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Displaying results 1 to 15 of 15.

  1. A theory of community formation and social hierarchy
    Author: Athey, Susan; Calvano, Emilio; Jha, Saumitra
    Published: August 2016
    Publisher:  [Stanford Graduate School of Business], [Stanford, CA]

    We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups – communities – that allow repeated... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    We analyze the classic problem of sustaining trust when cheating and leaving trading partners is easy, and outside enforcement is difficult. We construct equilibria where individuals are loyal to smaller groups – communities – that allow repeated interaction. Hierarchies provide incentives for loyalty and allow individuals to trust agents to extent that the agents are actually trustworthy. We contrast these with other plausible institutions for engendering loyalty that require inefficient withholding of trust to support group norms, and are not robust to coalitional deviations. In communities whose members randomly match, we show that social mobility within hierarchies falls as temptations to cheat rise. In communities where individuals can concentrate their trading with pre-selected members, hierarchies where senior members are favored for trade sustain trust even in the presence of proximate non-hierarchical communities. We link these results to the emergence of trust in new market environments and early human societies

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    Series: [Stanford University Graduate School of Business research paper ; no. 16-41]
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (ca. 49 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Merger policy in digital markets
    an ex-post assessment
    Author: Argentesi, Elena; Buccirossi, Paolo; Calvano, Emilio; Duso, Tomaso; Marrazzo, Alessia; Nava, Salvatore
    Published: 2019
    Publisher:  DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 14
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    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that create important challenges for competition policy. We show that these features have been key determinants of the theories of harm in major merger cases in the past few years. We then analyse the characteristics of almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major digital companies - Amazon, Facebook, and Google - between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity and show that they span a wide range of economic sectors. In most cases, their products and services appear to be complementary to those supplied by the acquirers. Moreover, target companies seem to be particularly young, being four-years-old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition. Finally, we examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the CAs performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/213307
    Series: Discussion papers / Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung ; 1836
    Subjects: Electronic Commerce; Digitale Plattform; Übernahme; Fusion; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Welt; Großbritannien
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Merger policy in digital markets
    an ex-post assessment
    Author: Argentesi, Elena; Buccirossi, Paolo; Calvano, Emilio; Duso, Tomaso; Marrazzo, Alessia; Nava, Salvatore
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that... more

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 63
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    This paper presents a broad retrospective evaluation of mergers and merger decisions in the digital sector. We first discuss the most crucial features of digital markets such as network effects, multi-sidedness, big data, and rapid innovation that create important challenges for competition policy. We show that these features have been key determinants of the theories of harm in major merger cases in the past few years. We then analyse the characteristics of almost 300 acquisitions carried out by three major digital companies -Amazon, Facebook, and Google -between 2008 and 2018. We cluster target companies on their area of economic activity and show that they span a wide range of economic sectors. In most cases, their products and services appear to be complementary to those supplied by the acquirers. Moreover, target companies seem to be particularly young, being four-years-old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition. Finally, we examine two important merger cases, Facebook/Instagram and Google/Waze, providing a systematic assessment of the theories of harm considered by the UK competition authorities as well as evidence on the evolution of the market after the transactions were approved. We discuss whether the CAs performed complete and careful analyses to foresee the competitive consequences of the investigated mergers and whether a more effective merger control regime can be achieved within the current legal framework.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/214987
    Series: Array ; no. 7985 (December 2019)
    Subjects: Electronic Commerce; Digitale Plattform; Übernahme; Fusion; Wettbewerbspolitik; Fusionskontrolle; Welt; Großbritannien
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 45 Seiten)
  4. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing and collusion
    Author: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Published: 20 December 2018
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 32 (13405)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; DP13405
    Scope: 44 Seiten, Illustrationen
    Notes:

    Erscheint auch als Online-Ausgabe
  5. Artificial intelligence, algorithmic recommendations and competition
    Author: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Published: 29 May 2023
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP18176
    Subjects: Artificial intelligence; Recommender system; Search; Product market competition; Manipulation; Biased recommendations; Niche products
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 55 Seiten), Illustrationen
  6. Pricing payment cards
    Author: Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Calvano, Emilio
    Published: 2009
    Publisher:  European Central Bank, Frankfurt am Main

    In a payment card association such as Visa, each time a consumer pays by card, the bank of the merchant (acquirer) pays an interchange fee (IF) to the bank of the cardholder (issuer) to carry out the transaction. This paper studies the determinants... more

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    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 534 (1139)
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    In a payment card association such as Visa, each time a consumer pays by card, the bank of the merchant (acquirer) pays an interchange fee (IF) to the bank of the cardholder (issuer) to carry out the transaction. This paper studies the determinants of socially and privately optimal IFs in a card scheme where services are provided by a monopoly issuer and perfectly competitive acquirers to heterogeneous consumers and merchants. Different from the literature, we distinguish card membership from card usage decisions (and fees). In doing so, we reveal the implications of an asymmetry between consumers and merchants: the card usage decision at a point of sale is delegated to cardholders since merchants are not allowed to turn down cards once they are affiliated with a card network. We show that this asymmetry is sufficient to induce the card association to set a higher IF than the socially optimal IF, and thus to distort the structure of user fees by leading to too low card usage fees at the expense of too high merchant fees. Hence, cap regulations on IFs can improve the welfare. These qualitative results are robust to imperfect issuer competition, imperfect acquirer competition, and to other factors affecting final demands, such as elastic consumer participation or strategic card acceptance to attract consumers. - Payment card associations ; Interchange fees ; Merchant fees

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
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    hdl: 10419/153573
    Series: Working paper series / European Central Bank ; 1139
    Subjects: Kreditkartengesellschaft; Gebühr; Anreizregulierung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource, (37 S., 891 KB)
  7. Pricing payment cards
    Author: Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Calvano, Emilio
    Published: 2010
    Publisher:  European School of Management and Technology, Berlin

    Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure,... more

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    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    DS 450 (2010,5)
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    Payment card networks, such as Visa, require merchants' banks to pay substantial "interchange" fees to cardholders' banks, on a per transaction basis. This paper shows that a network's profit-maximizing fee induces an inefficient price structure, over-subsidizing card usage and over-taxing merchants. In contrast to the literature we show that this distortion is systematic and arises from the fact that consumers make two distinct decisions (membership and usage) whereas merchants make only one (membership). These findings are robust to competition for cardholders and/or for merchants, network competition, and strategic card acceptance to attract consumers.

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/96557
    Series: ESMT working paper ; 10-005
    Subjects: Kreditkartengesellschaft; Gebühr; Anreizregulierung; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Unvollkommener Wettbewerb; Theorie
    Scope: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 40 S., 428 KB)
  8. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Author: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... more

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    DSM 13
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    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Series: Array ; V2
    Scope: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  9. The impact of the internet on advertising markets for news media
    Author: Athey, Susan; Calvano, Emilio; Gans, Joshua
    Published: 2013

    Location:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signature:
    W 1 (19419)
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Print
    Series: NBER working paper series ; 19419
    Subjects: Online-Marketing; Printwerbung; Pressemarkt; Digitale Plattform; Wettbewerb; Werbung; Markt; Theorie
    Scope: 54 S.
    Notes:

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  10. Financial markets, industry dynamics, and growth
    Author: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Published: 2014
    Publisher:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new... more

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    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effect of strategic interaction on advertising levels, and the impact of entry and mergers. We show that novel forces come into play, which reflect the outlets' incentives to control the composition of the customer base in addition to its size. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain a number of empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models

     
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    Series: ERID working paper ; 170
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 170
    Scope: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.
  11. Issues in on-line advertising and competition policy
    a two-sided market perspective
    Author: Calvano, Emilio; Jullien, Bruno
    Published: 2011

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working paper series / IGIER ; 427
    Scope: Online-Ressource (24 S.)
  12. Market power, competition and innovation in digital markets
    a survey
    Author: Calvano, Emilio; Polo, Michele
    Published: 15 January 2020
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    LZ 161
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    Location:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP14314
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 37 Seiten)
  13. Autonomous algorithmic collusion: economic research and policy implications
    Author: Assad, Stephanie; Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Clark, Robert; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Ershov, Daniel; Johnson, Justin P.; Pastorello, Sergio; Rhodes, Andrew; Xu, Lei; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
    Published: March 2021
    Publisher:  Toulouse School of Economics, [Toulouse]

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Working papers / Toulouse School of Economics ; no 1210
    Subjects: Algorithmic Pricing; Antitrust; Competition Policy; Artificial Intelligence; Collusion; Platforms
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 24 Seiten), Illustrationen
  14. Algorithmic collusion, genuine and spurious
    Author: Calvano, Emilio; Calzolari, Giacomo; Denicolò, Vincenzo; Pastorello, Sergio
    Published: 25 July 2021
    Publisher:  Centre for Economic Policy Research, London

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    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Series: Array ; DP16393
    Subjects: artificial intelligence; Reinforcement Learning; Collusion; exploration
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 9 Seiten), Illustrationen
  15. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Author: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Published: 2013
    Publisher:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... more

    Location:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
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    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Series: Array ; V2
    Scope: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.