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Displaying results 1 to 7 of 7.

  1. Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games
    = Magstabilitás és mag-jellegű megoldások háromoldalú hozzárendelési játékokra
    Author: Atay, Ata; Núñez, Marina
    Published: March 2018
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable... more

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    In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in this case, we first focus on other notions of stability such as the notions of subsolution and von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case where each sector of the market has two agents. Furthermore, for any three-sided assignment market, we prove that the union of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those allocations that are compatible with that matching, and this union is always non-empty.

     
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222019
    Series: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2018, 6
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  2. Key players in bullying networks
    Author: Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Schopohl, Simon; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/260965
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2022, 20
    Subjects: Social networks; bullying; harassment; peer effects; key player; conformity; #MeToo
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 30 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. School choice with farsighted students
    Author: Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/267340
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2022, 25
    Subjects: school choice; top trading cycle; stable sets; farsighted students
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 49 Seiten)
  4. Limited farsightedness in priority-based matching
    Author: Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
    Published: [2022]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/268317
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2022, 28
    Subjects: priority-based matching; top trading cycle; stable sets; limited farsightedness
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten)
  5. A bargaining set for roommate problems
    Author: Atay, Ata; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
    Published: [2019]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078/218201
    Series: CORE discussion papers ; 2019, 12
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 19 Seiten)
  6. Matching markets with farsighted couples
    Author: Atay, Ata; Funck, Sylvain; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent J.
    Published: [2023]
    Publisher:  CORE, Louvain-la-Neuve

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    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
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    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 2078.1/274287
    Series: LIDAM discussion paper CORE ; 2023, 11
    Subjects: matching with couples; stable sets; farsighted agents
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 22 Seiten)
  7. On bargaining sets of supplier-firm-buyer games
    = A beszállító-gyártó-vevő játékok alkuhalmazairól
    Author: Atay, Ata; Solymosi, Tamás
    Published: February 2018
    Publisher:  Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest

    We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have... more

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    We study a special three-sided matching game, the so-called supplier-firm-buyer game, in which buyers (customers) and sellers (suppliers) trade indirectly through middlemen (firms). Stuart (Stuart, 1997) showed that all supplier-firm-buyer games have non-empty core. We show that for these games the core coincides with the classical bargaining set (Davis and Maschler, 1967), and also with the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell, 1989).

     
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    Content information
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Source: Union catalogues
    Language: English
    Media type: Book
    Format: Online
    Other identifier:
    hdl: 10419/222018
    Series: Discussion papers / Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences ; MT-DP - 2018, 5
    Scope: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 14 Seiten)