Includes bibliographical references and index
Use copy Restrictions unspecified star MiAaHDL
Herbert A. Simon and Jonathan Schaeffer: Vol. 1.Game of chess
T. E. S. Raghavan: Vol. 2 .Zero-sum two-person games
Eric Van Damme: Vol. 3 .Strategic equilibrium
V.4. Rationality ; Advances in Zero-Sum Dynamic Games ; Games on Networks ; Reputations in Repeated Games ; Coalition Formation ; Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics ; Advances in Auctions ; Combinatorial Auctions ; Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Through the lens of Multiunit auctions ; Behavioral Game Theory Experiments and Modeling ; Evolutionary Game Theory in Biology ; Epistemic Game Theory ; Population Games and Deterministic Evolutionary Dynamics ; The Complexity of Computing Equilibria ; Theory of Combinatorial Games ; Game Theory and Distributed Control ; Ambiguity and Nonexpected Utility ; Calibration and Expert Testing.
Sergiu Hart: Games in extenive and strategic forms
Jan Mycielski: Games with perfect information
Sylvain Sorin: Repeated games with complete information
Shmuel Zamir: Repeated games of incomplete information: zero-sum
Françoise Forges: Repeated games of incomplete information : non-zero-sum
Ken Binmore, Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein: Noncooperative models of bargaining
Robert Wilson: Strategic analysis of auctions
Jean J. Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse: Location
Robert Wilson: Strategic models of entry deterrence
Morton I. Kamien: Patent licensing
Yakar Kannai: Core and balancedness
Bezalel Peleg: Axiomatizations of the core
Robert M. Anderson: Core in perfectly competitive economics
Jean J. Gabszewicz and Benyamin Shitovitz: Core in imperfectly competitive economies
Alvin E. Roth and Marilda Sotomayor: Two-sided matching
William F. Lucas: Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets
Michael Maschler: Bargaining set, kernel, and nucleolus
John C. Harsanyi: Game and decision theoretic models in ethics
Gideon Schwarz: Game theory and statistics
Avner Friedman: Differential games
Simone Clemhout and Henry Y. Wan, Jr.: Differential gameseconomic applications
Roger B. Myerson: Communication, correlated equilibria and incentive compatibility
David M. Kreps and Joel Sobel: Signalling
Prajit K. Dutta and Roy Radner: Moral hazard
John McMillan and Michael Rothschild: Search
Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten: Game theory and Evolutionary biology
Barry O'Neill: Game theory models of peace and war
Steven J. Brams: Voting procedures
Hervé Moulin: Social choice
Philip D. Straffin Jr.: Power and stability in politics
Mordecai Kurz: Game theory and public economics
H. P. Young: Cost allocation
William Thomson: Cooperative models of bargaining
Robert J. Weber: Games in coalitional form
Joseph Greenberg: Coalition structure
Nathan Linial: Game-theoretic aspects of computing
Peter C. Fishburn: Utility and subjective probability
John Geanakoplos: Common knowledge
John Hillas and Elon Kohlberg: Foundations of strategic equilibrium
Robert J. Aumann and Aviad Heifetz: Incomplete information
T. E. S. Raghavan: Non-zero-sum two-person games
Bernhard Von Stengel: Computing equilibria for two-person games
M. Ali Khan and Yeneng Sun: Non-cooperative games with many players
Jean-François Mertens: Stochastic games
Nicolas Vielle: Stochastic games: recent results
Kyle Bagwell and Asher Wolinsky: Game theory and industrial organization
Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton and Raymond J. Deneckere: Bargaining with incomplete information
Rudolf Avenhaus, Bernhard Von Stengel and Shmeuel Zamir: Inspection games
Avner Greif: Economic history and game theory
Eyal Winter: Shapley Value
Dov Monderer and Dov Samet: Variations on the Shapley value
Richard P. McLean: Values of non-transferable utility games
Abraham Neyman: Values of games with infinitely many players
Sergiu Hart: Values of perfectly competitive economies
Jean-François Mertens: Some other economic applications of the value
Jeffrey S. Banks: Strategic aspects of political systems
Jean-Pierre Benoît and Lewis A. Kornhauser: Game-theoretic analysis of legal rules and institutions
Thomas R. Palfrey: Implementation theory
Martin Shubik: Game theory and experimental gaming
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