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  1. A Transcendental Argument against Utilitarianism
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, Berlin

    Der Handlungs-Utilitarismus lässt sich mithilfe eines neuen, transzendentalen Arguments widerlegen: Wer stets den Nutzen maximiert, auch beim Reden, der kann seine moralische Position (aus interpretationstheoretischen Gründen) weder formulieren noch... more

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    Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Universitätsbibliothek, Jacob-und-Wilhelm-Grimm-Zentrum
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    Der Handlungs-Utilitarismus lässt sich mithilfe eines neuen, transzendentalen Arguments widerlegen: Wer stets den Nutzen maximiert, auch beim Reden, der kann seine moralische Position (aus interpretationstheoretischen Gründen) weder formulieren noch haben – der Utilitarismus unterminiert die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit seiner eigenen Artikulation. In Abschnitt I charakterisiere ich die Form von Utilitarismus, um die es gehen wird – Handlungs-Utilitarismus auf der idealen Ebene des ethischen Denkens. In Abschnitt II werde ich einen älteren Widerlegungsversuch dieses idealen Akt-Utilitarismus vorstellen und entkräften. Er stammt von Hodgson und ähnelt meinem Argument. Wer Hodgsons Widerlegungsversuch entrinnen will, ist gut beraten, sich auf eine Sprachphilosophie à la Quine einzulassen. Im Abschnitt III tritt Quines Prinzip des Wohlwollens ("principle of charity") auf den Plan. Hier werde ich mithilfe dreier Gedankenexperimente die Beweistechniken vorführen, die meinem Argument zugrundeliegen. Das Argument selber formuliere ich in Abschnitt IV. Ich werde zeigen, dass handlungsutilitaristische Akteure weder Versprechen noch Behauptungen formulieren können. Diese These werde ich in Abschnitt V gegen sechs kleinere Einwände und in Abschnitt VI gegen einen gewichtigen Einwand verteidigen. Im Abschnitt VII werde ich das Argument vervollständigen. I want to explore a new way of refuting act-utilitarianism. My claim is that nobody maximizing utility can possibly be said to believe in act-utilitarianism. In section I, I shall circumscribe the sort of utilitarianism with which we'll be concerned: Act-utilitarianism on the ideal level of ethical thought. Section II is devoted to an earlier attempt of refuting act-utilitarianism, which resembles the argument from this paper. I shall try to show that the proposed refutation (due to Hodgson) is not convincing because it leaves out half of the story. In that section, I shall also motivate the theoretical (Quinean) background of my own argument. The main hero of section III will be Quine's principle of charity; we'll be concerned with three preliminary thought experiments so as to become familiar with the dialectical techniques that will be needed for refuting act-utilitarianism. The core of my paper can be found in section IV. I shall demonstrate that act-utilitarian agents can express neither promises nor assertions. After having defended the latter claim (as regards assertions) against six small objections (section V) and one big objection (section VI), I shall complete my argument in section VII. Peer Reviewed

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Article (journal)
    ISSN: 0038-4283
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    Parent title: The Southern Journal of Philosophy; , 2003; 41,1998,2, Seiten 241-259
    Other subjects: Utilitarismus; ideale Ebene des ethischen Denkens; Idealnorm; idealer Akteur; radikale Übersetzung; radikale Interpretation; Prinzip des Wohlwollens; Externalismus; transzendentales Argument; Möglichkeitsbedingung; Behauptung; Lüge; Versprechen; Gehirn im Tank; Skeptizismus; Hilary Putnam; W.V.O. Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; Richard Hare; D.H. Hodgson; David Lewis; Peter Singer; utilitarianism; ideal level of ethical thought; ideal agent; radical interpretation; principle of charity; externalism; transcendental argument; assertion; lying; promise; brain in a vat; skepticism; Hilary Putnam; W.V.O. Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; Richard Hare; D.H. Hodgson; David Lewis; Peter Singer; Philosophie
    Notes:

    This is a modified version of a paper originally presented on September 16th at the "Fifth Karlovy Vary Symposion on Analytic Philosophy (Swimming in XYZ, Supervised by Hilary Putnam, September 14th-18th, 1998)." A shortened version appeared in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41 No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 241-259.
  2. A Transcendental Argument against Utilitarianism
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

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  3. Motivated skepticism
    Author: Hagenbach, Jeanne; Saucet, Charlotte
    Published: 17 July 2022
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    LZ 161
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17478
    Subjects: Disclosure games; Hard information; unraveling result; skepticism; motivated beliefs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. A comprehensive look at the empirical performance of equity premium prediction II
    Author: Goyal, Amit; Welch, Ivo; Zafirov, Athanasse
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Swiss Finance Institute, Geneva

    Our paper reexamines whether 29 variables from 26 papers published after Goyal and Welch (2008), as well as the original 17 variables, were useful in predicting the equity premium in-sample and out-of-sample. Our samples include the original periods... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 544
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    Our paper reexamines whether 29 variables from 26 papers published after Goyal and Welch (2008), as well as the original 17 variables, were useful in predicting the equity premium in-sample and out-of-sample. Our samples include the original periods in which these variables were identified, but end in 2021. Much of the extant literature seems obsolete, with a majority of variables no longer having empirical support even in-sample. A small number still perform reasonably well

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: Research paper series / Swiss Finance Institute ; no 21, 85
    Subjects: equity premium; prediction; out-of-sample; skepticism
    Other subjects: Array
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 64 Seiten), Illustrationen
  5. Epistemology’s Prime Evils
    Author: Bondy, Patrick
    Published: 2021

    Abstract This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Index theologicus der Universitätsbibliothek Tübingen
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    Abstract This essay addresses what we can call epistemology’s Prime Evils. These are the three demons epistemologists have conjured that are the most troublesome and the most difficult to dispel: Descartes’ classic demon; Lehrer and Cohen’s New Evil Demon; and Schaffer’s Debasing Demon. These demons threaten the epistemic statuses of our beliefs—in particular, the statuses of knowledge and justification—and they present challenges for our theories of these epistemic statuses. This paper explains the key features of these three central demons, highlights their family resemblances and differences, and attempts to show that a certain kind of internalist view of justification provides the resources to handle these demons well.

     
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    Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Article (journal)
    Format: Online
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    Parent title: Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism; Leiden : Brill, 2011; 11(2021), 4, Seite 312-354; Online-Ressource

    Subjects: new evil demon; debasing demon; evil demon; skepticism; justification; knowledge