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  1. The hold down problem and the boundaries of the firm
    lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

  2. Hidden insurance in a moral hazard economy
  3. Incentivizing research with (un)conditional teaching duties
    punishment or rent extraction?
    Published: 06 February 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Access:
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    Verlag (lizenzpflichtig)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    LZ 161
    No inter-library loan
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP17885
    Subjects: Moral hazard; limited liability; hidden action; incentive contractsADE-206; job design
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten)
  4. The hold-down problem and the boundaries of the firm
    lessons from a hidden action model with endogenous outside option
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  IZA, Bonn

    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    W 1194 (464)
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
    ifo Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, Bibliothek
    98/464 B-464
    No inter-library loan
    Export to reference management software   RIS file
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 464
    Subjects: Theorie der Unternehmung; Organisationsstruktur; Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Leistungsanreiz; Verhandlungstheorie; Outsourcing; Theorie; hidden action
    Scope: 24 S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 20 - 21