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Displaying results 1 to 4 of 4.

  1. Three accounting research essays in a historical setting
    Author: Günther, Jens
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Berlin

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  2. The association between mandated environmental liability recognition and voluntary ESG disclosure quality
    Author: Bens, Daniel; Chen, Cai; Joos, Peter
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  INSEAD, [Fontainebleau]

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    No inter-library loan
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; 2022, 38
    Subjects: Asset Retirement Obligations; AROs; Voluntary Disclosure; ESG; Environmental
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 51 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Failure of unravelling theory?
    a natural field experiment on voluntary quality disclosure
    Author: Lane, Tom; Zhou, Minghai
    Published: December 2022
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    Classic "unravelling" theory holds that buyers should treat with maximal scepticism sellers who withhold verifiable information relating to their quality, as buyers infer from such non-disclosure that the seller possesses the lowest possible quality.... more

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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 175
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    No inter-library loan

     

    Classic "unravelling" theory holds that buyers should treat with maximal scepticism sellers who withhold verifiable information relating to their quality, as buyers infer from such non-disclosure that the seller possesses the lowest possible quality. This study is the first to use a natural field experiment to test this proposition, and the first to test it in a labour market context. We sent out 12,301 job applications, varying the information on degree classification - a signal of academic quality - that the applicant presented to the employer. Our results do not support unravelling theory. Applications which left degree classification undisclosed were significantly more likely to receive positive responses from employers than those disclosing the lowest possible degree classification. Employers treated non-disclosing applicants similarly to those disclosing mid-scale classifications, suggesting the extent to which adverse inference is drawn from missing information is limited. Evidence is presented against the alternative interpretation that non-disclosure success is driven by recruiters' usage of software tools.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/284275
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2022, 17
    Subjects: Voluntary Disclosure; Unravelling; Labour Market; Field Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Failure of unravelling theory?
    a natural field experiment on voluntary quality disclosure
    Author: Lane, Tom; Zhou, Minghai
    Published: November 2021
    Publisher:  CEDEX, Centre for Decision Research & Experimental Economics, Nottingham

    This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 175
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    This paper presents a simple adaptive model of demand adjustment in cooperative games, and analyzes this model in weighted majority games. In the model, a randomly chosen player sets his demand to the highest possible value subject to the demands of other coalitions members being satisfied. This basic process converges to the aspiration set. By introducing some perturbations into the process, we show that the set of separating aspirations, i.e. demand vectors in which no player is indispensable in order for other players to achieve their demands, is the one most resistant to mutations. We then apply the process to weighted majority games. We show that in symmetric majority games and in apex games the unique separating aspiration is the unique stochastically stable one.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/248298
    Series: CeDEx discussion paper series ; no. 2021, 07
    Subjects: Voluntary Disclosure; Unravelling; Labour Market; Field Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 36 Seiten), Illustrationen