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  1. Grenzen für den Utilitarismus
    Ein transzendentales Gegenargument
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, Berlin

    Wenn sich der Utilitarist nicht vorsieht, fällt seine moralische Theorie einem transzendentalen Gegenargument zum Opfer. Dieses Argument richtet sich gegen Handlungsutilitaristen, die ihre Theorie auf einer Ebene der idealen Normen ingangsetzen... more

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    Wenn sich der Utilitarist nicht vorsieht, fällt seine moralische Theorie einem transzendentalen Gegenargument zum Opfer. Dieses Argument richtet sich gegen Handlungsutilitaristen, die ihre Theorie auf einer Ebene der idealen Normen ingangsetzen wollen, indem sie sich bei der Theorieformulierung auf einen idealisierten Akteur stützen, der keinen kognitiven oder motivationalen Beschränkungen unterworfen ist. Das Argument besagt, dass ein solcher idealer Akteur unmöglich Utilitarist sein kann: Der ideale utilitaristische Akteur müsste sein gesamtes Verhalten an der utilitaristischen Maximierungsregel ausrichten – also auch sein gesamtes verbales Verhalten. Wer sich aber beim Sprechen immer konsequent am Utilitarismus orientiert (statt an den sprachlichen Regeln, die für die verschiedenen Sprechakttypen einschlägig sind), vollzieht in Wirklichkeit keine der uns bekannten Sprechakte, sondern eine völlig neue Sorte von Sprechakt (der den tröstenden Worten ähnelt, die wir nach einer Beerdigung den Hinterbliebenen spenden). Kurz, ideale utilitaristische Akteure können keine Behauptungen oder Meinungen äußern. Wenn sie nun keine Meinungen äußern können, dann können sie auch keine Meinungen haben (Privatsprachenargument). Aber Utilitaristen müssen Meinungen haben: Utilitaristen müssen deshalb tun, was sie tun, weil sie meinen, dass dies die besten Konsequenzen zeitigen wird. Damit führt die Annahme, es gäbe ideale utilitaristische Akteure, in einen Widerspruch. Das Argument ist ein transzendentales Argument: Durch konsequent utilitaristisches Redeverhalten entzieht sich der Utilitarist die sprachlichen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, die dafür nötig sind, dass er überhaupt Utilitarist sein kann. Let us imagine an ideal ethical agent, i.e., an agent who (i) holds a certain ethical theory, (ii) has all factual knowledge needed for determining which action among those open to her is right and which is wrong, according to her theory, and who (iii) is ideally motivated to really do whatever her ethical theory demands her to do (even when she speaks). If we grant that the notions of omniscience and ideal motivation both make sense, we may ask: Could there possibly be an ideal utilitarian, that is, an ideal ethical agent whose ethical theory says that our only moral obligation consists in maximizing utility? I claim that an ideal agent cannot be utilitarian. An ideal utilitarian cannot entertain or communicate the beliefs necessary to being a utilitarian. For if every speech act from her mouth maximizes utility, she cannot be interpreted to utter assertions at all. Her very moral theory undermines the conditions necessary for entertaining it. Peer Reviewed

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Contributor: Hogrebe, Wolfram (Publisher)
    Language: German
    Media type: Article (edited volume)
    ISBN: 3-9806762-2-6
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    Parent title: Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen; Bonn : Sinclair Press; ,2002, Seiten 107-115
    Other subjects: Utilitarismus; Idealnorm; Idealer Akteur; Radikale Übersetzung; Radikale Interpretation; Prinzip des Wohlwollens; Transzendentales Argument; Behauptung; Lüge; Willard Van Orman Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; utilitarianism; ideal level of ethical thought; ideal agent; radical translation; radical interpretation; principle of charity; transcendental argument; assertion; lying; Willard Van Orman Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; Philosophie
    Notes:

    Dieser elektronische Text wird hier nicht in der Form wiedergegeben, in der er auf Papier erschienen ist. Zwar gibt es keine inhaltlichen Unterschiede zwischen den beiden Erscheinungsformen der Texte, wohl aber kleinere sprachliche Unterschiede. Das Original findet sich in Wolfram Hogrebe (ed): Grenzen und Grenzüberschreitungen. XIX. Deutscher Kongress für Philosophie - Sektionsbeiträge. (Bonn: Sinclair Press, 2002), pp. 107-115.
  2. A Transcendental Argument against Utilitarianism
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Philosophische Fakultät I, Berlin

    Der Handlungs-Utilitarismus lässt sich mithilfe eines neuen, transzendentalen Arguments widerlegen: Wer stets den Nutzen maximiert, auch beim Reden, der kann seine moralische Position (aus interpretationstheoretischen Gründen) weder formulieren noch... more

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    Der Handlungs-Utilitarismus lässt sich mithilfe eines neuen, transzendentalen Arguments widerlegen: Wer stets den Nutzen maximiert, auch beim Reden, der kann seine moralische Position (aus interpretationstheoretischen Gründen) weder formulieren noch haben – der Utilitarismus unterminiert die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit seiner eigenen Artikulation. In Abschnitt I charakterisiere ich die Form von Utilitarismus, um die es gehen wird – Handlungs-Utilitarismus auf der idealen Ebene des ethischen Denkens. In Abschnitt II werde ich einen älteren Widerlegungsversuch dieses idealen Akt-Utilitarismus vorstellen und entkräften. Er stammt von Hodgson und ähnelt meinem Argument. Wer Hodgsons Widerlegungsversuch entrinnen will, ist gut beraten, sich auf eine Sprachphilosophie à la Quine einzulassen. Im Abschnitt III tritt Quines Prinzip des Wohlwollens ("principle of charity") auf den Plan. Hier werde ich mithilfe dreier Gedankenexperimente die Beweistechniken vorführen, die meinem Argument zugrundeliegen. Das Argument selber formuliere ich in Abschnitt IV. Ich werde zeigen, dass handlungsutilitaristische Akteure weder Versprechen noch Behauptungen formulieren können. Diese These werde ich in Abschnitt V gegen sechs kleinere Einwände und in Abschnitt VI gegen einen gewichtigen Einwand verteidigen. Im Abschnitt VII werde ich das Argument vervollständigen. I want to explore a new way of refuting act-utilitarianism. My claim is that nobody maximizing utility can possibly be said to believe in act-utilitarianism. In section I, I shall circumscribe the sort of utilitarianism with which we'll be concerned: Act-utilitarianism on the ideal level of ethical thought. Section II is devoted to an earlier attempt of refuting act-utilitarianism, which resembles the argument from this paper. I shall try to show that the proposed refutation (due to Hodgson) is not convincing because it leaves out half of the story. In that section, I shall also motivate the theoretical (Quinean) background of my own argument. The main hero of section III will be Quine's principle of charity; we'll be concerned with three preliminary thought experiments so as to become familiar with the dialectical techniques that will be needed for refuting act-utilitarianism. The core of my paper can be found in section IV. I shall demonstrate that act-utilitarian agents can express neither promises nor assertions. After having defended the latter claim (as regards assertions) against six small objections (section V) and one big objection (section VI), I shall complete my argument in section VII. Peer Reviewed

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Article (journal)
    ISSN: 0038-4283
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    Parent title: The Southern Journal of Philosophy; , 2003; 41,1998,2, Seiten 241-259
    Other subjects: Utilitarismus; ideale Ebene des ethischen Denkens; Idealnorm; idealer Akteur; radikale Übersetzung; radikale Interpretation; Prinzip des Wohlwollens; Externalismus; transzendentales Argument; Möglichkeitsbedingung; Behauptung; Lüge; Versprechen; Gehirn im Tank; Skeptizismus; Hilary Putnam; W.V.O. Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; Richard Hare; D.H. Hodgson; David Lewis; Peter Singer; utilitarianism; ideal level of ethical thought; ideal agent; radical interpretation; principle of charity; externalism; transcendental argument; assertion; lying; promise; brain in a vat; skepticism; Hilary Putnam; W.V.O. Quine; Donald Davidson; Dieter Birnbacher; Richard Hare; D.H. Hodgson; David Lewis; Peter Singer; Philosophie
    Notes:

    This is a modified version of a paper originally presented on September 16th at the "Fifth Karlovy Vary Symposion on Analytic Philosophy (Swimming in XYZ, Supervised by Hilary Putnam, September 14th-18th, 1998)." A shortened version appeared in The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 41 No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 241-259.
  3. A Transcendental Argument against Utilitarianism
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 1998
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

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  4. Grenzen für den Utilitarismus
    Author: Müller, Olaf L.
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Berlin

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  5. Lying in competitive environments
    a clean identification of behavioral impacts
    Author: Dato, Simon; Feess, Eberhard; Nieken, Petra
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    In the last decade, forced ranking systems where employees' bonuses depend on their rank assigned by superiors have become less popular. Whereas the inherently competitive structure of ranking systems provides high effort incentives, it might also... more

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    In the last decade, forced ranking systems where employees' bonuses depend on their rank assigned by superiors have become less popular. Whereas the inherently competitive structure of ranking systems provides high effort incentives, it might also increase incentives for misconduct. Previous literature supports this view by demonstrating that, as compared to individual incentive schemes, highly competitive environments are associated with higher degrees of lying and cheating. However, it is not clear if this is driven by stronger financial incentives arising from the high marginal benefit from winning a competition, and/or the behavioral impacts of competition. Psychologically, a competitive environment alters incentives for misconduct via (i) the negative payoff externality that winning imposes on competitors, and (ii) a desire to win, i.e., succeeding in a competition is valuable per se. We design an experiment that allows us to disentangle financial and psychological incentives for misconduct and decompose the behavioral impacts. Our results provide clean evidence of a significant lying-enhancing desire-to-win-effect and an insignificant lying-reducing negative externality effect.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/263791
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9861 (2022)
    Subjects: private information; lying; contest; competition; cheating
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Meta-nudging honesty
    past, present, and future of the research frontier
    Author: Dimant, Eugen; Shalvi, Shaul
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Achieving successful and long-lasting behavior change via nudging comes with challenges. This is particularly true when choice architects attempt to change behavior that is collectively harmful but individually beneficial, such as dishonesty. Here,... more

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    Achieving successful and long-lasting behavior change via nudging comes with challenges. This is particularly true when choice architects attempt to change behavior that is collectively harmful but individually beneficial, such as dishonesty. Here, we introduce the concept of 'meta-nudging' and illustrate its potential benefits in the context of promoting honesty. The meta-nudging approach implies that instead of nudging end-users directly, one would nudge them indirectly via "social influencers". That is, one can arguably achieve better success by changing the behavior of those who have the ability to enforce other's behavior and norm adherence. We argue that this represents a promising new behavior change approach that helps overcome some of the challenges that the classical nudging approach has faced. We use the case of nudging honesty to develop the theoretical foundation of meta-nudging and discuss avenues for future work.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/265974
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9939 (2022)
    Subjects: behaviour change; honesty; lying; nudging
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa10Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. The effect of chosen or given luck on honesty
    Author: Geraldes, Diogo; Theurich, Franziska; Kim, Duk Gyoo
    Published: August 2022
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Does being lucky (or unlucky) affect honest decision-making? We examine (1) whether luck-based income strengthens or erodes the moral value of honesty; (2) whether the perceived level of agency over an uncertain event affects the relationship between... more

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    Does being lucky (or unlucky) affect honest decision-making? We examine (1) whether luck-based income strengthens or erodes the moral value of honesty; (2) whether the perceived level of agency over an uncertain event affects the relationship between luck and honesty; and (3) whether accumulated luck affects honesty. To this end, we conducted a lab experiment where participants self-report a dice roll outcome, which is associated with effort-based income, after having received luck-based income. We manipulated the participants' perceptions regarding their influence on luck-based income. In the exogenous luck treatment, computerized coin tosses determines the luck-based income, whereas in the endogenous luck treatment, the participants choose the coin's winning side before the computerized coin toss. Our results are as follows: (1) lying behaviour increases when contemporaneous luck-based income is high, (2) lying is not affected by the perceived level of agency, and (3) lying is not affected by the previous outcomes of the luck-based income. Our observations challenge the relative importance of context that may render moral justification. Therefore, our findings indicate that differences in dishonest behavior may be largely due to individual-specific heterogeneity.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/265939
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9904 (2022)
    Subjects: laboratory experiment; lying; luck; honesty; agency
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Norm compliance and lying patterns
    an experimental study among refugees and non-refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Germany
    Author: El Bialy, Nora; Fraile Aranda, Elisa; Nicklisch, Andreas; Saleh, Lamis; Voigt, Stefan
    Published: January 2021
    Publisher:  Universität Hamburg, Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft, [Hamburg]

    We report the results of an experiment on norm violation, specifically lying, in a repeatedly played mind game with Syrian refugees in Jordan and in Germany. We compare their behavior with Jordanians, Germans, and Syrians who still live in Syria. The... more

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    We report the results of an experiment on norm violation, specifically lying, in a repeatedly played mind game with Syrian refugees in Jordan and in Germany. We compare their behavior with Jordanians, Germans, and Syrians who still live in Syria. The average number of lies is amazingly similar - and low - across all five samples. However, the lying patterns of Syrian refugees are very different from non-refugee participants in Germany, Jordan, and Syria itself. After having lied once, refugee participants resort to a "never return"- pattern significantly more often than the nonrefugee participants. A closer look at the socio-demographic characteristics of our Syrian refugee participants reveals that lying is associated with higher age and gender, while a longer stay in the host country is positively correlated with a lower likelihood of reporting extreme numbers of matches.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228744
    Series: Institute of Law and Economics working paper series ; no. 44 (2021)
    Subjects: Civil war; experimental economics; honesty; lying; psychological distress
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Honesty nudges
    effect varies with content but not with timing
    Author: Le Maux, Benoît; Necker, Sarah
    Published: January 2023
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an... more

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    We use a ten-round online mind game to determine whether the effect of honesty nudges depends on timing and content. Reminding individuals about the right thing to do increases honesty. Including information that it is possible to assess an individual's dishonesty strengthens the effect of the intervention. Both types of intervention are similarly effective when they take place before an individual has made any decision or after individuals have played five rounds of the mind game. Nudging an individual after they have made five decisions allows us to add personalized information based on the individual's previous response; however, this does not increase honesty. Examining the reaction to nudges based on previous behavior shows that (presumably) honest and dishonest individuals respond by reducing overreporting. The effect of the different nudge content is driven by those previously dishonest.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/271865
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10221 (2023)
    Subjects: dishonesty; lying; cheating; honesty nudge; moral reminder; deterrence
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Malleability of preferences for honesty
    Author: Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences... more

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    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/256763
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 296 (November 15, 2021)
    Subjects: honesty; lying; truth-telling; formation of preferences; experiments with children
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  11. Nudging enforcers
    how norm perceptions and motives for lying shape sanctions
    Author: Dimant, Eugen; Gesche, Tobias
    Published: October 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of mul-tiple studies using different methodologies (a behavioral experiment and a vignette experiment in Study 1, as well as a norm elicitation experiment in... more

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    The enforcement of social norms is the fabric of a functioning society. Through the lens of mul-tiple studies using different methodologies (a behavioral experiment and a vignette experiment in Study 1, as well as a norm elicitation experiment in Study 2), we examine how motives for lying and norm perceptions steer norm enforcement. Pursuing a pre-registered three-part data collection effort, our study investigates the extent to which norm breaches are sanctioned, how norm-nudges affect punishment behavior, and how enforcement links to norm perceptions. Using a representative sample of U.S. participants, we provide robust evidence that norm-enforcement is not only sensitive to the magnitude of the observed transgression (= size of the lie) but also to the consequence of the transgression (= whether the lie remedies or creates payoff inequalities). We also find that norm enforcers are sensitive to different norm-nudges that convey social in-formation about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. Importantly, these results hold both in the behavioral experiment and in an add-on vignette study that confirm the robustness of our findings in the context of whistleblowing. To explain the punishment patterns of the behavioral experiment in Study 1, we subsequently examine how norms are perceived across dif-ferent transgressions and how norm-nudges change these perceptions. We find that social norm perceptions are malleable: norm-nudges are most effective when preexisting norms are vague. Importantly, we find that punishment patterns in the first experiment closely follow these norm perceptions. With that, our findings suggest that norm enforcement can be nudged successfully.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/248930
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9385 (2021)
    Subjects: lying; norm-nudges; nudging; punishment; social norms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 103 Seiten), Illustrationen
  12. Lying in two dimensions
    Author: Geraldes, Diogo; Theurich, Franziska; Rosenkranz, Stephanie
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  U.S.E. Research Institute, Utrecht, The Netherlands

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: U.S.E. working paper series ; nr: 21, 01
    Subjects: lying; honesty; morals; multi-dimensional; lab experiment; lab-in-the-field experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. Big and small lies
    Author: Geraldes, Diogo; Theurich, Franziska; Kim, Duk Gyoo
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  U.S.E. Research Institute, Utrecht, The Netherlands

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: U.S.E. working paper series ; nr: 21, 03
    Subjects: laboratory experiment; lying; luck; honesty
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. The effect of self-awareness and competition on dishonesty
    Author: Çıbık, Ceren Bengü; Sgroi, Daniel
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  University of Warwick, Department of Economics, Coventry, United Kingdom

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    Format: Online
    Series: Warwick economics research papers ; no: 1373 (September 2021)
    Subjects: lying; honesty; truth-telling; cognitive dissonance; social norms; competition;experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Unexpected waiting corrupts
    Author: Dezső, Linda; Hajdu, Gergely; Tobol, Yossef
    Published: March 2024
    Publisher:  Vienna University of Economics and Business, Wien

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    Series: Department of Economics working paper / Vienna University of Economics and Business ; no. 358
    Subjects: die–under–the–cup task; lying; expectations; compensation–seeking; waiting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Resolving lawsuits with a decisive oath
    an economic analysis
    Author: Coşgel, Metin Murat; Miceli, Thomas J.; Özer, Emre
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, Storrs, CT

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: Revised May 2023
    Series: Department of Economics working paper series / University of Connecticut ; 2023, 03 (March 2023)
    Subjects: Decisive oath; law; dispute resolution; legal procedure; litigation; settlement; trial; evidence; lying; Ottoman law
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Malleability of preferences for honesty
    Author: Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences... more

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    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/236335
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 14304
    Subjects: honesty; lying; truth-telling; formation of preferences; experiments with children
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Malleability of preferences for honesty
    Author: Abeler, Johannes; Falk, Armin; Kosse, Fabian
    Published: April 2021
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences... more

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    Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/235403
    Series: CESifo working paper ; no. 9033 (2021)
    Subjects: honesty; lying; truth-telling; formation of preferences; experiments with children
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Individual oath-swearing and lying under peer pressure
    Author: Kingsuwankul, Sorravich
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying... more

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    Previous studies have shown that an oath can reduce lying at an individual level. Can oaths reduce lying in groups, a context where the prevalence of lying is typically higher? Results from a lab experiment reveal that the impact of an oath on lying in a group context depends on the incentive structure. Oath reduces lying only when payoffs are independent. Evidence supports the notion that payoff interdependence creates pressure on individuals to conform to the group, crowding out the impact of oath on honest reporting. An implication is that to be effective in an organizational context, an oath intervention must be designed in strict connection with the incentive structures.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282882
    Series: Array ; TI 2023, 069
    Subjects: Honesty oath; lying; group incentive; peer pressure; lab experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Honesty of groups
    effects of size and gender composition
    Author: Mühlheußer, Gerd; Promann, Timo; Roider, Andreas; Wallmeier, Niklas
    Published: April 2024
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This paper studies unethical behavior by groups and provides systematic evidence on how lying decisions are affected by group size and group gender composition. We conduct an online experiment with 1,677 participants (477 groups) where group members... more

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    This paper studies unethical behavior by groups and provides systematic evidence on how lying decisions are affected by group size and group gender composition. We conduct an online experiment with 1,677 participants (477 groups) where group members can communicate with each other via a novel video chat tool. Our key findings are that (i) larger groups lie more, (ii) all-male groups stand out in their proclivity to lie, (iii) already the first female in a group causes an honesty shift, and (iv) group behavior cannot be fully explained by members' individual honesty preferences.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/299882
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16954
    Subjects: group decisions; unethical behavior; lying; gender differences; online experiment; group video chat
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Commitment requests do not affect truth-telling in laboratory and online experiments
    Author: Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Rincke, Johannes; Schudy, Simeon
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions)... more

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    Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

     
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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/282157
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 466 (November 27, 2023)
    Subjects: cheating; lying; truth-telling; compliance; commitment; no-cheating rule; no-cheating declaration; commitment request
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten)
  22. Unexpected waiting corrupts
    Author: Dezső, Linda; Hajdu, Gergely; Tobol, Yossef
    Published: Februar 2024
    Publisher:  EcoAustria - Institute for Economic Research, Wien, Austria

    The experience of waiting is ubiquitous in all areas of life, and sometimes a waiting experi ence is followed by decisions where morality matters. We present the results of a lab-in-the-field study to analyze the effects of (un)expected waiting... more

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    The experience of waiting is ubiquitous in all areas of life, and sometimes a waiting experi ence is followed by decisions where morality matters. We present the results of a lab-in-the-field study to analyze the effects of (un)expected waiting duration on moral behavior. Passengers who had just joined the check-in line at the Ben Gurion Airport guessed how long they would have to wait to check in. After checking in, they then completed the die-under-the-cup task, wherein they could lie without being caught to improve their financial outcomes. Specifically, passengers rolled a die privately and reported any number of dots, knowing that their earn ings increase linearly in the number reported. We found that both the wait duration and its unexpectedness adversely shape morality. For comparison, an expected 100-minute wait and an unexpected 25-minute wait resulted in the same average increase of one dot in the reported number. We propose that after a wait (especially if unexpected), people seek compensation. As we fail to find selections on observables, we argue that the setup provides variations that are comparable to random assignments, giving support to the effects estimated. These results underscore that managing expectations about waiting duration could play an important role in mitigating subsequent immoral behavior.

     
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    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/283619
    Series: Research paper / EcoAustria ; no. 26
    Subjects: die-under-the-cup task; lying; expectations; compensation-seeking; waiting
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Lying to individuals versus lying to groups
    Author: Angelova, Vera; Tolksdorf, Michel
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    We investigate experimentally whether individuals or groups are more lied to, and how lying depends on the group size and the monetary loss inflicted by the lie. We employ an observed cheating game, where an individual's misreport of a privately... more

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    We investigate experimentally whether individuals or groups are more lied to, and how lying depends on the group size and the monetary loss inflicted by the lie. We employ an observed cheating game, where an individual's misreport of a privately observed number can monetarily benefit her while causing a loss to either a single individual, a group of two or a group of five. As the privately observed number is known to the experimenter, the game allows to study both, whether the report deviates from the observed number and also by how much. Treatments either vary the individual loss caused by a given lie (keeping the total loss constant), or the total loss (keeping the individual loss constant). We find more lies toward individuals than toward groups. Liars impose a larger loss with their lie when that loss is split among group members rather than borne individually. The size of the group does not affect lying behavior.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282042
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 350 (December 15, 2022)
    Subjects: cheating; lying; groups; observed cheating game; laboratory experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 20 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Attempting to detect a lie
    do we think it through?
    Author: Grabova, Iuliia; Nielsen, Hedda; Weizsäcker, Georg
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190, [München]

    Game-theoretic analyses of communication rely on beliefs – especially, the receiver’s belief about the truth status of an utterance and the sender’s belief about the reaction to the utterance – but research that provides measurements of such beliefs... more

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    Game-theoretic analyses of communication rely on beliefs – especially, the receiver’s belief about the truth status of an utterance and the sender’s belief about the reaction to the utterance – but research that provides measurements of such beliefs is still in its infancy. Our experiment examines the use of second-order beliefs, measuring belief hierarchies regarding a message that may be a lie. In a two-player communication game between a sender and a receiver, the sender knows the state of the world and has a transparent incentive to deceive the receiver. The receiver chooses a binary reaction. For a wide set of non-equilibrium beliefs, the reaction and the receiver’s second-order belief should dissonate: she should follow the sender’s statement if and only if she believes that the sender believes that she does not follow the statement. The opposite is true empirically, constituting a new pattern of inconsistency between actions and beliefs.

     
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    hdl: 10419/282168
    Series: Discussion paper / Rationality & Competition, CRC TRR 190 ; no. 477 (December 13, 2023)
    Subjects: strategic information transmission; lying; higher-order beliefs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 25 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. The truth-telling of truth-seekers
    evidence from online experiments with scientists
    Author: Drupp, Moritz A.; Khadjavi, Menusch; Voss, Rüdiger
    Published: January 2024
    Publisher:  CESifo, Munich, Germany

    Academic honesty is crucial for scientific advancement, yet replication crises and misconduct scandals are omnipresent. We provide evidence on scientists' truth-telling from two incentivized coin-tossing experiments with more than 1,300 scientists.... more

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    Academic honesty is crucial for scientific advancement, yet replication crises and misconduct scandals are omnipresent. We provide evidence on scientists' truth-telling from two incentivized coin-tossing experiments with more than 1,300 scientists. Experiment I, with predominantly European and North-American scientists, shows that fewer scientists over-report winning tosses when their professional identity is salient. The global Experiment II yields heterogeneous effects. We replicate Experiment I's effect for North-American scientists, but find the opposite for Southern European and East-Asian scientists. Over-reporting correlates with publication metrics and country-level measures of academic and field-experimental dishonesty, suggesting that country-level honesty norms also guide truth-telling by scientists.

     
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    hdl: 10419/295986
    Series: CESifo working papers ; 10897 (2024)
    Subjects: truth-telling; lying; identity; science; cross-country; experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen