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Displaying results 1 to 10 of 10.

  1. Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Research Unit Market Processes and Governance ; 2008,01
    Subjects: Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Sozialhilfe; Effizienz; Wahlverhalten; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Öffentliche Sozialleistungen; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Wechselwähler; (thesoz)Umverteilung; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Parteipolitik; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Loyalität; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: IV, 11 S., 30 cm
  2. Non-partisan "Get-Out-the-Vote" efforts and policy outcomes
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  3. Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2008

    Abstract: "This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, parties... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, parties have incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps between the two parties' transfers towards voter segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. Because of this dependence on relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties/ optimal strategies may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective transfers. At the extreme, in the spirit of Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), we obtain 'black hole' inefficiency. When the model is extended to allow for loyal voter segments and loyalty to a party is positively related to the efficiency of that party's transfers to the segment, the incentives leading to black hole inefficiency becom

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25832
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2008-01
    Subjects: Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Sozialhilfe; Effizienz; Wahlverhalten; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Öffentliche Sozialleistungen; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Wechselwähler; (thesoz)Umverteilung; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Parteipolitik; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Loyalität; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 11 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  4. Comparative politics of strategic voting: a hierarchy of electoral systems
    Author: Gschwend, Thomas
    Published: 2006

    Abstract: "What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Institutional incentives moderate a voter’s expectation formation process and, therefore, make the frequency of strategic voters predictable across... more

     

    Abstract: "What is the impact of electoral rules on the way people make decisions in the voting booth? Institutional incentives moderate a voter’s expectation formation process and, therefore, make the frequency of strategic voters predictable across a wide range of electoral systems. I provide evidence that there is a latent dimension of propensity to cast a strategic vote following the wasted-vote logic on which various seat-allocation systems can be placed even controlling for district magnitude. Thus the variance of vote-to-seat conversion mechanisms is far more important in determining the level of strategic voting across electoral systems than previously thought." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25771
    DDC Categories: 320
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Wahlsystem
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Wahlsystem; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Wahlsystem; (thesoz)Strategie; (thesoz)Entscheidungsfindung; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 30 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  5. Ticket-splitting and strategic voting under mixed electoral rules: evidence from Germany
    Author: Gschwend, Thomas
    Published: 2007

    Abstract: "There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to... more

     

    Abstract: "There is more to strategic voting than simply avoiding wasting one’s vote if one is liberated from the corset of studying voting behavior in plurality systems. Mixed electoral systems provide different voters with diverse incentives to cast a strategic vote.They not only determine the degree of strategic voting, but also the kind of strategies voters employ. Strategic voters employ either a wasted-vote or a coalition insurance strategy, but do not automatically cast their vote for large parties as the current literature suggest. This has important implications for the consolidation of party systems. Moreover, even when facing the same institutional incentives, voters vary in their proclivity to vote strategically." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25788
    DDC Categories: 320
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Strategie; Wahlsystem
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Strategie; (stw)Wahlsystem; (stw)Deutschland; (thesoz)Bundesrepublik Deutschland; (thesoz)Wahlsystem; (thesoz)Entscheidungsprozess; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Strategie; (thesoz)Mehrheitswahl; (thesoz)Verhältniswahl; (thesoz)Koalition; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

    In: European Journal of Political Research ; 46 (2007) 1 ; 1–23
  6. Non-partisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts and policy outcomes
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2009

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan 'get-out-the-vote' efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment's size." (author's abstract)

     
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  7. Inverse campaigning
    Author: Konrad, Kai A.
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are... more

     

    Abstract: "It can be advantageous for an office motivated party A to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party A's policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose much and do not benefit small groups of voters who win much." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11307
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 320; 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-29
    Subjects: Konflikt; Signaling; Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; Wahlverhalten; Theorie; Wahlkampf
    Other subjects: (stw)Konflikt; (stw)Signalling; (stw)Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Informationsverhalten; (thesoz)Informationsvermittlung; (thesoz)Wirkung; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Implementation; (thesoz)politisches Programm; (thesoz)Kampagne; (thesoz)politische Kommunikation; Wahlprogramm; Arbeitspapier; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Buch; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 17 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  8. Electoral poaching and party identification
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2005

    Abstract: "This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or 'poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while 'freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of 'political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is in

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11729
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2005-17
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Umverteilung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Umverteilung; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Opposition; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Parteianhänger; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Polarisierung; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 33 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  9. Electoral poaching and party identification
    Author: Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion papers / WZB
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Umverteilung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Umverteilung; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Opposition; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Parteianhänger; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Polarisierung; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: IV, 33 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 23 - 25
  10. Inverse campaigning
    Author: Konrad, Kai A.
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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