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Displaying results 1 to 14 of 14.

  1. Rank incentives and social learning
    evidence from a randomized controlled trial
    Author: Dobrescu, Loretti Isabella; Faravelli, Marco; Megalokonomou, Rigissa; Motta, Alberto
    Published: June 2019
    Publisher:  IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany

    In a 1-year randomized controlled trial involving thousands of university students, we provide real-time private feedback on relative performance in a semester-long online assignment. Within this setup, our experimental design cleanly identifies the... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 4
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    In a 1-year randomized controlled trial involving thousands of university students, we provide real-time private feedback on relative performance in a semester-long online assignment. Within this setup, our experimental design cleanly identifies the behavioral response to rank incentives (i.e., the incentives stemming from an inherent preference for high rank). We find that rank incentives not only boost performance in the related assignment, but also increase the average grade across all course exams taken over the semester by 0.21 standard deviations. These beneficial effects remain sizeable across all quantiles and extend beyond the time of the intervention. The mechanism behind these findings involves social learning: rank incentives make students engage more in peer interactions, which lead them to perform significantly better across the board. Finally, we explore the virtues of real-time feedback by analyzing a number of alternative variations in the way it is provided.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/202783
    Series: Discussion paper series / IZA ; no. 12437
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0902)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0902
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Ungleichheit; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Macht; Experiment
    Other subjects: Business enterprises; Partnership; Balance of power; Incomplete contracts
    Scope: 51 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  3. A prize to give for
    an experiment on public good funding mechanism
    Author: Corazzini, Luca; Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca M.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0714)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0714
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Fundraising; Auktion; Glücksspiel; Experiment; Theorie; Fund raising; Benefit auctions; Lotteries; Public goods
    Scope: 39 S., graph. Darst.
  4. Single versus multiple prize contests to finance public goods
    theory and experimental evidence
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca M.
    Published: 2007
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0715)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0715
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Auktion; Experiment; Theorie; Contests; Public goods; Public-private sector cooperation
    Scope: 33 S., graph. Darst.
  5. Social welfare versus inequality concerns in an incomplete contract experiment
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  CESifo, München

    We study a situation where two players first choose a sharing rule, then invest into a joint production process, and then split joint benefits. We investigate how social preferences determine investments. In our experiment we find that even the... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    We study a situation where two players first choose a sharing rule, then invest into a joint production process, and then split joint benefits. We investigate how social preferences determine investments. In our experiment we find that even the materially disadvantaged player cares more for social welfare than about inequality. Behavioral preferences of disadvantaged players actually increase inequality. We also investigate when players give up an advantageous sharing rule. Power-sharing can be successful in the experiment, even when it is not in a selfish world. -- experiments ; incomplete contracts ; relationship-specific investment ; allocation of power ; social preferences

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/30751
    Series: Array ; 2933
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Ungleichheit; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Macht; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource ( 44 S.), graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Druckausg. erschienen
  6. When less is more
    rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Stanca, Luca M.
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  School of Economics, Univ. of Queensland, Brisbane

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    VS 17 (412)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: School of Economics discussion papers series ; 412
    Subjects: Auktionstheorie; Rent-Seeking; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S., 211,92 Kb), graph. Darst.
  7. Smooth politicians and paternalistic voters
    a theory of large elections
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Walsh, Randall P.
    Published: 2011

    "We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the... more

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    "We propose a new game theoretic approach to modeling large elections that overcomes the "paradox of voting" in a costly voting framework, without reliance on the assumption of ad hoc preferences for voting. The key innovation that we propose is the adoption of a "smooth" policy rule under which the degree to which parties favor their own interests is increasing in their margin of victory. In other words, mandates matter. We argue that this approach is an improvement over the existing literature as it is consistent with the empirical evidence. Incorporating this policy rule into a costly voting model with paternalistic voters yields a parsimonious model with attractive properties. Specifically, the model predicts that when the size of the electorate grows without bound, limiting turnout is strictly positive both in terms of numbers and proportions. Further, the model preserves the typical comparative statics predictions that have been identified in the extant costly voting models such as the underdog effect and the competition effect. Finally, under the case of selfish agents, we are able to extend Palfrey and Rosenthal's (1985) zero turnout result to a general class of smooth policy rules. Thus, this new approach reconciles the predictions of standard costly voting, both in terms of positive turnout and comparative statics predictions with the assumption of a large electorate environment"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 17397
    Subjects: Politische Partei; Politiker; Wahlkampf; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie
    Scope: 42 S., graph. Darst.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  8. Mandate and paternalism
    a theory of large elections
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Man, Priscilla; Walsh, Randall P.
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. of Queensland, School of Economics, Brisbane

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 17 (474)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: School of Economics discussion papers series ; 474
    Subjects: Wahlkampf; Wahlverhalten; Spieltheorie; Neue politische Ökonomie; USA; costly voting model
    Scope: Online-Ressource
  9. Selection, tournaments, and dishonesty
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Friesen, Lana; Gangadharan, Lata
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Monash Univ., Dep. of Economics, Canberra

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    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper / Monash University,Department of Economics ; 14,08
    Scope: Online-Ressource (42 S.)
  10. Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Kirchkamp, Oliver; Rainer, Helmut
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  Univ. [u.a.], Jena

    We explore experimentally how power asymmetries between partners affect relationship-specific investments. We find that on average players' investments are larger than equilibrium investments. In contrast to social dilemma experiments, in our... more

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    Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek
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    DS 78 (2009.016)
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    We explore experimentally how power asymmetries between partners affect relationship-specific investments. We find that on average players' investments are larger than equilibrium investments. In contrast to social dilemma experiments, in our experiment preferences for social welfare and those for equality call for different actions. Surprisingly, even disadvantaged players care more for social welfare and less for equality. As a result social welfare increases but so does inequality. We then study conditions under which power-advantaged players give up power. Power-sharing can be successful in the experiment, even when it is not in a selfish world.-- Experiments ; incomplete contracts ; relationship-specific investment ; allocation of Power ; social preferences

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/31730
    Series: Jena economic research papers ; 2009,016
    Subjects: Soziale Beziehungen; Soziale Ungleichheit; Gerechtigkeit; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion; Unvollständiger Vertrag; Macht; Experiment
    Scope: Online-Ressource, (51 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Conflict in the pool
    a field experiment
    Author: Balafoutas, Loukas; Faravelli, Marco; Sheremeta, Roman M.
    Published: 9-1-2021
    Publisher:  Chapman University, Economic Science Institute, [Orange, CA]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: ESI working papers ; 21, 16
    Subjects: conflict; conflict resolution; field experiment
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  12. The important thing is not (Always) winning but taking part
    funding public goods with contests
    Author: Faravelli, Marco
    Published: 2008
    Publisher:  CRIEFF, St. Andrews

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1393 (0802)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: CRIEFF discussion papers ; 0802
    Subjects: Öffentliche Güter; Experiment; Spieltheorie; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten; Asymmetrische Information; Theorie; Public goods; Finance, Public; Contests
    Scope: 20 S., graph. Darst.
  13. (Don’t) make my vote count
    Author: Faravelli, Marco; Sanchez-Pages, Santiago
    Published: 2012
    Publisher:  Univ. of Queensland, School of Economics, Brisbane

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    VS 17 (464)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: School of Economics discussion papers series ; 464
    Subjects: Abstimmungsregel; Unvollkommene Information; Neue politische Ökonomie; Spieltheorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (25 S.)
  14. Terrorism and local economic development
    Author: Ponnusamy, Sundar; Faravelli, Marco
    Published: October 2023
    Publisher:  University of Queensland, [Brisbane]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Discussion paper series / UQ School of Economics ; no. 664
    Subjects: Terrorism; Economic Development; Spatial Analysis
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 42 Seiten), Illustrationen