This book addresses the problem of justifying the institution of criminal punishment. It examines the "paradox of retribution: the fact that we cannot seem to reject the intuition that punishment is morally required, and yet we cannot (even after...
more
Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
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Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
Inter-library loan:
No inter-library loan
This book addresses the problem of justifying the institution of criminal punishment. It examines the "paradox of retribution: the fact that we cannot seem to reject the intuition that punishment is morally required, and yet we cannot (even after two thousand years of philosophical debate) find a morally legitimate basis for inflicting harm on wrongdoers. The book comes at a time when a new "abolitionist movement has arisen, a movement that argues that we should give up the search for justification and accept that punishment is morally unjustifiable and should be discontinued immediately. This book, however, proposes a new approach to the retributive theory of punishment, arguing that it should be understood in its traditional formulation that has been long forgotten or dismissed: that punishment is essentially a defense of the honor of the victim. Properly understood, this can give us the possibility of a legitimate moral justification for the institution of punishment.?
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Honor and Revenge: A Theory of Punishment; Contents; Chapter 1: The Problem of Punishment; 1.1 The Paradox of Retribution; 1.2 The Incoherence of Public Policy: A Muddle of Theories; 1.3 The Rise of Abolitionism; 1.4 The Strategy of This Book; 1.5 The Importance of the Debate; Chapter 2: Punishment as Crime Prevention; 2.1 Does Punishment Prevent Crime?; 2.2 Crime Prevention and the Utilitarian Moral Theory; 2.3 The Critique of Consequentialism; 2.4 Is It Ever Useful to Punish the Innocent?; 2.5 Punishing the Guilty; 2.6 What's Left of the Crime Prevention Theory?
2.7 The Intend/Foresee Distinction2.8 The Crime-Prevention Theory and Double Effect; 2.9 The DDE and Punishing the Innocent; 2.10 Deterrence and Retribution; Chapter 3: Can Retributive Punishment Be Justified?; 3.1 Crypto-Utilitarian Theories of Retribution; 3.1.1 The Deterrence-Based Theory of Retribution; 3.1.2 Retribution and Satisfaction of Victims; 3.2 Retribution as a Natural Instinct or Emotion; 3.3 Retribution as a Requirement of Reason; 3.3.1 Respect for the Offender; 3.3.2 Right to Be Punished; 3.3.3 Consent to Be Punished; 3.3.4 Unfair Advantage
3.4 Retribution as Conceptual Requirement3.5 The Expressive Theory of Retribution; 3.5.1 Can the Expressive Theory Justify Punishment?; 3.5.2 Why Hard Treatment?; 3.6 Retribution as a Moral Primitive; Chapter 4: The Mixed Theory of Punishment; 4.1 The Idea of "Separate Questions"; 4.2 The Conceptual Version of the Mixed Theory; 4.3 Legal Formalism; 4.4 The Separation of Powers Principle; 4.5 The Rule-Utilitarian Theory; 4.6 H.L.A. Hart's Two-Level Theory; 4.7 The "Practice Conception" Argument; 4.8 Utilitarianism, Retribution, and the Two Levels; 4.9 Conclusion
Chapter 5: Retribution and Revenge5.1 Six Supposed Distinctions Between Revenge and Retribution; 5.2 Revenge Is Personal; 5.3 Revenge Is Inherently Excessive; 5.4 Revenge Is for Insults and Slights, Not Moral Wrongs; 5.5 Revenge Is Based on Sadistic Pleasure; 5.6 Revenge Is Based on the Principle of Collective Responsibility; 5.7 Revenge Is Based upon Strict Liability; 5.8 Conclusion: Revenge Versus Retribution; 5.9 Is Revenge Morally Permissible?; 5.10 Revenge, Retribution, and Honor; Chapter 6: What Is the Purpose of Retribution?; 6.1 The Intending Harm Requirement
6.2 Assessing the "Intending Harm Requirement"6.3 The Purpose of Revenge; 6.4 Punishment and Honor; 6.5 Honor and Punishment; 6.6 Intending Harm Versus Defending Honor; 6.7 From Private Revenge to Societal Punishment; 6.8 Retribution and Intentional Harm; 6.9 Honor and Impartiality; 6.10 The Expressive Theory Revisited; Chapter 7: Making Sense of Honor; 7.1 The Descriptive Claim and the Evolutionary Alternative; 7.2 The Value of Honor; 7.3 Is Honor Essentially External?; 7.4 The External Honor Thesis; 7.5 Five Interpretations of the External Honor Thesis; 7.6 Is Honor External?
This book addresses the problem of justifying the institution of criminal punishment. It examines the "paradox of retribution: the fact that we cannot seem to reject the intuition that punishment is morally required, and yet we cannot (even after...
more
Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
Inter-library loan:
No inter-library loan
Location:
Bibliotheks-und Informationssystem der Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg (BIS)
Inter-library loan:
No inter-library loan
This book addresses the problem of justifying the institution of criminal punishment. It examines the "paradox of retribution: the fact that we cannot seem to reject the intuition that punishment is morally required, and yet we cannot (even after two thousand years of philosophical debate) find a morally legitimate basis for inflicting harm on wrongdoers. The book comes at a time when a new "abolitionist movement has arisen, a movement that argues that we should give up the search for justification and accept that punishment is morally unjustifiable and should be discontinued immediately. This book, however, proposes a new approach to the retributive theory of punishment, arguing that it should be understood in its traditional formulation that has been long forgotten or dismissed: that punishment is essentially a defense of the honor of the victim. Properly understood, this can give us the possibility of a legitimate moral justification for the institution of punishment.?
Honor and Revenge: A Theory of Punishment; Contents; Chapter 1: The Problem of Punishment; 1.1 The Paradox of Retribution; 1.2 The Incoherence of Public Policy: A Muddle of Theories; 1.3 The Rise of Abolitionism; 1.4 The Strategy of This Book; 1.5 The Importance of the Debate; Chapter 2: Punishment as Crime Prevention; 2.1 Does Punishment Prevent Crime?; 2.2 Crime Prevention and the Utilitarian Moral Theory; 2.3 The Critique of Consequentialism; 2.4 Is It Ever Useful to Punish the Innocent?; 2.5 Punishing the Guilty; 2.6 What's Left of the Crime Prevention Theory?
2.7 The Intend/Foresee Distinction2.8 The Crime-Prevention Theory and Double Effect; 2.9 The DDE and Punishing the Innocent; 2.10 Deterrence and Retribution; Chapter 3: Can Retributive Punishment Be Justified?; 3.1 Crypto-Utilitarian Theories of Retribution; 3.1.1 The Deterrence-Based Theory of Retribution; 3.1.2 Retribution and Satisfaction of Victims; 3.2 Retribution as a Natural Instinct or Emotion; 3.3 Retribution as a Requirement of Reason; 3.3.1 Respect for the Offender; 3.3.2 Right to Be Punished; 3.3.3 Consent to Be Punished; 3.3.4 Unfair Advantage
3.4 Retribution as Conceptual Requirement3.5 The Expressive Theory of Retribution; 3.5.1 Can the Expressive Theory Justify Punishment?; 3.5.2 Why Hard Treatment?; 3.6 Retribution as a Moral Primitive; Chapter 4: The Mixed Theory of Punishment; 4.1 The Idea of "Separate Questions"; 4.2 The Conceptual Version of the Mixed Theory; 4.3 Legal Formalism; 4.4 The Separation of Powers Principle; 4.5 The Rule-Utilitarian Theory; 4.6 H.L.A. Hart's Two-Level Theory; 4.7 The "Practice Conception" Argument; 4.8 Utilitarianism, Retribution, and the Two Levels; 4.9 Conclusion
Chapter 5: Retribution and Revenge5.1 Six Supposed Distinctions Between Revenge and Retribution; 5.2 Revenge Is Personal; 5.3 Revenge Is Inherently Excessive; 5.4 Revenge Is for Insults and Slights, Not Moral Wrongs; 5.5 Revenge Is Based on Sadistic Pleasure; 5.6 Revenge Is Based on the Principle of Collective Responsibility; 5.7 Revenge Is Based upon Strict Liability; 5.8 Conclusion: Revenge Versus Retribution; 5.9 Is Revenge Morally Permissible?; 5.10 Revenge, Retribution, and Honor; Chapter 6: What Is the Purpose of Retribution?; 6.1 The Intending Harm Requirement
6.2 Assessing the "Intending Harm Requirement"6.3 The Purpose of Revenge; 6.4 Punishment and Honor; 6.5 Honor and Punishment; 6.6 Intending Harm Versus Defending Honor; 6.7 From Private Revenge to Societal Punishment; 6.8 Retribution and Intentional Harm; 6.9 Honor and Impartiality; 6.10 The Expressive Theory Revisited; Chapter 7: Making Sense of Honor; 7.1 The Descriptive Claim and the Evolutionary Alternative; 7.2 The Value of Honor; 7.3 Is Honor Essentially External?; 7.4 The External Honor Thesis; 7.5 Five Interpretations of the External Honor Thesis; 7.6 Is Honor External?
