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  1. Consolidation, delimitation and stalemate
    disruptive interplay and strategic incentives in the CBD TRIPS relationship
    Author: Jungcurt, Stefan; Meyer, Thomas
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Inst. für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwiss. des Landbaus, Fachgebiet Ressourcenökonomie, Berlin

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  2. Consolidation, delimitation and stalemate
    isruptive interplay and strategic incentives in the CBD-TRIPS relationship
    Author: Jungcurt, Stefan; Meyer, Thomas
    Published: 2006
    Publisher:  Inst. für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaus, Fachgebiet Ressourcenökonomie, Berlin

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    Thünen-Institut, Zentrum für Informationsmanagement, Bibliothek Ländliche Räume
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    T 553/16
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    Leibniz-Institut für Agrarentwicklung in Transformationsökonomien, Bibliothek
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    A 3.5.7 Jung
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    RS 6581(16)
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    Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
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    Universitätsbibliothek Kiel, Zentralbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    C 250467
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    Universitätsbibliothek Rostock
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    ZB 7931 (2006,16)
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    Kommunikations-, Informations- und Medienzentrum der Universität Hohenheim
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    ZB 50200 I15-16
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    RVK Categories: ZB 60000 ; ZB 40500 ; ZB 56400
    Series: Institutional change in agriculture and natural resources discussion paper ; 16/2006
    Subjects: Artenvielfalt; Umweltabkommen; TRIPS; Konflikt; Verhandlungen; Gefangenendilemma; Theorie; Welt
    Scope: 27 S., graph. Darst., 30 cm
    Notes:

    Literaturverz. S. 25 - 27
  3. Consolidation, delimitation and stalemate: disruptive interplay and strategic incentives in the CBD-TRIPS relationship
    Author: Jungcurt, Stefan; Meyer, Thomas
    Published: 2006

    Abstract: "The relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is characterized by a persistent potential for disruptions in implementation, such... more

     

    Abstract: "The relationship between the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is characterized by a persistent potential for disruptions in implementation, such as 'biopiracy' conflicts, because of the agreements' incompatible provisions on property rights over genetic resources. The lack of consolidation is often explained by attempts to strategically exploit interplay between the two institutions. Countries of the North and the South are said to push for provisions under their preferred agreement in order to circumvent obligations under the other. We develop an alternative explanation based on a conception of international negotiators acting as agents of particular interest groups rather than as representatives of the state as a whole. Using a Two-level Games model of independent negotiations for agreements on functionally interdependent issues, we analyze the incentives for negotiators to delay or pr

     
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