Narrow Search
Last searches

Results for *

Displaying results 1 to 1 of 1.

  1. Network games, peer effect and neutral transfers
    Published: [2021]
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Keynes College, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent

    We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate nearness to non-interior agents and its implication for interior contribution.... more

    Access:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    DS 178
    No inter-library loan

     

    We study properties of collective action problems bounded by minimal contributions as well as endowment and variable contributions are neighbourhood dependent. We relate nearness to non-interior agents and its implication for interior contribution. Here, we see the aspects of node distance to non-interior agents which have implications for interior agents. Endowments may be redistributed among agents. We highlight strict conditions for budget-balanced transfers for which neighbourhood contributions and individual residual consumption are invariant. Agents may or may not be concerned about neighbourhood outcomes. We find that welfare is self-correcting and neither cases are relevant to the overall welfare impact of neutral transfers.

     

    Export to reference management software   RIS file
      BibTeX file
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/246692
    Series: School of Economics discussion papers / University of Kent ; KDPE 2107 (June 2021)
    Subjects: Centrality; Contagion; Neutrality; Peer Effect
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 27 Seiten), Illustrationen