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  1. Dialog statt Spaltung!
    verantwortungsbewusst kommunizieren und Brücken bauen in unserer Gesellschaft
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  GABAL, Offenbach

    Hochschul- und Kreisbibliothek Bonn-Rhein-Sieg
    21 = HUV2141
    Unlimited inter-library loan, copies and loan
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  2. Confirmation bias in social networks
    Published: 2023
    Publisher:  [FEA/USP], [São Paulo]

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VS 532
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Edition: This version: January 2023
    Series: Working paper series / Department of Economics-FEA/USP ; no 2023, 02
    Subjects: Social Networks; Social Learning; Misinformation; Confirmation Bias
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 47 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The macroeconomic stabilization of tariff shocks
    what is the optimal monetary response?
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    VSP 1362
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Edition: Revised 28 July 2021
    Series: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2026
    Cambridge-INET working paper series ; no.: 2020, 12
    Subjects: Social Learning; Confirmation Bias; Network; Elections; Media; tariff shock; tariff war; optimal monetary policy; comparative advantage; productionchains
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 70 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Dialog statt Spaltung!
    verantwortungsbewusst kommunizieren und Brücken bauen in unserer Gesellschaft
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  GABAL, Offenbach

  5. Dialog statt Spaltung!
    Verantwortungsbewusst kommunizieren und Brücken bauen in unserer Gesellschaft
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  GABAL Verlag, Offenbach

  6. Dialog statt Spaltung!
    Verantwortungsbewusst kommunizieren und Brücken bauen in unserer Gesellschaft
    Published: 2020
    Publisher:  GABAL Verlag, Offenbach

  7. 30 Minuten Besser entscheiden mit Red Teaming
  8. Dialog statt Spaltung!
    verantwortungsbewusst kommunizieren und Brücken bauen in unserer Gesellschaft
  9. Strategic information selection
    Published: [2024]
    Publisher:  Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany

    Before choosing her action to match the state of the world, an agent observes a stream of messages generated by some unknown binary signal. The agent can either learn the underlying signal for free and update her belief accordingly or ignore the... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 263
    No inter-library loan

     

    Before choosing her action to match the state of the world, an agent observes a stream of messages generated by some unknown binary signal. The agent can either learn the underlying signal for free and update her belief accordingly or ignore the observed message and keep her prior belief. After each period the stream stops with positive probability and the final choice is made. We show that a Markovian agent with Gilboa-Schmeidler preferences learns and updates after confirming messages, but she ignores contradicting messages if her belief is sufficiently strong. Her threshold solely depends on the least precise signal. The agent has strictly higher anticipatory utility than an agent who uses every message to update. However, the latter has a higher chance to choose the correct outcome in the end. In a population of strategic agents, who only differ in their initial beliefs, polarization is inevitable.

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/289846
    Series: Working papers / Center for Mathematical Economics ; 689 (March 2024)
    Subjects: Dynamic Decision Problem; Ambiguity; Gilboa-Schmeidler Preferences; Confirmation Bias; Polarization
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen