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Displaying results 1 to 14 of 14.

  1. Contribution to productivity or pork barrel? The two faces of infrastructure investment
    Author: Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments;... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper proposes a simultaneous-equation approach to the estimation of the contribution of transport infrastructure accumulation to regional growth. We model explicitly the political-economy process driving infrastructure investments; in doing so, we eliminate a potential source of bias in production-function estimates and generate testable hypotheses on the forces that shape infrastructure policy. Our empirical findings on a panel of France's regions over 1985-92 suggest that electoral concerns and influence activities were, indeed, significant determinants of the crossregional allocation of transportation infrastructure investments. By contrast, we find little evidence of concern for the maximization of economic returns to infrastructure spending, even after controlling for pork-barrel." (author's abstract)

     
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  2. Contribution to productivity or pork barrel?
    the two faces of infrastructure investment
    Author: Cadot, Olivier; Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Stephan, Andreas
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  3. Market conduct and endogenous lobbying: evidence from the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry
    Author: Duso, Tomaso; Jung, Astrid
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms' market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper empirically explores the relationship between firms' market behavior and their lobbying activities in a regulated market. In particular, we investigate whether the amount of contributions offered by cellular service providers to fund the campaigns of political parties affected market conduct in the early US mobile telecommunications industry. We structurally estimate market interactions while taking the potential endogeneity of lobbying decisions into account. Our results show that competition was more intense in those states where campaign contributions by the cellular industry have been higher. Furthermore, we reject the hypothesis that lobbying activities can be regarded as exogenous in the study of market conduct." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11338
    DDC Categories: 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-35
    Subjects: Mobile Telekommunikation; Telekommunikationspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Marktverhalten; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Mobilkommunikation; (stw)Telekommunikationspolitik; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Struktur-Verhalten-Ergebnis- Paradigma; (stw)Theorie; (stw)USA; (thesoz)Mobilfunk; (thesoz)Interessenvertretung; (thesoz)Marktstellung; (thesoz)Telekommunikation; (thesoz)Marktreaktion; (thesoz)Wirtschaftszweig; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)USA; (thesoz)Lobby; (thesoz)Nordamerika; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 30 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  4. Who decides to regulate? Lobbying activity in the U.S. cellular industry
    Author: Duso, Tomaso
    Published: 2000

    Abstract: "How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role... more

     

    Abstract: "How does the choice to regulate a market take place? And how does regulation influence market outcome? We argue that to explicitly model the simultaneity between these two issues makes a qualitative difference in the analysis of the role of regulation, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find support for our approach: regulatory choice should be considered endogenous. We show that, correcting for the simultaneity, regulation's overall effect should have been a reduction of cellular tariffs. However, this result is not highly significant. Our explanation for this finding is that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been successful: some firms were able to avoid regulation in those market where it would have significantly reduced prices. We argue that this is the real source of the found simultaneity. Moreover, we provide evidence that the probability of regulation was higher, other things equal, when the regulator was appoi

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11586
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-05
    Subjects: Mobile Telekommunikation; Telekommunikationspolitik; Interessenpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Marktverhalten; Schätzung; :z Geschichte 1984-1988
    Other subjects: (stw)1984-1988; (stw)Mobilkommunikation; (stw)Telekommunikationspolitik; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Wirkungsanalyse; (stw)Struktur-Verhalten-Ergebnis- Paradigma; (stw)Schätzung; (stw)USA; (thesoz)Behörde; (thesoz)Politik; (thesoz)Telekommunikation; (thesoz)Preisbildung; (thesoz)USA; (thesoz)Marktordnung; (thesoz)Lobby; (thesoz)Nordamerika; (thesoz)Industrie; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 39 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  5. Der politische Einfluss der Agrarlobbies in Polen, Russland und der Ukraine: eine vergleichende Politikfeldanalyse
    Author: Pleines, Heiko
    Published: 2006

    Abstract: Verschiedene gesellschaftliche Interessengruppen wirken bei der Politikformulierung mit und haben Einfluss auf die Implementierung dieser Politik. Ihre Interessen und ihre Strategien der politischen Einflussnahme bestimmen deshalb die... more

     

    Abstract: Verschiedene gesellschaftliche Interessengruppen wirken bei der Politikformulierung mit und haben Einfluss auf die Implementierung dieser Politik. Ihre Interessen und ihre Strategien der politischen Einflussnahme bestimmen deshalb die Ergebnisse von Politik mit. Dieses Verständnis von Politik als geregeltem Interessenkonflikt verschiedener gesellschaftlicher Gruppen, also als Entscheidungsfindungsprozess, liegt der vorliegenden Analyse zugrunde. Es wird der Einfluss von Interessengruppen im Politikfeld "Agrarpolitik" für drei post-sozialistische Länder, Polen, Russland und die Ukraine, untersucht. Angewandt wird dabei ein "fokussierter Vergleich", der häufig als sinnvoller Kompromiss zwischen historisch-singulären Einzelfallstudien und stark generalisierenden makrostatistischen Untersuchungen gesehen wird. Als Beginn des Untersuchungszeitraums wurde jeweils das Ende des sozialistischen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Systems gewählt. Für das Ende des Untersuchungszeitraums wurde e

     
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  6. Strategische Gruppen und Staatskapazität: das Beispiel der Privatunternehmer in China
    Author: Heberer, Thomas
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "Der Aufsatz erläutert zunächst den Begriff der 'strategischen Gruppen', sodann deren Interessenlagen, ehe er auf die transformatorischen und strategischen Potenziale eingeht. Schließlich wird erörtert, in welcher Weise Unternehmer... more

     

    Abstract: "Der Aufsatz erläutert zunächst den Begriff der 'strategischen Gruppen', sodann deren Interessenlagen, ehe er auf die transformatorischen und strategischen Potenziale eingeht. Schließlich wird erörtert, in welcher Weise Unternehmer Staatskapazität beeinflussen. Dabei geht es nicht darum zu zeigen, wie die Reformen Staatskapazität verändern, sondern wie eine Akteursgruppe (Privatunternehmer) zu diesem Veränderungsprozess beiträgt. Ohne ein Verständnis von der Rolle sozialer Akteure für den Wandel von Staatskapazität muss auch der Wandel des Staates letztlich unklar bleiben. Die zu verifizierende Untersuchungsthese lautet also, dass die strategische(n) Gruppe(n) der Privatunternehmer in signifikantem Maße zur Veränderung staatlicher Strukturen und Kapazität beiträgt bzw. beitragen. Die Strategie der Unternehmer ist dabei interessengeleitet in dem Sinne, dass sie im Interesse der Realisierung ihrer Erwartungen agieren, ohne dass dadurch das politische System grundsätzlich in Frage ges

     
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  7. Lobbying and regulation in a political economy: evidence from the US cellular industry
    Author: Duso, Tomaso
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper develops a political-economy model of price regulation. Firms' lobbying activity for a given regulatory status might generate a simultaneity problem between the effects and the determinants of regulatory decisions. We explicitly model this two way causality, and empirically test our model in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry. We find support for our approach: Regulatory choice should be considered endogenous. Accounting for the simultaneity bias, we show that regulation, whenever it actually took place, did not reduce significantly cellular tariffs. However, it would have been more effective if applied in those markets which have not been regulated. To explain this finding, we show that firms' lobbying activity on regulatory choice has been successful, so that firms were able to avoid regulation in those markets where it would have been more effective. From the political economy side, we provide evidence that the probability of price regulation was higher, cet

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11494
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung ; Bd. 01-03
    Subjects: Telekommunikationspolitik; Administrierter Preis; Preisüberwachung; Staatliche Preispolitik; Interessenpolitik; Mobile Telekommunikation; Fernmeldegebühr; Telefongebühr; Flatrate; Schätzung; :z Geschichte 1984-1988
    Other subjects: (stw)1984-1988; (stw)Telekommunikationspolitik; (stw)Preisregulierung; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Mobilkommunikation; (stw)Telekommunikationspreis; (stw)Schätzung; (stw)USA; (thesoz)Telefon; (thesoz)Telekommunikation; (thesoz)Preisbildung; (thesoz)politische Ökonomie; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)USA; (thesoz)Lobby; (thesoz)Nordamerika; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 43 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  8. Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control
    Author: Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2000

    Abstract: "This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can be assigned to the antitrust agency in the presence of these regulatory failures. We find that under a welfare standard, lobbying leads to the clearance of relatively inefficient mergers that decrease welfare (i.e. there is a type II error). By contrast, under a consumer surplus standard, the agency will ban relatively efficient mergers that would increase welfare (i.e. there is a type I error). Lobbying actually reduces the extent to which this occurs, albeit at a cost in terms of real resources. We also find that a consumer surplus standard is more attractive when mergers are large, when increasing the size of a merger greatly enhances industry profits, when there is little transparency

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11611
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QR 300 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-15
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Interessenpolitik; LEN-Modell; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; (stw)Wohlfahrtsanalyse; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Kostenfaktor; (thesoz)Wohlfahrt; (thesoz)Kartellamt; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Einfluss; (thesoz)Lobby; Antitrust law; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Consumers' surplus; Trusts, Industrial; Welfare economics; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Antitrust law; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Consumers' surplus; Trusts, Industrial; Welfare economics; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 27 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  9. Who decides to regulate? - lobbying activity in the US cellular industry
    Author: Duso, Tomaso
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Berlin

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  10. Der politische Einfluss der Agrarlobbies in Polen, Russland und der Ukraine
    eine vergleichende Politikfeldanalyse
    Author: Pleines, Heiko
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Publ.-Referat, Bremen

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  11. Der politische Einfluss der Kohlelobbies in Polen, Russland und der Ukraine
    eine vergleichende Politikfeldanalyse
    Author: Pleines, Heiko
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Forschungsstelle Osteuropa, Publ.-Referat, Bremen

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  12. Strategische Gruppen und Staatskapazität
    das Beispiel der Privatunternehmer in China
    Author: Heberer, Thomas
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  InfO, Duisburg

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  13. Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control
    Author: Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2000
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Berlin

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  14. Lobbying and regulation in a political economy
    evidence from the US cellular industry
    Author: Duso, Tomaso
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Berlin

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