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Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Research Unit Market Processes and Governance ; 2008,01
    Subjects: Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Sozialhilfe; Effizienz; Wahlverhalten; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Öffentliche Sozialleistungen; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Wechselwähler; (thesoz)Umverteilung; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Parteipolitik; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Loyalität; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: IV, 11 S., 30 cm
  2. Electoral poaching and party identification
    Published: 2005
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion papers / WZB
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Umverteilung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Umverteilung; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Opposition; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Parteianhänger; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Polarisierung; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: IV, 33 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 23 - 25

  3. The distributional impact of subsidies to higher education - empirical evidence from Germany
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "The present paper deals with the net-transfer-calculation and the data (section II) presents empirical evidence for the distribution of children from various income brackets in the German higher educations system (section III) and builds a... more

     

    Abstract: "The present paper deals with the net-transfer-calculation and the data (section II) presents empirical evidence for the distribution of children from various income brackets in the German higher educations system (section III) and builds a net transfer calculation on this analysis in order to ascertain the net incidence which is presented in section IV. Section V provides further extensions including the distributional impact of partial cut of the subsidies. Aditionally, it shall be investigated in section V how various kinds of benefits from public higher education affect the income distribution within households with children entrolled in higher education. To judge the statistical inference, bias corrected and accelerated confidence intervals (BC2) via bootstrapping are used. The main goal of this procedure is to point out which kind of benefit significantly affects the income distribution within the subgroup that consists only of net-gainer. The main goal of the present paper i

     

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  4. Electoral poaching and party identification
    Published: 2005

    Abstract: "This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper studies electoral competition in a model of redistributive politics with deterministic voting and heterogeneous voter loyalties to political parties. We construct a natural measure of 'party strength' based on the sizes and intensities of a party's loyal voter segments and demonstrate how party behavior varies with the two parties' strengths. In equilibrium, parties target or 'poach' a strict subset of the opposition party's loyal voters: offering those voters a high expected transfer, while 'freezing out' the remainder with a zero transfer. The size of the subset of opposition voters frozen out and, consequently, the level of inequality in utilities generated by a party's equilibrium redistribution schedule is increasing in the opposition party's strength. We also construct a measure of 'political polarization' that is increasing in the sum and symmetry of the parties' strengths, and find that the expected ex-post inequality in utilities of the implemented policy is in

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11729
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2005-17
    Subjects: Wahlverhalten; Umverteilung; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Umverteilung; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)politische Kultur; (thesoz)Wahlkampf; (thesoz)Opposition; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)politisches Verhalten; (thesoz)Parteianhänger; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Polarisierung; (thesoz)politische Partizipation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 33 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

  5. Inefficient redistribution and inefficient redistributive politics
    Published: 2008

    Abstract: "This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, parties... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper examines the effect of inefficient redistribution in Myerson's (1993) model of redistributive politics. Regardless of the absolute levels of the efficiency of political parties' transfers to different voter segments, parties have incentive to (stochastically) shift resources away from voter segments with large relative efficiency gaps between the two parties' transfers towards voter segments with smaller relative efficiency gaps. Because of this dependence on relative, and not absolute, levels of efficiency, the parties/ optimal strategies may lead to large discrepancies between the sum of the budgetary transfers and the sum of the effective transfers. At the extreme, in the spirit of Magee, Brock, and Young (1989), we obtain 'black hole' inefficiency. When the model is extended to allow for loyal voter segments and loyalty to a party is positively related to the efficiency of that party's transfers to the segment, the incentives leading to black hole inefficiency becom

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25832
    DDC Categories: 320
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 2008-01
    Subjects: Verteilungspolitik; Ökonomische Theorie der Politik; Public-Choice-Theorie; Sozialhilfe; Effizienz; Wahlverhalten; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Verteilungspolitik; (stw)Neue politische Ökonomie; (stw)Öffentliche Sozialleistungen; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)Wahlverhalten; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Wechselwähler; (thesoz)Umverteilung; (thesoz)Wahlverhalten; (thesoz)Wähler; (thesoz)Partei; (thesoz)Parteipolitik; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Loyalität; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 11 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

  6. Öffentliche und private Transfers und Unterstützungsleistungen im Alter - "crowding out" oder "crowding in"?
    Published: 2006

    Abstract: 'Der Beitrag diskutiert die Plausibilität der These des 'crowding out', nach der der Ausbau sozialstaatlicher Leistungen familiale Unterstützungsleistungen und familiale Solidarität verdrängen würde. In einer theoretischen Erörterung der... more

     

    Abstract: 'Der Beitrag diskutiert die Plausibilität der These des 'crowding out', nach der der Ausbau sozialstaatlicher Leistungen familiale Unterstützungsleistungen und familiale Solidarität verdrängen würde. In einer theoretischen Erörterung der Motive für private intergenerationelle Unterstützungsleistungen wird herausgearbeitet, das ein crowding out theoretisch zwar möglich, insgesamt betrachtet aber empirisch unwahrscheinlich ist, da gegenläufige Effekte des crowding in eine höhere Plausibilität haben. Mit Hilfe eines Ländervergleichs wird anschließend untersucht, ob sich die Anteile der Hilfen, die die Älteren von ihren Kindern erhalten, systematisch mit Blick auf das Niveau der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Versorgung unterscheiden, wie es der These des crowding out entsprechen würde. Die deskriptiven empirischen Befunde sprechen jedoch ebenfalls gegen diese These.' (Autorenreferat)

     

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/5799
    DDC Categories: 300; 301
    Other subjects: (thesoz)Bundesrepublik Deutschland; (thesoz)Nordeuropa; (thesoz)alter Mensch; (thesoz)Solidarität; (thesoz)Altruismus; (thesoz)soziale Sicherung; (thesoz)Südeuropa; (thesoz)Europa; (thesoz)Eltern-Kind-Beziehung; (thesoz)Transferleistung; (thesoz)Wohlfahrtsstaat; (thesoz)crowding-out; (thesoz)Motiv; (thesoz)Familie; (thesoz)Hilfeleistung; (thesoz)internationaler Vergleich; (thesoz)Generationenverhältnis; (thesoz)Vergleich; (thesoz)Westeuropa; (thesoz)Substitution
    Scope: Online-Ressource
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

    begutachtet (peer reviewed)

    In: Zeitschrift für Familienforschung ; 18 (2006) 3 ; 269-289