Publisher:
Oxford University Press USA - OSO, Oxford
Only Imagine offers a new theory of fictional content. Kathleen Stock argues for a controversial view known as 'extreme intentionalism'; the idea that the content of a particular work of fiction is equivalent to exactly what the author of the work...
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Universität Ulm, Kommunikations- und Informationszentrum, Bibliotheksservices
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Only Imagine offers a new theory of fictional content. Kathleen Stock argues for a controversial view known as 'extreme intentionalism'; the idea that the content of a particular work of fiction is equivalent to exactly what the author of the work intended the reader to imagine. Cover -- Only Imagine: Fiction, Interpretation, and Imagination -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- 1: Extreme Intentionalism about Fictional Content -- 1.1 Introduction -- 1.2 Extreme Intentionalism Introduced -- 1.3 What is an Intention? -- 1.4 What is a Reflexive Intention? -- 1.5 What is F-imagining? -- A. F-imagining is propositional -- B. F-imagining is potentially conjunctive -- 1.6 Extreme Intentionalism and Intended Readership -- 1.7 Grice on Conversational Utterance -- 1.8 Fiction Versus Conversation -- 1.9 What Is the Relation Between Understanding Fictional Content and Imagining? -- 1.10 Four Challenges to Extreme Intentionalism -- 1.11 Speaker Meaning and Sentence Meaning -- 1.12 Extreme Intentionalism and Miswriting -- 1.13 Summary -- 2: Intentionalist Strategies of Interpretation -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Conventions of Sentence Meaning -- 2.3 Implied Fictional Truths -- 2.4 Fiction Treated as Ordinary Conversation -- 2.5 Treating Fiction as a Counterfactual -- A. Lewis's account -- B. Lewis's view and the reader's experience -- C. Extreme intentionalism again -- D. Partial application of the Lewisian analyses? -- 2.6 A Sparsely Populated Fictional Scenario? -- 2.7 'Explicit' and 'Implied' Fictional Content and Unreliable Narration -- 2.8 Treating Fiction as a Fictional Conversation -- 2.9 Treating Fiction as Subject to Genre Conventions -- 2.10 Fictional Content and Hidden Meaning -- 2.11 Fictional Content and Authorial Purposes -- A. Wider purposes and more local intentions -- B. Evidence of authorial purpose -- 2.12 Summary -- 3: Extreme Intentionalism and its Rivals -- 3.1 The Problem of 'Unsuccessful' Intentions -- 3.2 The Structure of Unsuccessful Intentions -- 3.3 Intentionally Controlled Ambiguity or Selective Communication -- 3.4 Inadvertently Unsuccessful Intentions.
