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Displaying results 1 to 6 of 6.

  1. Endogenous sanctioning institutions and migration patterns
    experimental evidence
    Author: Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Meraglia, Simone
    Published: [2017]
    Publisher:  University of Exeter, Department of Economics, Exeter

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 226 (2017,02)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics Department discussion papers series ; paper number 17, 02
    Subjects: FormalSanctions; Cooperation; Migration; Voting; Experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 59 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities
    experimental evidence
    Author: Cobo-Reyes, Ramón; Katz, Gabriel; Markussen, Thomas; Meraglia, Simone
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  CDR, Copenhagen

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 572
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion papers / Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen ; no. 19, 7
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 60 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The medieval roots of inclusive institutions
    from the Norman Conquest of England to the Great Reform Act
    Author: Angelucci, Charles; Meraglia, Simone; Voigtländer, Nico
    Published: July 2017
    Publisher:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (23606)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Working paper series / National Bureau of Economic Research ; 23606
    Subjects: Kaufleute; Politische Partizipation; Wirtschaftsgeschichte; Geschichte; England
    Scope: 59 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  4. Potential output and fiscal rules in a monetary union under asymmetric information
    Author: Marattin, Luigi; Meraglia, Simone
    Published: July 9, 2015
    Publisher:  Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics, Bologna, Italy

    We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 566 (1018)
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    We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information about member states' potential output and, therefore, output gap and (ii) bail-out among member states. In our framework, bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders). In the presence of asymmetric information, bail-out and national governments' shortsightedness make the first-best fiscal rule non-implementable as member states are tempted to run excessively high deficits. The Monetary Union designs a mechanism such that member states with high output gap (i.e., in a recession) run higher budget deficits by making an ex-post transfer to the Union. We find that the first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle - i.e., on the member state's output gap - and, all else equal, can be implemented provided the member states' ability to repay its own debt upon the realization of a bad shock is sufficiently high. A downward distortion in the deficit run by a member state during an expansion is otherwise introduced. Finally, the Monetary Union cannot discriminate among types of borrowers when national governments are excessively shortsighted.

     
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    46
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/159856
    Series: Working paper DSE / Department of Economics, Università di Bologna ; no 1018
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten)
  5. Potential output and fiscal rules in a monetary union under asymmetric information - 2nd ed
    Author: Marattin, Luigi; Meraglia, Simone
    Published: April 19, 2016
    Publisher:  Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics, Bologna, Italy

    We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states'... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    No inter-library loan

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DS 566 (1063)
    Inter-library loan:
    No inter-library loan

     

    We analyze fiscal rules within a Monetary Union in the presence of (i) asymmetric information on member states' potential output and (ii) bail-out among member states. The first-best deficit is contingent on the cycle, that is, on member states' output gap. In the presence of asymmetric information and bailout, the first-best deficit is not implementable. Bail-out lowers the scope for signalling (discrimination) by member states (lenders) and induces overborrowing by member states characterized by a low output gap. The Monetary Union can design a mechanism such that a member state with a smaller negative output gap runs an optimal budget deficit upon receiving a transfer form the Union. We show that, this 'cyclically-contingent' fiscal framework Pareto dominates the 'cyclically-adjusted' fiscal rule currently enforced by the European Monetary Union. Our model can then account for a situation where both asymmetric information over cyclical positions and the presence of bail-out among member states does not induce borrowing distortions.

     
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    46
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/159901
    Edition: 2nd edition
    Series: Working paper DSE / Department of Economics, Università di Bologna ; no 1063
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 32 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Trade, law and order, and political liberties
    theory and application to English medieval boroughs
    Author: Angelucci, Charles; Meraglia, Simone
    Published: 2015
    Publisher:  Univ. of Exeter Business School, Exeter

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 226 (2015,09)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Economics Department discussion paper series ; 15/09
    Subjects: Bürokratie; Institutioneller Wandel; Institutionelle Infrastruktur; Liberalismus; Rechtsordnung; Mittelalter; England
    Scope: Online-Ressource (59 S.)