyoji; Funaki, Yukihiko
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Waseda INstitute of Political EConomy, Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; no. 22, 06 (December 2022)
    Subjects: Fairness; Distributional Preferences; Dictator game
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Sustainable consumption and prosocial actions
    Author: Bilén, David
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789188199720
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2077/76761
    Series: Economic studies / Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg ; 256
    Subjects: Consumer Economics; Empirical Analysis; Environment; Climate; Dictator game; Altruism; Gender difference; Meta-analysis
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (4 PDFs), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, University of Gothenburg, 2022
  4. Participatory interventions for pro-social and collective action in natural resource management
    an institutional and behavioural approach
    Author: Ortiz-Riomalo, Juan Felipe
    Published: 07/2020

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    Universitätsbibliothek Osnabrück
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    Subjects: Participatory governance; Collective action; Pro-social action; Cooperation; Pro-social behavior; Participatory processes; Perspective-taking; Communication; Natural resource management; Environmental protection; Participatory approaches; Dictator game; Public goods game; Watershed management; Behavioral economics; Institutional economics; Behavioral sciences
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: xxx, 207 Seiten, 3,35 MB), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Universität Osnabrück, 2020
  5. Essays on Information Acquisition and Avoidance in Games
    Author: Spurlino, Eric Cyrus
    Published: 2023

    In the following dissertation, I use theory and experiments to study how limited cognition and psychological motives influence individuals' acquisition of, or avoidance of, information in contexts involving multiple players. Chapter 1 considers a... more

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    In the following dissertation, I use theory and experiments to study how limited cognition and psychological motives influence individuals' acquisition of, or avoidance of, information in contexts involving multiple players. Chapter 1 considers a game with costly information acquisition in which the ability of one player to acquire information directly affects her opponent’s incentives for gathering information. Rational inattention theory posits that the opponent’s information-acquisition strategy is a direct function of these incentives. This paper argues that people are cognitively limited in predicting their opponent’s level of information, and hence lack the strategic sophistication that the theory requires. In an experiment involving a real-effort attention task and a simple two-player trading game, I study the ability of subjects to (1) anticipate the information acquisition of opponents in this strategic game, and (2) best respond to this information acquisition when acquiring their own costly information. I study this by exogenously manipulating the difficulty of the attention task for both the player and their opponent. Predictions of behavior are generated by a novel theoretical model in which Level-K agents can acquire information a la rational inattention. I find an out-sized lack of strategic sophistication, driven largely by the cognitive difficulties of predicting opponent information. These results suggest a necessary integration of the theories of rational inattention and costly sophistication in strategic settings.Chapter 2 examines how the psychological effects of empathy and social pressure affect giving behavior and avoidance in a modified two-player dictator game. Previous literature on charitable giving in the field has shown that (1) people give substantially more when asked and (2) people tend to avoid the ask if possible. There are two potential explanations for this behavior: social pressure, and empathy. The social pressure theory posits that people do not enjoy giving, but dislike saying "no". The empathy theory claims that the ask causes people to have more altruistic preferences, and thus people may avoid the ask as a self-control device. To separate these two explanations, I formulate empathy as an effect triggered by the giver seeing the ask itself, and social pressure as triggered by the recipient seeing how the giver responds. I utilize an online lab experiment to separate these two theories and test each directly. In the experiment, subjects are assigned to be either solicitors for an NYC COVID-19 relief fund or to be potential donors, with a USD10 endowment. Solicitors write messages encouraging their partners to donate to their charity. Via a probabilistic avoidance mechanism, I vary (1) whether donors are shown the message and (2) whether solicitors see how much their donor gives. Subjects choose to avoid social pressure at a much higher rate than empathy. However, subjects give more when exposed to either. Evidence also points to sizable heterogeneity in sensitivity to and avoidance of these two effects.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9798379773687
    Series: Dissertations Abstracts International
    Subjects: Information acquisition; Avoidance; Dictator game; Social pressure theory; Potential donors
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (164 p.)
    Notes:

    Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 85-01, Section: A. - Advisor: Caplin, Andrew

    Dissertation (Ph.D.), New York University, 2023