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  1. Non-partisan "Get-Out-the-Vote" efforts and policy outcomes
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  2. Non-partisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2009

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size." (author's abstract)

     
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  3. Public debt and the political economy of reforms
    Author: Boyer, Pierre C.; Esslinger, Christoph; Roberson, Brian
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63
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    We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and choose the amount of public debt. Politicians also allocate pork-barrel spending to voters in each period. We show that allowing politicians to raise debt ensures that the reform is always implemented when the reform’s ratio of private good to public good gains exceeds a threshold, i.e. the reform generates enough private good benefits. This is not the case when the reform’s ratio of private good to public good gains is below this threshold. We also examine hard and a soft debt limits, and find that both limits reduce the political success of the reform. However, at moderate debt levels soft limits dominate hard limits with respect to equilibrium efficiency of reform provision.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235332
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 8962 (2021)
    Subjects: political competition; public debt; reforms; redistributive politics; debt and spending limits
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 58 Seiten), Illustrationen