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Displaying results 1 to 5 of 5.

  1. Data driven regulation
    theory and application to missing bids
    Author: Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan M.
    Published: March 2019
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (25654)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 25654
    Subjects: Beschaffung; Auktion; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Regulierungstheorie; Japan
    Scope: 54 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  2. Using Bid Rotation and Incumbency to Detect Collusion
    A Regression Discontinuity Approach
    Author: Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain
    Published: 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Cartels participating in procurement auctions frequently use bid rotation or prioritize incumbents to allocate contracts. However, establishing a link between observed allocation patterns and firm conduct has been difficult: there are cost-based competitive explanations for such patterns. We show that by focusing on auctions in which the winning and losing bids are very close, it is possible to distinguish allocation patterns reflecting cost differences across firms from patterns reflecting non-competitive environments. We apply our tests to two datasets: the sample of Ohio milk auctions studied in Porter and Zona (1999), and a sample of municipal procurement auctions from Japan

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w29625
    Subjects: Kartell; Öffentlicher Auftrag; Auktionstheorie; Milchmarkt; Ohio; Gemeinde; Japan
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  3. Screening Adaptive Cartels
    Author: Ortner, Juan M.; Chassang, Sylvain; Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun
    Published: July 2022
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of... more

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    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We propose an equilibrium theory of data-driven antitrust oversight in which regulators launch investigations on the basis of suspicious bidding patterns and cartels can adapt to the statistical screens used by regulators. We emphasize the use of asymptotically safe tests, i.e. tests that are passed with probability approaching one by competitive firms, regardless of the underlying economic environment. Our main result establishes that screening for collusion with safe tests is a robust improvement over laissez-faire. Safe tests do not create new collusive equilibria, and do not hurt competitive industries. In addition, safe tests can have strict bite, including unraveling all collusive equilibria in some settings. We provide evidence that cartel adaptation to regulatory oversight is a real concern

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w30219
    Subjects: Kartell; Regulierung; Kartellrecht; Signalling; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Auktionstheorie; Econometrics of Games and Auctions; Noncooperative Games; Auctions; Procurement; Antitrust Issues and Policies
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers
  4. Disagreement and optimal security design
    Author: Ortner, Juan M.; Schmalz, Martin C.
    Published: 2018
    Publisher:  Munich Society for the Promotion of Economic Research ‐ CESifo GmbH, Munich, Germany

    We study optimal security design when the issuer and market participants agree to disagree about the characteristics of the asset to be securitized. We show that pooling assets can be optimal because it mitigates the effects of disagreement between... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 63 (6906)
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    We study optimal security design when the issuer and market participants agree to disagree about the characteristics of the asset to be securitized. We show that pooling assets can be optimal because it mitigates the effects of disagreement between issuer and investors, whereas tranching a cash-flow stream allows the issuer to exploit disagreement between investors. Interestingly, pooling and tranching can be complements. The optimality of debt with or without call provisions can be derived as a special case. In a model with multiple financing rounds, convertible securities naturally emerge to finance highly skewed ventures.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/176925
    Series: Array ; no. 6906
    Subjects: Unternehmensfinanzierung; Verbriefung; Anlageverhalten; Investor Relations; Emissionsgeschäft; Theorie
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
  5. The Value of Privacy in Cartels
    An Analysis of the Inner Workings of a Bidding Ring
    Author: Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan M.
    Published: 2021
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    We study the inner workings of a bidding cartel focusing on the way in which bidders communicate with one another regarding how each bidder should bid. We show that the designated winner of the cartel can attain higher payoffs by randomizing its bid... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    Location:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Freiburg
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    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
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    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    Location:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study the inner workings of a bidding cartel focusing on the way in which bidders communicate with one another regarding how each bidder should bid. We show that the designated winner of the cartel can attain higher payoffs by randomizing its bid and keeping it secret from other bidders when defection is a concern. Intuitively, randomization makes defection less attractive as potential defectors face the risk of not winning the auction even if they deviate. We illustrate how our theoretical predictions are borne out in practice by studying a bidding cartel that operated in the town of Kumatori, Japan

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: NBER working paper series ; no. w28539
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Kartell; Japan
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource, illustrations (black and white)
    Notes:

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers