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Displaying results 1 to 18 of 18.

  1. Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
    Author: Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M.
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  CES, Munich ; Ifo

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000 ; QC 000
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: CESifo working papers ; No. 445
    Subjects: Kontrakttheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Anreiz; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Unvollständiger Vertrag; (stw)Gerechtigkeit; (stw)Anreiz; (stw)Moral Hazard; (stw)Leistungsanreiz; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Theorie; Fairness; Incomplete contracts; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Fairness; Incomplete contracts; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 40 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
    Notes:

    Auch im Internet unter der Adresse www.SSRN.com oder www.CESifo.de verfügbar
  2. Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
    Author: Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M.
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Volkswirtschaftliche Fak. der Univ., München

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000 ; QC 000
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670
    Series: Münchener Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge ; [20]01,07
    Subjects: Kontrakttheorie; Gerechtigkeit; Anreiz; Moral Hazard; Anreizsystem; Spieltheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Unvollständiger Vertrag; (stw)Gerechtigkeit; (stw)Anreiz; (stw)Moral Hazard; (stw)Leistungsanreiz; (stw)Spieltheorie; (stw)Theorie; Fairness; Incomplete contracts; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Fairness; Incomplete contracts; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: 40 S., graph. Darst., 21 cm
  3. Incomplete contracts and the product cycle
    Author: Antràs, Pol
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (9945)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 9945
    Subjects: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Internationale Wirtschaft; Nord-Süd-Beziehungen; Produktlebenszyklus; Partielles Gleichgewicht; Allgemeines Gleichgewicht; Theorie; Incomplete contracts; Product life cycle
    Scope: 43 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w9945.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 38 - 40
  4. Distance and FDI when contracts are incomplete
    Author: Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P.; Turrini, Alessandro
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (4041)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 4041
    Subjects: Auslandsinvestition; Outsourcing; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Multinationales Unternehmen; Theorie; Costs, Industrial; Industrial location; Investments, Foreign; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 21, [5] S, graph. Darst
  5. Testing out contractual incompleteness
    evidence from soccer
    Author: Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol; Comin, Diego
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (11110)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 11110
    Subjects: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Fußball; Schätzung; Spanien; Incomplete contracts; Professional sports contracts
    Scope: 47, [4] S
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 45 - 47

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w11110.pdf - lizenzpflichtig
  6. Smart contracts vs incomplete contracts
    a transaction cost economics viewpoint
    Author: Vatiero, Massimiliano
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  Università di Trento, Dipartimento di economia e management, [Trento]

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 740
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: DEM working papers ; n. 2023, 02
    Subjects: Adaptation; Blockchain; Enforcement; Incomplete contracts; Smart contracts; Transaction costs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 18 Seiten)
  7. Completely relationship-specific investments, transaction costs, and the property rights theory
    Author: Schmitz, Patrick W.
    Published: 31 March 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18048
    Subjects: Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Ownership rights; Relationship specificity; Transaction costs
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 17 Seiten), Illustrationen
  8. Agreeing now to agree later
    contracts that rule out but do not rule in
    Author: Hart, Oliver D.; Moore, John
    Published: 2004
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass.

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (10397)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 10397
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Game theory; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 54 S, graph. Darst
    Notes:

    Internetausg.: papers.nber.org/papers/w10397.pdf - lizenzpflichtig

    Literaturverz. S. 48 - 51
  9. The costs and benefits of rules of origin
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John
    Published: 29 January 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation... more

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    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a $strict$ rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18789
    Subjects: Hold-up problem; Sourcing; Incomplete contracts; Regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  10. Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness
    Author: Fehr, Ernst
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (2790)
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    Location:
    Universität Konstanz, Kommunikations-, Informations-, Medienzentrum (KIM)
    Signature:
    wrc 10.06:i/d55-2790
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QC 000
    Series: Array ; 2790
    Subjects: Unvollständiger Vertrag; Gerechtigkeit; Anreiz; Moral Hazard; Leistungsanreiz; Spieltheorie; Theorie; Fairness; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 40 S., graph. Darst.
  11. Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0902)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0902
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Ungleichheit; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Macht; Experiment
    Other subjects: Business enterprises; Partnership; Balance of power; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 51 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  12. Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem and asymmetric information
    Author: Schmitz, Patrick W.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (6322)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6322
    Subjects: Vertragstheorie; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Asymmetrische Information; Wirtschaftsmodell; Incomplete contracts; Investments; Business intelligence
    Scope: 13 S.
  13. Intra-firm trade and product contractibility
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  Peterson Inst. for Internat. Economics, Washington, DC

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    Keine Speicherung
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    Content information
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / Peterson Institute for International Economics ; 10,3
    Subjects: Import; Firmeninterner Handel; USA; Monetary policy; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: Online-Ressource (20 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    "May 2010

    Electronic reproduction; Available via World Wide Web
  14. Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete contracts
    Author: Horn, Henrik; Maggi, Giovanni; Staiger, Robert W.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (6037)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6037
    Subjects: Handelsabkommen; Vertragstheorie; Unvollkommene Information; Wirtschaftsmodell; Commercial treaties; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 47, [2] S., graph. Darst.
  15. Vertical integration as a source of hold‐up
    Author: Allain, Marie-Laure; Chambolle, Claire; Rey, Patrick
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  IDEI, Toulouse

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / IDEI ; 836
    Subjects: Vertical Integration; Hold-up; Incomplete contracts; Vertical foreclosure
    Scope: Online-Ressource (39 S.)
  16. Contract enforcement, comparative advantage and long-run growth
    Author: Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (6419)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    Series: Array ; 6419
    Subjects: Theorie der Unternehmung; Vertragstheorie; Betriebliche Standortwahl; Industrieforschung; Produktionsplanung; Wirtschaftswachstum; Theorie; Comparative advantage (International trade); Incomplete contracts; Business enterprises; Economic development
    Scope: 17, [3] S., graph. Darst.
  17. A theory of debt maturity and innovation
    Author: Mitkov, Yuliyan
    Published: [2020]
    Publisher:  ECONtribute, Bonn

    I propose a theory of debt maturity as an incentive device to motivate innovation when contracts are fundamentally incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. The financing of innovative firms must balance two goals. On the one hand, since... more

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    Signature:
    DS 711
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    I propose a theory of debt maturity as an incentive device to motivate innovation when contracts are fundamentally incomplete and shaped by ex-post renegotiation. The financing of innovative firms must balance two goals. On the one hand, since innovation is inherently risky, the entrepreneur must receive adequate protection after failure. Simultaneously, the firm must be liquidated when its assets can be redeployed more efficiently elsewhere. Meeting these two goals can be especially challenging when contracts are incomplete. I show how an appropriate choice of debt maturity, together with ex-post contract renegotiation, embeds a "put option" into the firm's capital structure. The put is exercised when liquidation is efficient, and it partially insures the entrepreneur against failure and thus motivates innovation. The theory has novel empirical implications for the financing patterns of innovative firms.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/228853
    Series: ECONtribute discussion paper ; no. 050 (December 2020)
    Subjects: Innovation; Debt maturity; Incomplete contracts; Renegotiation
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 44 Seiten), Illustrationen
  18. The costs and benefits of rules of origin
    Author: Ornelas, Emanuel; Turner, John
    Published: 29 January 2024
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation... more

    Access:
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)
    Verlag (Deutschlandweit zugänglich)

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    LZ 161
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    Location:
    Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
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    Location:
    Universität Potsdam, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Rules of origin offer preferred market access for final goods whose inputs originate mostly within a free trade agreement. Governments often champion such rules for boosting investment. We use a property-rights framework to study when this motivation is justifiable. The rule does not bind for all supply chains, as some (very-high-productivity) suppliers comply in an unconstrained way and some (very-low-productivity) suppliers do not comply. For those suppliers it affects, the rule both increases investments and induces excessive sourcing within the trading bloc. From a social standpoint, the best rule binds for relatively high-productivity suppliers, because the marginal net welfare gain from tightening it increases with productivity. Therefore, when industry productivity is high, a $strict$ rule is socially desirable. In contrast, a lenient rule binds for relatively low-productivity suppliers and is more likely to be harmful. For output tariffs that are not too high, a sufficiently strict rule ensures welfare gains.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18789
    Subjects: Hold-up problem; Sourcing; Incomplete contracts; Regionalism
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen