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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 27.

  1. Delegated project search
    Author: Chen, Xi; Chen, Yu; Wan, Xuhu
    Published: May 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz, [Graz]

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This draft: May 21, 2018
    Series: Graz economics papers ; GEP 2018, 11
    Subjects: Dynamic Contract; Continuous Time; Moral Hazard; Adverse Selection; Project Search
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Push or pull?
    performance-pay, incentives, and information
    Author: Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu
    Published: May 2018
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz, [Graz]

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Graz economics papers ; GEP 2018, 12
    Subjects: Pay for Performance; Moral Hazard; Adverse Selection; Observable Action; Principal-Agent Problem
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten)
  3. Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets
    Author: Biglaiser, Gary; Li, Fei; Murry, Charles; Zhou, Yiyi
    Published: December 7, 2018
    Publisher:  Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Boston College working papers in economics ; 969
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Middleman; Dealer; Information Intermediary; Used Car; Automobiles
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Trading under asymmetric information
    positive and normative implications
    Author: Attardi, Andrea; Aspremont, Claude d'
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  CORE, [Louvain-la-Neuve]

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/183577
    Series: CORE discussion papers ; 2017, 09
    Subjects: Mechanism design; Bilateral Trade; Competing Mechanism; Constrained Efficiency; Adverse Selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Algorithmic Pricing and Liquidity in Securities Markets
    Author: Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Foucault, Thierry; Lovo, Stefano M.
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    We let "Algorithmic Market-Makers" (AMMs), using Q-learning algorithms, choose prices for a risky asset when their clients are privately informed about the asset payoff. We find that AMMs learn to cope with adverse selection and to update their... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    We let "Algorithmic Market-Makers" (AMMs), using Q-learning algorithms, choose prices for a risky asset when their clients are privately informed about the asset payoff. We find that AMMs learn to cope with adverse selection and to update their prices after observing trades, as predicted by economic theory. However, in contrast to theory, AMMs charge a mark-up over the competitive price, which declines with the number of AMMs. Interestingly, markups tend to decrease with AMMs’ exposure to adverse selection. Accordingly, the sensitivity of quotes to trades is stronger than that predicted by theory and AMMs’ quotes become less competitive over time as asymmetric information declines

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: HEC Paris Research Paper ; No. FIN-2022-1459
    Subjects: Algorithmic pricing; Market Making; Adverse Selection; Market Power; Reinforcement learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (45 p)
    Notes:

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 18, 2022 erstellt
  6. On the fragility of DeFi lending
    Author: Chiu, Jonathan; Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy; Zhang, Shengxing
    Published: August 2023
    Publisher:  [LSE Financial Markets Group], [London]

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    Language: English
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    Series: Discussion paper / [Financial Markets Group] ; no 883
    Paul Woolley Centre working paper ; no 95
    Subjects: Decentralized Finance; DeFi; Smart Contracts; Dynamic Price Feedback; Financial Fragility; Adverse Selection; DeFi trilemma; Stability; Efficiency; DecentralizationTradeof
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Underrepresentation, quotas and quality
    a dynamic argument for reform
    Author: Arve, Malin; Valasek, Justin
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Norwegian School of Economics, Bergen, Norway

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 11250/3068412
    Series: Discussion paper / NHH, Department of Economics ; SAM 2023, 08 (May 2023)
    Subjects: Affirmative Action; Quotas; Mentorship; Identity; Gender; Adverse Selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten)
  8. Information aggregation in dynamic markets with adverse selection
    Author: Asriyan, Vladimir; Fuchs, William; Green, Brett
    Published: July 2017
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Series: Economics working paper series / Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business ; no. 1573
    Subjects: Information Aggregation; Information Design; Decentralized Markets; Adverse Selection; Optimal Information Policy; Transparency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. "On competitive nonlinear pricing"
    Author: Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François
    Published: November 2016
    Publisher:  IDEI, Institut d'économie industrielle, [Toulouse]

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    Series: Working papers / IDEI, Institut d'économie industrielle ; no IDEI-866
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Competing Mechanisms; Limit-Order Book
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Private information and insurance rejections
    a comment
    Author: Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François
    Published: March 2017
    Publisher:  IDEI, Institut d'économie industrielle, [Toulouse]

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    Contributor: Hendren, Nathaniel (VerfasserIn des Bezugswerks)
    Language: English
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    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper / IDEI, Institut d'économie industrielle ; n. 868
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Entry Proofness; Market Breakdown; Nonexclusivity
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 28 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Sorting versus screening in decentralized markets with adverse selection
    Author: Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We study the role of traders' meeting capacities in decentralized markets with adverse selection. Uninformed customers choose trading mechanisms in order to find a provider for a service. Providers are privately informed about their quality and aim... more

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    We study the role of traders' meeting capacities in decentralized markets with adverse selection. Uninformed customers choose trading mechanisms in order to find a provider for a service. Providers are privately informed about their quality and aim to match with one of the customers. We consider a rich set of meeting technologies and characterize the properties of the equilibrium allocations for each of them. In equilibrium, different provider types can be separated either via sorting - they self-select into different submarkets - or screening within the trading mechanism, or a combination of the two. We show that, as the meeting technology improves, the equilibrium features more screening and less sorting. Interestingly, this reduces both the average quality of trade as well as the total level of trade in the economy. The trading losses are, however, compensated by savings in entry costs, so that welfare increases.

     
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    Language: English
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/262342
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 180
    Subjects: Competitive Search; Adverse Selection; Market Segmentation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 56 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Dynamic asset-backed security design
    Author: Ozdenoren, Emre; Yuan, Kathy; Zhang, Shengxing
    Published: May 2022
    Publisher:  [LSE Financial Markets Group], [London]

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    Series: Discussion paper / [Financial Markets Group] ; no 856
    Paul Woolley Centre working paper ; no 86
    Subjects: Liquidity; Dynamic Price Feedback; Tradable Assets; Inter-temporal Coordination; Security Design; Multiple Equilibria; Self-fulfilling Prices; Financial Fragility; Haircut; Repo; Repo Runs; Credit Crunch; Asset-Backed Security; Collateral; Limited Commitment; Adverse Selection; Market-Based Financial Intermediation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, Illustrationen
  13. The rise of social sentiment and payment for order flow
    new implications for non-fundamental information in financial markets
    Author: Russ, David
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  Universitätsbibliothek Regensburg, Regensburg

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    Universitätsbibliothek Braunschweig
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Zentrale Hochschulbibliothek Lübeck
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    Leuphana Universität Lüneburg, Medien- und Informationszentrum, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Hochschulbibliothek
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    Hochschule Osnabrück, Bibliothek Campus Westerberg
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    Hochschule Magdeburg-Stendal, Standort Stendal, Bibliothek
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    UB Weimar
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    Contributor: Arnold, Lutz (AkademischeR BetreuerIn)
    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
    Format: Online
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    Subjects: Financial Trading; Non-Fundamental Information; Noise Trading; Asymmetric Information; Rational Destabilization; Price Efficiency; Adverse Selection; Social Sentiment; Payment for Order Flow
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 244 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Dissertation, Universität Regensburg, 2022
  14. On the welfare effects of adverse selection in oligopolistic markets
    Author: De Pinto, Marco; Goerke, Laszlo; Palermo, Alberto
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  Institute for Labour Law and Industrial Relations in the European Union (IAAEU), Trier

    We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay informational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more... more

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    We consider a principal-agent relationship with adverse selection. Principals pay informational rents due to asymmetric information and sell their output in a homogeneous Cournot-oligopoly. We find that asymmetric information may mitigate or more than compensate the welfare reducing impact of market power, irrespective of whether the number of firms is given exogenously or determined endogenously by a profit constraint. We further show that welfare in a setting with adverse selection may be higher than the maximized welfare level attainable in a world with perfect observability.

     
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    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265260
    Series: IAAEU discussion paper series in economics / IAAEU ; no. 2022, 02
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Oligopoly; Welfare
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Algorithmic pricing and liquidity in securities markets
    Author: Colliard, Jean-Edouard; Foucault, Thierry; Lovo, Stefano M.
    Published: 25 October 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17606
    Subjects: Algorithmic pricing; Market Making; Adverse Selection; Market Power; Reinforce-ment learning
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Agency problems in a competitive conglomerate with production constraints
    Author: Herrera-Velasquez, Jose de Jesus
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: KIER discussion paper series ; no. 1083
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Contract Mechanism; Multimarket Competition; Stackelberg Oligopoly; Production Constraint
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Employer credit checks: poverty traps versus matching efficiency
    Author: Corbae, Dean; Glover, Andrew
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Federal Research Bank of Kansas City, Kansas City, Mo.

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    Series: KcFED research working papers ; RWP 23, 01 (January 2023)
    Subjects: Pre-Employment Credit Screening; Consumer Default; Adverse Selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. A model of secular migration from centralized to decentralized trade
    Author: Cai, Zhifeng; Dong, Feng
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Rutgers University, Department of Economics, [New Brunswick, NJ]

    A large number of financial assets are traded in both exchanges and over-the-counter markets (i.e., centralized and decentralized markets, CM and DM hereafter, respectively). Moreover, as documented by Biais and Green (2019), the 20th century has... more

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    A large number of financial assets are traded in both exchanges and over-the-counter markets (i.e., centralized and decentralized markets, CM and DM hereafter, respectively). Moreover, as documented by Biais and Green (2019), the 20th century has witnessed a secular migration of asset trade from CM to DM. To this end, this paper develops a tractable model on strategic selection of venue trading to study the causes and consequences of the endogenous coexistence of CM and DM. In the model, traders' choice of venue is shaped by the trade-off between information frictions in the CM and matching frictions in the DM. Closed-form solutions are obtained and used to characterize the endogenous share of trade across the two venues. We then use the model to evaluate two potential explanations of the migration from CM to DM: improvements in matching technologies and increases in the number of institutional investors. Surprisingly, while both forces could lead to more trade in DM, there exist parameter regions where the increase in the number of institutional investors leads to less trade in DM. We also obtain empirically testable implications that differentiate the two explanations.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246484
    Edition: This Version: November, 2019
    Series: Departmental working papers / Rutgers University, Department of Economics ; [2020, 03]
    Subjects: Exchange vs Over-The-Counter (OTC) Market; Adverse Selection; Search Frictions; Institutional Investors; Fragmented Financial Markets
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Regulating insurance markets
    multiple contracting and adverse selection
    Author: Mariotti, Thomas
    Published: 09 September 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16531
    Subjects: Insurance Markets; Regulation; Multiple Contracting; Adverse Selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Essays on financial incentives in the Dutch healthcare system
    Author: Remmerswaal, Minke
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Tilburg University, Tilburg

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    Language: English
    Media type: Dissertation
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    ISBN: 9789056686444
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    Series: [Dissertation series] / [Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University] ; [nr. 643 (2021)]
    Subjects: Financial Incentives; Health Care System; Healthcare; Deductibles; Cost Sharing; Payment Scheme; Rebates; Expenditure; Health; Microsimulation; Equity; Payment System; Adverse Selection; Moral Hazard; The Netherlands; Tariffs; Payment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 257 Seiten), Illustrationen
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    Enthält mehrere Beiträge

    Dissertation, Tilburg University, 2021
  21. Simultaneous search and adverse selection
    Author: Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero; Wolthoff, Ronald
    Published: 09 January 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16871
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; multiple applications; directed search
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 61 Seiten), Illustrationen
  22. Simultaneous search and adverse selection
    Author: Auster, Sarah; Gottardi, Piero; Wolthoff, Ronald
    Published: January 2022
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade-off: facilitating... more

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    We study the effect of diminishing search frictions in markets with adverse selection by presenting a model in which agents with private information can simultaneously contact multiple trading partners. We highlight a new trade-off: facilitating contacts reduces coordination frictions but also the ability to screen agents' types. We find that, when agents can contact sufficiently many trading partners, fully separating equilibria obtain only if adverse selection is sufficiently severe. When this condition fails, equilibria feature partial pooling and multiple equilibria co-exist. In the limit, as the number of contacts becomes large, some of the equilibria converge to the competitive outcomes of Akerlof (1970), including Pareto dominated ones; other pooling equilibria continue to feature frictional trade in the limit, where entry is inefficiently high. Our findings provide a basis to assess the effects of recent technological innovations which have made meetings easier.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249873
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 135
    Subjects: Directed Search; Adverse Selection
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Information aggregation in dynamic markets with adverse selection
    Author: Asriyan, Vladimir; Fuchs, William; Green, Brett
    Published: September 18, 2017
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Edition: This version: September 2017
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 979
    Subjects: Information Aggregation; Information Design; Decentralized Markets; Adverse Selection; Optimal Information Policy; Transparency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Credit market frictions and coessentiality of money and credit
    Author: Kwon, Ohik; Lee, Manjong
    Published: 2020. 11
    Publisher:  Bank of Korea, Seoul, Korea

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 629
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: BOK working paper ; no. 2020, 23
    Subjects: Asymmetric Information; Adverse Selection; Cash; Coessentiality; Credit
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Competitive nonlinear pricing under adverse selection
    Author: Attar, Andrea; Mariotti, Thomas; Salanié, François
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 330
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1201
    Subjects: Adverse Selection; Entry-Proofness; Discriminatory Pricing; Nonexclusive Markets; Ascending Auctions
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 52 Seiten), Illustrationen