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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. French domination of Francophone African markets: Post-colonialism at its finest?
    Author: Kohnert, Dirk
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V., Mannheim

    Abstract: Francophone Africa has been dominated to date by the political, economic and cultural repercussions of France’s colonial rule. A major instrument to assert France's interests was the upkeep of a common monetary policy and currency, the CFA... more

     

    Abstract: Francophone Africa has been dominated to date by the political, economic and cultural repercussions of France’s colonial rule. A major instrument to assert France's interests was the upkeep of a common monetary policy and currency, the CFA Franc. Although this has been increasingly resented by African politicians and economists, who wanted to replace it by a West African currency (the 'Eco') the CFA still prevails, due to the social network of French and African political leaders, the 'messieurs Afrique' who benefit from the system. Controversial international discussion concentrates on questions of sovereignty and formal political and economic questions. However, the rules of the informal sector proved to be at least as crucial in structuring the CFA-zone as the institutions and policies of the formal economic sector, including its monetary institutions. For decades, for example, prices of French imports were overpriced, due to protection by tied aid and other political and cultur

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    DDC Categories: 330; 327
    Other subjects: (thesoz)Frankreich; (thesoz)frankophones Afrika; (thesoz)Postkolonialismus; (thesoz)Geldpolitik; (thesoz)Außenhandelspolitik; (thesoz)Freihandelszone; (thesoz)Zollunion; (thesoz)Afrika südlich der Sahara; regulated market; special interests; regulatory capture; CFA franc; international trade; African Studies
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 1-18 S.
    Notes:

    Preprint

    nicht begutachtet
  2. A theory of soft capture
    Author: Agrell, Per J.; Gautier, Axel
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 203 (2010,84)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/69190
    Series: CORE discussion paper ; 2010,84
    Subjects: Regulierung; Asymmetrische Information; Staatsversagen; Regulierungstheorie; regulatory capture
    Scope: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.
  3. The capital buffer calibration for other systemically important institutions
    is the country heterogeneity in the EU caused by regulatory capture?
    Author: Sigmund, Michael
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  OeNB, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna, Austria

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 552
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264824
    Series: Working paper / OeNB, Oesterreichische Nationalbank ; 232
    Subjects: systemic risk; €nancial stability; macroprudential policy; other systemically important institutions; regulatory capture
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 48 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Investing in influence
    how minority interests can prevail in a democracy
    Author: Skaperdas, Stergios; Vaidya, Samarth
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    How can the West's economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    How can the West's economic and political polarization be explained? We argue that persuasive lobbying at various levels of government leads to systematic deviations of policies from those desired by the majority. Implemented policies diverge from the majority position despite centripetal forces that induce interest groups to select positions closer to that majority position. Resources, organization, and cognitive biases can induce one-sided outcomes. When we allow for long-term lobbying infrastructure investments in a simpli_ed tax-and-spend model, the deviations between majority desires and implemented policies are even larger than those in the absence of long-term investments.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248912
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9367 (2021)
    Subjects: interest groups; lobbying; polarization; persuasion; regulatory capture
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 57 Seiten)
  5. A dynamic theory of regulatory capture
    Author: De Chiara, Alessandro; Schwarz, Marco
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the revolving-door channel) than through a hidden payment (i.e., a bribe). This is because the revolving door publicly signals the firm's eagerness and commitment to rewarding lenient regulators, which facilitates collusive equilibria. We find that opening the revolving door conditional on the regulator's report is usually more efficient than a blanket ban on post-agency employment and may increase social welfare. This insight extends to a variety of applications and can also be used to determine the optimal length of cooling-off periods.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235338
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8968 (2021)
    Subjects: collusion; cooling-off periods; corruption; dynamic games; experts; regulation; regulatory capture; revolving door
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen