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Displaying results 1 to 25 of 38.

  1. The political economy of enforcing fiscal rules
    Author: Wijsman, Sebastiaan; Crombez, Christophe
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Leuven, Belgi͏̈e

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: MSI ; MSI_17, 01
    Subjects: Fiscal rules; Stability and Growth Pact; enforcement
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten)
  2. Economic and legal aspects of international environmental agreements
    the case of enforcing and stabilising an international CO_1htn2 agreement
    Contributor: Heister, Johannes (Mitwirkender)
    Published: 1995
    Publisher:  Inst. für Weltwirtschaft an der Univ., Kiel

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  3. Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion
    Author: Borck, Rainald
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  DIW, Berlin

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  4. Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion
    Author: Borck, Rainald
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin

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  5. Perceived fairness and regulatory policy
    a behavioural science perspective on government-citizen interactions
    Author: Lind, E. Allan; Arndt-Bascle, Christiane
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  OECD Publishing, Paris

    A great deal of research in psychology and policy studies has demonstrated that when citizens feel fairly treated in their encounters with government agencies, they are more likely to accept and comply with regulatory rules and decisions, to feel... more

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    A great deal of research in psychology and policy studies has demonstrated that when citizens feel fairly treated in their encounters with government agencies, they are more likely to accept and comply with regulatory rules and decisions, to feel included in society and to trust their government. This paper explains how careful design of rocedures in the development and administration of laws and regulations and targeted training of officials can enhance perceived fairness and produce greater decision acceptance and compliance. It draws on a large number of empirical studies in different policy settings and countries to identify three key factors that drive perceived fairness: voice, respect and explanations. Successful programs to improve subjective justice must be built upon a foundation of objective justice: attempts to simulate fairness without actually providing objectively fair procedures tend to provoke very negative reactions when the true nature of the unfair process is discovered. Findings of this paper feed into OECD work on trust, open government and stakeholder engagement.

     
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: OECD regulatory policy working papers ; no. 6
    Subjects: compliance; enforcement; citizen; trust; regulatory policy; behavioural economics; appeal process; consultation; inclusive; Governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. How to improve tax compliance?
    evidence from population-wide experiments in Belgium
    Author: De Neve, Jan-Emmanuel; Imbert, Clement; Spinnewijn, Johannes; Tsankova, Teodora; Luts, Maarten
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Performance, London School of Economics and Political Science, London

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: CEP discussion paper ; no 1621 (May 2019)
    Subjects: Tax compliance; field experiments; simplification; enforcement
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 73 Seiten), Illustrationen
  7. Sovereign defaults in court
    Author: Schuhmacher, Julian; Trebesch, Christoph; Enderlein, Henrik
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW), Kiel

  8. Perceived fairness and regulatory policy
    a behavioural science perspective on government-citizen interactions
    Author: Lind, E. Allan; Arndt-Bascle, Christiane
    Published: 2016
    Publisher:  OECD Publishing, Paris

    A great deal of research in psychology and policy studies has demonstrated that when citizens feel fairly treated in their encounters with government agencies, they are more likely to accept and comply with regulatory rules and decisions, to feel... more

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    A great deal of research in psychology and policy studies has demonstrated that when citizens feel fairly treated in their encounters with government agencies, they are more likely to accept and comply with regulatory rules and decisions, to feel included in society and to trust their government. This paper explains how careful design of rocedures in the development and administration of laws and regulations and targeted training of officials can enhance perceived fairness and produce greater decision acceptance and compliance. It draws on a large number of empirical studies in different policy settings and countries to identify three key factors that drive perceived fairness: voice, respect and explanations. Successful programs to improve subjective justice must be built upon a foundation of objective justice: attempts to simulate fairness without actually providing objectively fair procedures tend to provoke very negative reactions when the true nature of the unfair process is discovered. Findings of this paper feed into OECD work on trust, open government and stakeholder engagement.

     
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    Source: Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin
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    Series: OECD regulatory policy working papers ; no. 6
    Subjects: compliance; enforcement; citizen; trust; regulatory policy; behavioural economics; appeal process; consultation; inclusive; Governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen
  9. Blockchain's struggle to deliver impersonal exchange
    Author: Arruñada, Benito
    Published: January 2017
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
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    Series: Economics working paper series / Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business ; no. 1549
    Subjects: property rights; enforcement; transaction costs; impersonal exchange; blockchain; distributed ledgers; smart contracts
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 33 Seiten)
  10. How should we model property?
    thinking with my critics
    Author: Arruñada, Benito
    Published: May 2017
    Publisher:  Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Economics working paper series / Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Department of Economics and Business ; no. 1570
    Subjects: property rights; externalities; enforcement; transaction costs; publicordering; private ordering; impersonal exchange
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  11. How should we model property?
    thinking with my critics
    Author: Arruñada, Benito
    Published: May 2017
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
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    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 970
    Subjects: property rights; externalities; enforcement; transaction costs; public ordering; private ordering; impersonal exchange
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 23 Seiten)
  12. N-S trade with weak institutions
    Author: Anderson, James E.
    Published: June 22, 2017
    Publisher:  Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA, USA

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Boston College working papers in economics ; number 930
    Subjects: Predation; enforcement; colonialism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  13. How Rome enabled impersonal markets
    Author: Arruñada, Benito
    Published: March, 2016
    Publisher:  GSE, Graduate School of Economics, Barcelona

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: March 2016
    Series: Barcelona GSE working paper series ; no 881
    Subjects: property rights; enforcement; transaction costs; Roman law; impersonal exchange; personal exchange; New Institutional Economics; Law and Economics
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten)
    Notes:

    Kein Zugriff auf das Dokument
  14. Nautical patrol and illegal fishing practices
    Author: Kastoryano, Stephen; Vollaard, Ben A.
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    We uncover a hidden illegal fishing practice: the use of fishing nets with illegally small mesh size. The small mesh prevents nearly all fish of saleable size from escaping the net, but also traps a large number of fish which are too small to be sold... more

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    We uncover a hidden illegal fishing practice: the use of fishing nets with illegally small mesh size. The small mesh prevents nearly all fish of saleable size from escaping the net, but also traps a large number of fish which are too small to be sold on the market and are therefore discarded at sea. Our approach relies on readily available data on reported fish landings rather than on data from inspections, which are rare, and which tend to be anticipated by fishermen. We focus on bottom trawling, the world's most widely used fishing method. We exploit the fact that using illegally small mesh size strongly increases the share of small fish in the catch. Using quasi-random variation in nautical patrol as a source of variation in the incentive to comply, we show that in weeks without patrol the share of small fish in the landed catch is systematically larger than in adjacent weeks with patrol. Our results are in line with widespread use of illegally small mesh.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/265764
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 15543
    Subjects: enforcement; regulation; environmental economics; fisheries
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 53 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. The effectiveness of revolving door laws
    evidence from government debt management
    Author: Silano, Filippo
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  Universität Hamburg, Fakultät für Rechtswissenschaft, [Hamburg]

    The increasing presence of the revolving door across several dimensions of statecraft has prompted the introduction of laws addressing the phenomenon's risks. Focusing on executive branches in charge of issuing and managing government debt - debt... more

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    The increasing presence of the revolving door across several dimensions of statecraft has prompted the introduction of laws addressing the phenomenon's risks. Focusing on executive branches in charge of issuing and managing government debt - debt management units (DMUs) -, this article delivers a case study assessing the effectiveness of revolving door policies, with the overarching purpose of designing regulatory solutions. In government debt management, the revolving door denotes the transition of employees working at the dealers to DMUs, and vice versa. Dealers are financial institutions either appointed by the domestic DMU to participate in auctions of government securities, or exclusively distributing bonds in the secondary market. Drawing on a comparative legal analysis across eight OECD countries and career data from a sample of public debt managers, this study provides empirical evidence that despite legislations curbing the revolving door are in force, the dynamic is free to flow. Reasons are lack of effective monitoring, credible enforcement mechanisms and adequate ethical culture. Addressing shortcomings, policy proposals advocate the establishment of independent oversight bodies endowed with sanctioning power, and measures enhancing the transparency of public officials' career moves. Identifying and plugging loopholes in the framework in force, this study aims at steering policymakers through the ongoing process of modernising conflict of interest regulation.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/264441
    Series: Institute of Law and Economics working paper series ; no. 63 (2022)
    Subjects: revolving doors; conflicts of interest; public integrity; government debt management; effectiveness of policies; enforcement; regulatory governance
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 34 Seiten), Illustrationen
  16. Revealing 21 per cent of GDP in hidden assets
    evidence from Argentina's tax amnesties
    Author: Londoño Vélez, Juliana; Tortarolo, Dario
    Published: September 2022
    Publisher:  United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research, Helsinki, Finland

    This paper studies the effectiveness of tax amnesties and their impacts on capital taxation and public spending. We leverage rich policy variation from Argentina, where left- and right-wing governments implemented multiple programmes and achieved... more

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    This paper studies the effectiveness of tax amnesties and their impacts on capital taxation and public spending. We leverage rich policy variation from Argentina, where left- and right-wing governments implemented multiple programmes and achieved varying success. After numerous failed enforcement efforts, its 2016 scheme reportedly revealed assets worth 21 per cent of GDP-the world's most successful tax amnesty. We use detailed data from fiscal tabulations spanning two decades and obtain three key results. First, despite substantial offshore tax evasion, declared foreign assets quadrupled after the 2016 amnesty. Second, disclosures were extensive among the wealthiest 0.1 per cent of individuals, who more than doubled their declared assets. Third, improving tax compliance has sizeable fiscal externalities on capital taxes and social transfers: the wealth and capital income tax bases more than doubled, and the amnesty's earmarked revenue boosted pension benefits by 15 per cent. We conclude by discussing the lessons from Argentina's experience with amnesty programmes.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789292672379
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/273897
    Series: WIDER working paper ; 2022, 103
    Subjects: tax evasion; amnesties; enforcement; Argentina
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  17. Social norms or enforcement?
    a natural field experiment to improve traffic and parking fine compliance
    Author: Sinning, Mathias; Zhang, Yinjunjie
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Essen, Germany

    Very little is known about the efficient collection of fines despite their indispensable contribution to local government budgets. This paper fills an important gap in the literature by studying the effectiveness of deterrence (enforcement) and... more

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    Very little is known about the efficient collection of fines despite their indispensable contribution to local government budgets. This paper fills an important gap in the literature by studying the effectiveness of deterrence (enforcement) and non-deterrence (social norms) letters that aim to improve the collection of traffic and parking fines. We discuss potential mechanisms through which these letters may affect fine compliance and present results from a natural field experiment that was implemented in collaboration with the government of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT). We find that both letters increase fine payments significantly relative to a control group that did not receive a letter. The effect of the enforcement letter is stronger than that of the social norms letter. Our analysis of heterogenous treatment effects indicates that addressing social norms does not change the behavior of young offenders, those who committed a speeding offence, those with a long outstanding debt and those with a debt above the median. In contrast, the enforcement letter is generally effective across subgroups. Über die effiziente Eintreibung von Bußgeldern ist sehr wenig bekannt, obwohl sie einen unverzichtbaren Beitrag zu den Budgets der Kommunalverwaltungen leisten. Dieser Artikel füllt eine wichtige Lücke in der Literatur, indem er die Wirksamkeit von Briefen mit abschreckenden (Vollstreckung) und nicht-abschreckenden (soziale Norm) Mitteilungen untersucht, die darauf abzielen, die Eintreibung von Verkehrs- und Parkbußen zu verbessern. Wir diskutieren mögliche Mechanismen, durch die diese Briefe die Einhaltung von Bußgeldern beeinflussen können und präsentieren Ergebnisse von einem natürlichen Feldexperiment, das in Zusammenarbeit mit der Regierung des Australian Capital Territory (ACT) durchgeführt wurde. Wir finden, dass beide Briefe die Bußgeldzahlungen im Vergleich zu einer Kontrollgruppe, die keinen Brief erhalten hat, signifikant erhöhen. Der Effekt des Vollstreckungsbriefes ist stärker als der des sozialen Norm-Briefes. Unsere Analyse heterogener Effekte zeigt, dass das Ansprechen sozialer Normen das Verhalten von jungen Straftätern, von Personen, die eine Geschwindigkeitsüberschreitung begangen haben, von Personen mit einer lang ausstehenden Schuld und von Personen mit einer Verschuldung über dem Median nicht verändert. Im Gegensatz dazu ist der Vollstreckungsbrief generell über alle Untergruppen hinweg wirksam.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9783969730416
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/249303
    Series: Ruhr economic papers ; #900
    Subjects: Fine compliance; natural field experiment; nudges; enforcement; social norms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. Does media visibility make EU fiscal rules more effective?
    Author: Mohl, Philipp; Mourre, Gilles; Langedijk, Sven; Hoogeland, Martijn
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9789276446231
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    Series: Array ; 155 (December 2021)
    Subjects: fiscal rules; fiscal councils; media visibility; tonality of news; enforcement; panel data
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 38 Seiten), Illustrationen
  19. Heterogeneous returns of informality: evidence from Brazil
    Author: Otero-Cortés, Andrea
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  Banco de la República Colombia, Centro de Estudios Económicos Regionales (CEER), Cartagena

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    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 20.500.12134/10378
    Series: Documentos de trabajo sobre economía regional y urbana ; no. 310 (june, 2022)
    Subjects: Labor informality; labor regulation; enforcement; marginal treatment effects
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  20. Theoretical foundations of relational incentive contracts
    Author: Watson, Joel
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  Department of Economics, UC San Diego, San Diego

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    Series: Recent work / Department of Economics, UC San Diego
    Subjects: relational contracts; enforcement; game theory; negotiation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 35 Seiten), Illustrationen
  21. Measuring effective labor regulation in the less developed world
    recent advances and challenges ahead
    Author: Ronconi, Lucas; Raphael, Steven
    Published: March 2024
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    This paper reviews recent efforts in social science to analyze labor enforcement in low-andmiddle income countries (LMIC) and inform policy debates. Despite the existing limitations, the empirical evidence suggests that: 1) Enforcement is quite low... more

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    This paper reviews recent efforts in social science to analyze labor enforcement in low-andmiddle income countries (LMIC) and inform policy debates. Despite the existing limitations, the empirical evidence suggests that: 1) Enforcement is quite low in LMIC; there are fewer inspectors and inspections, lower penalties, and less trust in the judiciary compared to developed countries. 2) Increasing enforcement produces more compliance with little job destruction, although there is substantial debate and heterogeneity across countries. 3) Countries with more protective labor codes tend to enforce less. 4) Countries that become more open to trade also tend to enforce less. However, trade agreements with special clauses protecting workers can promote higher labor enforcement. 5) Inspection agencies in LMIC tend to focus their efforts on formal firms, leaving informal firms out of the radar which implies that the most vulnerable workers are usually excluded. 6) The constituency base of the government shapes labor enforcement, wherein labor-based governments devote more resources to inspection, although this is a debated issue. 7) Labor unions help promote enforcement, although in LMIC they can displace public inspections from small informal firms to larger formal firms because there is where labor unions members work. 8) Autonomous and professional bureaucracies do more labor enforcement presumably because they internalize the long-run benefits of enforcing the law and allow inspectors to accumulate experience.

     
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    Media type: Book
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289811
    Series: IZA policy paper ; no. 210
    Subjects: labor; inspections; enforcement; informality; development; judiciary
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten)
  22. Tax policies, informality, and real wage rigidities
    Author: García, Andrés; Jaramillo, Fernando; Salazar, Marlon
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Banco de la Republica Colombia, Bogotá, Colombia

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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 20.500.12134/10661
    Series: Borradores de economía ; no.1245 (2023)
    Subjects: Informality; payroll taxes; fiscal policy; enforcement; search frictions,shirking
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 40 Seiten), Illustrationen
  23. Weberian civil service and labor enforcement
    Author: Dewey, Matías; Ronconi, Lucas
    Published: July 2023
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    Most workers in the developing world do not receive the benefits they are legally entitled to. Why, then, is there so little public enforcement? This paper argues that this is partly because of a lack of an autonomous and professional bureaucracy.... more

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    Most workers in the developing world do not receive the benefits they are legally entitled to. Why, then, is there so little public enforcement? This paper argues that this is partly because of a lack of an autonomous and professional bureaucracy. Using a novel dataset with objective measures of labor inspections and fines across countries, we show that Weberian bureaucracies are more likely to enforce labor standards. We provide OLS and 2SLS estimates that address endogeneity concerns and use ethnographic evidence collected in Latin America to understand the mechanisms better. The case study suggests that politicized bureaucracies underinvest in labor inspection because elected officials have short-term horizons and do not internalize the social benefits of enforcement (such as formal job creation and enhancement of the rule of law) because they take time to materialize.

     
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    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/278993
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 16295
    Subjects: enforcement; autonomy; compliance; state-capture; labor
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  24. Crime and (a preference for) punishment
    the effects of drug policy reform on policing activity
    Author: Soliman, Adam
    Published: June 25, 2021
    Publisher:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    We still know very little about the incentives of police, often due to data constraints and the underlying policy environment. Using geocoded crime data and a novel source of within-city spatial and temporal variation in punishment severity, I am able to shed light on enforcement behavior. I find that in parts of a city where drug penalties were weakened, there is a 13% decrease in drug arrests within a year; there is no displacement of non-drug offenses and majority black neighborhoods have a larger decline in drug arrests. If offenders were significantly deterred by harsher penalties, as the law intended and Becker’s (1968) model predicts, there should have been an increase in drug arrests. My results are therefore consistent with police treating enforcement effort and punishment severity as complementary. I also find that citywide crime and drug use do not increase following the weakening of drug penalties; this calls into question the "War on Drugs" view of punishment and suggests that certain types enforcement can be reduced without incurring large public safety costs

     
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    Media type: Book
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    Series: ERID working paper ; number 303
    Subjects: crime; enforcement; deterrence; punishment; enhanced penalty zones
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  25. Social norms or enforcement?
    a natural field experiment to improve traffic and parking fine compliance
    Author: Sinning, Mathias; Zhang, Yinjunjie
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  Australian National University, Canberra

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    Series: TTPI - working papers ; 2021, 4 (March 2021)
    Subjects: Fine compliance; natural field experiment; nudges; enforcement; social norms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 39 Seiten), Illustrationen