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  1. Necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of asymptotically stationary equilibria in OLG models
    Published: June 18, 2019
    Publisher:  Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 29
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; no. 2179 (May 2019)
    Subjects: Overlapping generations; Implicit function theorem; Determinacy; Time-invariance; Comparative statics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Comparative statics and centrality measures in oligopolies with interdependent preferences
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Management and Statistics, University of Milano-Bicocca, Milan, Italy

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 718
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: DEMS working paper series ; no. 464 (March 2021)
    Subjects: Cournot Game; Preference interdependence; Network; Centrality measures; Comparative statics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Empowerment of social norms on water consumption
    Published: July 2021
    Publisher:  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Milano, Italia

    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 125
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    This study develops a model of water extraction with endogenous social norms. Many users are connected by a unique shared resource that can become scarce in case of over-exploitation. Preferences of individuals are guided by their extraction values and their taste for conformity to social norms which provide incentives to follow others. As the main result of this study, the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is established under a sufficient condition. Afterward, some comparative statics analysis shows the effects of change in individual heterogeneous parameters, conformism, and density of the network on the global quantity extracted. Welfare and social optimum properties are established to avoid the tragedy of the commons and sub-optimal consumptions of water. Lastly, this theoretical framework is completed by extensions to highlight levers of water preservation, including the calibration of social norm incentives.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/237745
    Series: Working paper / Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei ; 2021, 020
    Subjects: Comparative statics; Conformism; Nash equilibrium; Network; Social norms; Water extraction
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen