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  1. Merger control in the new economy
    Author: Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By 'new economy' we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper addresses the potential for conflict between antitrust authorities in the arena of merger control in the new economy. By 'new economy' we mean two related developments. First, the internationalization of the economy, i.e. the ability to sell and produce products world-wide, and secondly, markets with certain characteristics such as network effects and other aspects of natural monopoly. We focus on three types of substantive issues in merger control - market definition, assessment of competitive effects, and the role of remedies. We argue that the scope for conflict varies significantly across these three arenas. In particular, conflict over market definition is less likely. By contrast, the assessment of competitive effects and the role of remedies are areas where conflict between antitrust authorities may be more likely in 'new economy-type' markets." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11255
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 02-02
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Wettbewerbskontrolle; Konflikt; Neuer Markt <Börse>; Neuer Markt; New Economy
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)International; (stw)Wettbewerbsaufsicht; (stw)Konflikt; (stw)Welt; (stw)New Economy; (thesoz)Wirtschaftspolitik; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)New Economy; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)internationaler Konflikt; (thesoz)Unternehmen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 21 S.
    Notes:

    Preprint
  2. Merger control in the new economy
    Author: Röller, Lars-Hendrik; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung ; 2002,02
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Wettbewerbskontrolle; Konflikt; Neuer Markt <Börse>; Neuer Markt; New Economy
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)International; (stw)Wettbewerbsaufsicht; (stw)Konflikt; (stw)Welt; (stw)New Economy; (thesoz)Wirtschaftspolitik; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)New Economy; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)internationaler Konflikt; (thesoz)Unternehmen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: 15 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 13 - 15
  3. Downstream merger with oligopolistic input suppliers
    Author: Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sørgard, Lars
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  4. On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control
    Author: Lagerlöf, Johan; Heidhues, Paul
    Published: 2002
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  5. On the desirability of an efficiency defense in merger control
    Author: Lagerlöf, Johan; Heidhues, Paul
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to... more

     

    Abstract: "We develop a model in which two firms that have proposed to merge are privately informed about merger-specific efficiencies. This enables the firms to influence the merger control procedure by strategically revealing their information to an antitrust authority. Although the information improves upon the quality of the authority's decision, the influence activities may be detrimental to welfare if information processing/ gathering is excessively costly. Whether this is the case depends on the merger control institution and, in particular, whether it involves an efficiency defense. We derive the optimal institution and provide conditions under which an efficiency defense is desirable. We also discuss the implications for antitrust policy and outline a three-step procedure that take the influence activities into consideration." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11253
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-08
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Synergie; Effizienz; Fusion; Unternehmen; Informationsverhalten; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Synergie; (stw)Effizienz; (stw)Fusion; (stw)Unternehmen; (stw)Informationsverhalten; (stw)Wohlfahrtsanalyse; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Unternehmenskonzentration; (thesoz)Wirtschaftspolitik; (thesoz)Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; (thesoz)Kartellamt; (thesoz)Unternehmenspolitik; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Unternehmensübernahme; (thesoz)Unternehmen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 30 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  6. Remedy for now but prohibit for tomorrow
    the deterrence effects of merger policy tools
    Author: Seldeslachts, Jo; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Barros, Pedro Pita
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  7. Bargaining, mergers, and technology: choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries
    Author: Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper provides a conceptual framework of multilateral bargaining in a bilaterally oligopolistic industry to analyze the motivations for horizontal mergers, technology choice, and their welfare implications. We first analyze the implication of market structure for the distribution of industry profits. We find that retailer mergers are more likely (less likely) if suppliers have increasing (decreasing) unit costs, while supplier mergers are more likely (less likely) if goods are substitutes (complements). In a second step we explore how market structure affects suppliers' technology choice, which reflects a trade-off between inframarginal and marginal production costs. We find that suppliers focus more on marginal cost reduction if (1) retailers are integrated and (2) suppliers are non-integrated. In a final step we consider the whole picture where both market structure and (subsequent) technology choice are endogenous. Analyzing the equilibrium market structure, we find cases

     
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  8. Bargaining power of a coalition in parallel bargaining: advantage of multiple cable system operators: Advantage of Multiple Cable System Operators
    Author: Chae, Suchan; Heidhues, Paul
    Published: 1999

    Abstract: "Ausgehend von zwei unabhängigen bilateralen Monopolen, werden in diesem Beitrag die Auswirkungen von horizontalen Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen auf die Verhandlungsmacht einer Marktseite untersucht. Als Beispiel einer solchen Marktstruktur... more

     

    Abstract: "Ausgehend von zwei unabhängigen bilateralen Monopolen, werden in diesem Beitrag die Auswirkungen von horizontalen Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen auf die Verhandlungsmacht einer Marktseite untersucht. Als Beispiel einer solchen Marktstruktur wird das Verhandlungsproblem zwischen US-amerikanischen Kabelbetreibern und lokalen Fernsehstationen in zwei von einander unabhängigen Märkten betrachtet. Es wird gezeigt, daß sich ein Zusammenschluß auf einer Marktseite lohnen kann, weil sich hierdurch die Verhandlungsmacht der integrierten Unternehmung erhöhen kann. Verhandelt ein horizontal integriertes Unternehmen in mehreren Märkten, so nimmt es in jedem einzelnen Markt die Verhandlungslösung der anderen Märkte als gegeben an. Würde die Verhandlung in einem Markt scheitern, bekäme das integrierte Unternehmen immer noch Zahlungen von den anderen Märkten. Falls dies das Unternehmen glaubw ürdig höhere Forderungen stellen läßt, erhöht dies die Verhandlungsmacht des integrierten Unternehmens, w

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/19439
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 99-1
    Subjects: Kabelfernsehen; Verhandlungstheorie; Bilaterales Monopol; Monopol; Horizontale Konzentration; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Kabelfernsehen; (stw)Verhandlungstheorie; (stw)Monopol; (stw)Horizontale Integration; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Unternehmer; (thesoz)Markt; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Kabelkommunikation; (thesoz)Fernsehen; (thesoz)lokale Kommunikation; (thesoz)Spieltheorie; (thesoz)Verhalten; (thesoz)Macht; (thesoz)ökonomisches Modell; (thesoz)Monopol; (thesoz)USA; (thesoz)zwischenbetriebliche Kooperation; (thesoz)Medientechnik; (thesoz)Verhandlung; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 55 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  9. Merger and collusion in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the... more

     

    Abstract: "Competition in some product markets takes the form of a contest. If some firms cooperate in such markets, they must decide how to allocate effort on each of their products and whether to reduce the number of their products in the competition. The authors show how this decision depends on the convexity properties of the contest success function, and we characterize conditions under which cooperation is profitable." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11502
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; Bd. 01-04
    Subjects: Fusion; Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; Monopolistische Konkurrenz; Administrierter Preis; Preisüberwachung; Staatliche Preispolitik; Auktionstheorie; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Wettbewerbsbeschränkung; (stw)Monopolistischer Wettbewerb; (stw)Preisregulierung; (stw)Auktionstheorie; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Funktion; (thesoz)Marktstellung; (thesoz)Marktanteil; (thesoz)Werbung; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Kooperation; (thesoz)Unternehmen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 16 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  10. Internationales Team Building aus britischer Perspektive: mit Schwerpunkt interkultureller Kompetenz
    Author: Bründl-Price, Sonja
    Published: 2004

    Abstract: In Zeiten wachsender Globalisierung sind internationale Teams alltäglich und werden mit allen möglichen Schattierungen von Erfolg und Misserfolg konfrontiert. Menschen unterschiedlichen kulturellen Hintergrundes bemühen sich, einander zu... more

     

    Abstract: In Zeiten wachsender Globalisierung sind internationale Teams alltäglich und werden mit allen möglichen Schattierungen von Erfolg und Misserfolg konfrontiert. Menschen unterschiedlichen kulturellen Hintergrundes bemühen sich, einander zu verstehen, interkulturelle Hindernisse zu überwinden und Gruppenpotenziale zu optimieren. Oft erübrigt sich die Frage nach der Erfolgsrate internationaler Teams im Vergleich zu monokulturellen Gruppen, da Internationalität heutzutage wesentlicher Bestandteil des Wirtschaftswachstums ist, zum Beispiel in Bezug auf Fusionen und Firmenkäufe, internationale Holdinggesellschaften oder beim Wissenstransfer

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: German
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/45412
    DDC Categories: 330; 301
    Subjects: Interkulturelles Verstehen; Gruppe
    Other subjects: (thesoz)Holding; (thesoz)Teamarbeit; (thesoz)Internationalisierung; (thesoz)Globalisierung; (thesoz)Wirtschaftswachstum; (thesoz)interkulturelle Kommunikation; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Großbritannien; (thesoz)Wissenstransfer; (thesoz)interkulturelle Kompetenz; (thesoz)Unternehmen; kultureller Unterschied
    Scope: Online-Ressource
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion

    begutachtet (peer reviewed)

    In: interculture journal: Online-Zeitschrift für interkulturelle Studien ; 3 (2004) 9 ; 12
  11. Downstream merger with oligopolistic input suppliers
    Author: Lommerud, Kjell Erik; Straume, Odd Rune; Sørgard, Lars
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions... more

     

    Abstract: "We examine how a downstream merger affects input prices and, in turn, the profitability of such a merger under Cournot competition with differentiated products. Input suppliers can be interpreted as ordinary upstream firms, or trade unions organising workers. If the input suppliers are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous input prices. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific input suppliers, on the other hand, results are reversed. We apply our model to endogenous merger formation in an international oligopoly, and show that the equilibrium market structure is likely to be characterised by cross-border merger." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11241
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-22
    Subjects: Fusion; Lieferant; Vertikale Integration; Oligopol; Gewerkschaft; Multinationales Unternehmen; Nash-Gleichgewicht; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Lieferantenmanagement; (stw)Vertikale Integration; (stw)Oligopol; (stw)Gewerkschaft; (stw)Multinationales Unternehmen; (stw)Nash-Gleichgewicht; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Oligopol; (thesoz)Preisbildung; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Wirkung; (thesoz)zwischenbetriebliche Kooperation; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Einfluss; (thesoz)Zulieferer; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)Gewerkschaft; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 26 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  12. The political economy of European merger control: evidence using stock market data
    Author: Duso, Tomaso; Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2002

    Abstract: "The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the... more

     

    Abstract: "The objective of this paper is to investigate the determinants of EU merger control decisions. We consider a sample of 164 EU merger control decisions and evaluate the anti-competitive consequences of these mergers from the reaction of the stock market price of competitors to the merging firms. We then account for the discrepancies between the actual decisions and what the stock market would have dictated in terms of the political economy surrounding the cases. Our results suggest that the commission's decisions cannot be solely accounted for by the motive of protecting consumer surplus. The institutional and political environment does matter. As far as firms' influence is concerned, however, our data suggests that the commission's decisions are not sensitive to firms' interests. Instead, the evidence suggests that other factors - such as country and industry effects, as well as market definition and procedural aspects - do play significant roles." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11334
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 02-34
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Interessenpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Börsenkurs
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Wirkungsanalyse; (stw)Börsenkurs; (stw)EU-Staaten; (thesoz)Wirtschaftsrecht; (thesoz)politische Ökonomie; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Aktienkurs; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)EU; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 41 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  13. Merger profitability and trade policy
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "The authors study the profitability and welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though... more

     

    Abstract: "The authors study the profitability and welfare effects of merger in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing here, even though it is not profitable in a laissez-faire economy. A key element is the change in the governments' incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. We apply the results to the merger between Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, where subsidies are a constant matter of debate. Our theory explains why the merger was profitable for Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, why Airbus Industries opposed the merger, why the US authorities agreed to the merger, and why the EU competition authorities opposed it." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11525
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-12
    Subjects: Fusion; Horizontale Konzentration; Reale Außenwirtschaftstheorie; Theorie der strategischen Handelspolitik; Dyopol; Zwei-Länder-Modell; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Horizontale Integration; (stw)Neue Außenhandelstheorie; (stw)Strategische Handelspolitik; (stw)Duopol; (stw)Zwei-Länder-Modell; (stw)Wohlfahrtsanalyse; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Profit; (thesoz)multinationales Unternehmen; (thesoz)Unternehmenskonzentration; (thesoz)Binnenmarkt; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Handelspolitik; (thesoz)Außenhandel; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Buch; Online-Publikation
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 20 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  14. The incentives for takeover in oligopoly
    Author: Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper presents a model of takeover incentives in an oligopolistic industry, which, in contrast to previous approaches, takes both insiders' and outsiders' gains from an increase in industry concentration into account. Our main application is to compare takeover incentives in a differentiated Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly model with linear demand and costs. We provide a complete analysis for arbitrary numbers of firms, complements and substitutes, and degrees of product differentiation. An increase in concentration is more likely under Cournot competition if products are complements and more likely under Bertrand competition if products are substitutes. Moreover, as products become closer substitutes, a takeover becomes more likely under Bertrand and less likely under Cournot competition." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11543
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-24
    Subjects: Takeover; Fusion; Oligopol; Dyopol; Anreiz; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Übernahme; (stw)Fusion; (stw)Oligopol; (stw)Duopol; (stw)Anreiz; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Oligopol; (thesoz)Theorie; (thesoz)ökonomisches Modell; (thesoz)Angebotspolitik; (thesoz)Modell; (thesoz)Angebot; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Unternehmensübernahme; (thesoz)Nachfrage; jel:L13; jel:D43; jel:L41; Takeover bidding; Merger incentives; Oligopoly; Übernahme (STW); Fusion (STW); Oligopol (STW); Duopol (STW); Ökonomischer Anreiz (STW); Theorie (STW); Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 39 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  15. Remedy for now but prohibit for tomorrow: the deterrence effects of merger policy tools
    Author: Seldeslachts, Jo; Clougherty, Joseph A.; Barros, Pedro Pita
    Published: 2007

    Abstract: "Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have... more

     

    Abstract: "Antitrust policy involves not just the regulation of anti-competitive behavior, but also an important deterrence effect. Neither scholars nor policymakers have fully researched the deterrence effects of merger policy tools, as they have been unable to empirically measure these effects. We consider the ability of different antitrust actions - Prohibitions, Remedies, and Monitorings - to deter firms from engaging in mergers. We employ cross-jurisdiction/ pan-time data on merger policy to empirically estimate the impact of antitrust actions on future merger frequencies. We find merger prohibitions to lead to decreased merger notifications in subsequent periods, and remedies to weakly increase future merger notifications: in other words, prohibitions involve a deterrence effect but remedies do not." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/25862
    RVK Categories: QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 2007-02
    Subjects: Unternehmenskonzentration; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Wirkungsanalyse; :z Geschichte 1993-2005
    Other subjects: (stw)1993-2005; (stw)Unternehmenskonzentration; (stw)Wettbewerbspolitik; (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Wirkungsanalyse; (stw)OECD-Staaten; (thesoz)Unternehmenskonzentration; (thesoz)Wirtschaftsrecht; (thesoz)Auswirkung; (thesoz)ökonomisches Modell; (thesoz)Wirtschaftspolitik; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Kartell; (thesoz)Abschreckung; merger policy tools; deterrence effects; cross-section/ time-series data; L40; L49; K21; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Competition; Antitrust law; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Competition; Antitrust law; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 41 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  16. Consumer surplus vs. welfare standard in a political economy model of merger control
    Author: Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2000

    Abstract: "This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We... more

     

    Abstract: "This paper considers merger control in a common agency framework where firms and their competitors can influence the antitrust agency and where transparency - while making lobbying less effective - also implies real resource costs. We examine the performance of two alternative standards that can be assigned to the antitrust agency in the presence of these regulatory failures. We find that under a welfare standard, lobbying leads to the clearance of relatively inefficient mergers that decrease welfare (i.e. there is a type II error). By contrast, under a consumer surplus standard, the agency will ban relatively efficient mergers that would increase welfare (i.e. there is a type I error). Lobbying actually reduces the extent to which this occurs, albeit at a cost in terms of real resources. We also find that a consumer surplus standard is more attractive when mergers are large, when increasing the size of a merger greatly enhances industry profits, when there is little transparency

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11611
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QR 300 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-15
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Interessenpolitik; LEN-Modell; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie; (stw)Wohlfahrtsanalyse; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Kostenfaktor; (thesoz)Wohlfahrt; (thesoz)Kartellamt; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Einfluss; (thesoz)Lobby; Antitrust law; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Consumers' surplus; Trusts, Industrial; Welfare economics; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen; Antitrust law; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Consumers' surplus; Trusts, Industrial; Welfare economics; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 27 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  17. The scope of conflict in international merger control
    Author: Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2000

    Abstract: "In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance... more

     

    Abstract: "In this paper, we analyse the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which assert jurisdictions simultaneously. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. We find that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, 'globalisation' should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is less likely to arise between countries of different size and for extreme policy rules (very lenient or very strict) towards dominance." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11612
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Marktprozeß und Unternehmensentwicklung, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; Bd. 00-14
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik; Konflikt; Globalisierung; Gemeinsamer Markt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik; (stw)Konflikt; (stw)Globalisierung; (stw)Marktintegration; (stw)Theorie; (stw)Welt; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)internationaler Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Kartellamt; (thesoz)Konfliktpotential; (thesoz)Kontrolle; Antitrust law; Conflict of laws; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Antitrust law; Conflict of laws; Consolidation and merger of corporations; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 18 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  18. Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages: the role of internal organization, information, and market structure
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. The authors show that this may render horizontal mergers... more

     

    Abstract: "Merged firms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors. The authors show that this may render horizontal mergers profitable and welfare ż improving even if costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with various empirical findings, is the assumption that information about output decisions flows more freely within a merged firm." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11500
    RVK Categories: QC 000
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-05
    Subjects: Fusion; Horizontale Konzentration; Organisation; Dezentralisation; Organisationsentwicklung; Unternehmenstheorie; Informationsökonomie; Wohlfahrtseffekt; Theorie
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusion; (stw)Horizontale Integration; (stw)Dezentrale Organisation; (stw)Theorie der Unternehmung; (stw)Informationsökonomik; (stw)Wohlfahrtsanalyse; (stw)Theorie; (thesoz)Management; (thesoz)Organisation; (thesoz)Markt; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Monopol; (thesoz)Informationsfluss; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Kosten-Nutzen-Analyse; (thesoz)Informationspolitik; (thesoz)Joint Venture; (thesoz)Unternehmen; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 13 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  19. Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices: a theory of preemptive mergers
    Author: Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan
    Published: 2001

    Abstract: "We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value of the insiders is... more

     

    Abstract: "We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better than being an 'outsider', firms may merge to preempt their partner merging with a rival. The stock-value of the insiders is increased, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also explain why shareholders of targets gain while acquirers typically break even. These results are derived in an endogenousmerger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, when they occur, and how the surplus is shared." (author's abstract)

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    oai:gesis.izsoz.de:document/11641
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion Papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und politische Ökonomie ; Bd. 01-26
    Subjects: Takeover; Fusion; Wettbewerbsstrategie; Spieltheorie; Verhandlungsspiel; Verhandlungstheorie
    Other subjects: (thesoz)Motiv; (thesoz)Auswirkung; (thesoz)politische Ökonomie; (thesoz)Modell; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Interdependenz; (thesoz)Aktienkurs; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)Profitmaximierung
    Scope: Online-Ressource, 36 S.
    Notes:

    Veröffentlichungsversion
  20. Why mergers reduce profits and raise share prices - a theory of preemptive mergers
    Author: Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung ; 2001,26
    Subjects: Takeover; Fusion; Wettbewerbsstrategie; Spieltheorie; Verhandlungsspiel; Verhandlungstheorie
    Other subjects: (thesoz)Motiv; (thesoz)Auswirkung; (thesoz)politische Ökonomie; (thesoz)Modell; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Interdependenz; (thesoz)Aktienkurs; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)Profitmaximierung
    Scope: 36 S., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz S. 25 - 31
  21. The incentives for takeover in oligopoly
    Author: Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  22. Merger and collusion in contests
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  23. Profitable horizontal mergers without cost advantages
    the role of internal organization, information, and market structure
    Author: Huck, Steffen; Konrad, Kai A.; Müller, Wieland
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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  24. The political economy of European merger control
    evidence using stock market data
    Author: Duso, Tomaso; Neven, Damien J.; Röller, Lars-Hendrik
    Published: 2003
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: QB 910 ; QB 910
    DDC Categories: 330; 380; 650; 670; 330
    Series: Discussion papers / Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung ; 2002,34
    Subjects: Fusionskontrolle; Interessenpolitik; Wirkungsanalyse; Börsenkurs
    Other subjects: (stw)Fusionskontrolle; (stw)Interessenpolitik; (stw)Wirkungsanalyse; (stw)Börsenkurs; (stw)EU-Staaten; (thesoz)Wirtschaftsrecht; (thesoz)politische Ökonomie; (thesoz)Kontrolle; (thesoz)Wettbewerb; (thesoz)Fusion; (thesoz)Aktienkurs; (thesoz)Unternehmen; (thesoz)EU; Arbeitspapier; Graue Literatur; Buch; Online-Publikation; Als Aufsatz endgültig erschienen
    Scope: IV, 41 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 27 - 29
  25. Bargaining, mergers, and technology choice in bilaterally oligopolistic industries
    Author: Inderst, Roman; Wey, Christian
    Published: 2001
    Publisher:  WZB, Berlin

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