Direkt zur Hauptnavigation springen Direkt zum Inhalt springen
info(at)avldigital.remove-this.de
Deutsch English
Letzte Suchanfragen

Ergebnisse für *

Zeige Ergebnisse 1 bis 25 von 34.

  1. The effect of a "none of the above" ballot paper option on voting behavior and election outcomes
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben; Zednik, Anita
    Erschienen: March 14, 2019
    Verlag:  Economic Research Initiatives @ Duke (ERID), Durham, NC

    We investigate how an explicit blank vote option “None of the above” (NOTA) on the ballot paper affects voting behavior and election results in political elections where non-establishment candidates are on the ballot. We report evidence from two... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We investigate how an explicit blank vote option “None of the above” (NOTA) on the ballot paper affects voting behavior and election results in political elections where non-establishment candidates are on the ballot. We report evidence from two online field experiments conducted in the weeks preceding the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election and the 2016 Austrian run-off election for President. The two elections are special because in the U.S. election one firmly establishment candidate (Hillary Clinton) was facing a self-declared non-establishment candidate (Donald Trump), while in the Austrian election, both candidates were from outside the traditional political establishment. In our experiments we subjected participants either to the original ballot paper or to a manipulated ballot paper where we added a NOTA option. We find that participants with a protest motive, who are either unhappy with the candidate set or with the political establishment in general, choose NOTA. Introducing a NOTA option on the ballot increases participation and reduces the vote shares of non-establishment candidates

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; number 277
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 277
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 31 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. Investments in social ties, risk sharing and inequality
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Elliott, Matthew
    Erschienen: [2020]
    Verlag:  University of Cambridge, Faculty of Economics, Cambridge

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VSP 1362
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: Cambridge working paper in economics ; 2071
    Cambridge-INET working paper series ; no.: 2020, 33
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 87 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. The effect of a "None of the above" ballot paper option on voting behavior and election outcomes
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben; Zednik, Anita
    Erschienen: June 2020
    Verlag:  Vienna University of Economics and Business, Department of Strategy and Innovation, Wien

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 700
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Strategy and Innovation working paper / WU Vienna University of Economics and Business ; no. 2020, 11
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 43 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila
    Erschienen: [2014]
    Verlag:  SSRN, [S.l.]

    This paper studies costly network formation in the context of risk sharing. Neighboring agents negotiate agreements as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which results in the social surplus being allocated according to the Myerson value. We uncover two... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper studies costly network formation in the context of risk sharing. Neighboring agents negotiate agreements as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which results in the social surplus being allocated according to the Myerson value. We uncover two types of inefficiency: overinvestment in social relationships within group (e.g., caste, ethnicity), but underinvestment across group. We find a novel tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Both within and across groups, inefficiencies are minimized by increasing social inequality, which results in financial inequality and increasing the centrality of the most central agents. Evidence from 75 Indian village networks is congruent with our model

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: NBER Working Paper ; No. w20669
    Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Einkommensverteilung; Netzwerk; Verhandlungstheorie; Allokationseffizienz; Indien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (56 p)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2014 erstellt
  5. Social Investments, Informal Risk Sharing, and Inequality
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila
    Erschienen: November 2014
    Verlag:  National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Mass

    This paper studies costly network formation in the context of risk sharing. Neighboring agents negotiate agreements as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which results in the social surplus being allocated according to the Myerson value. We uncover two... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Verlag (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Sächsische Landesbibliothek - Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Dresden
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Technische Informationsbibliothek (TIB) / Leibniz-Informationszentrum Technik und Naturwissenschaften und Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper studies costly network formation in the context of risk sharing. Neighboring agents negotiate agreements as in Stole and Zwiebel (1996), which results in the social surplus being allocated according to the Myerson value. We uncover two types of inefficiency: overinvestment in social relationships within group (e.g., caste, ethnicity), but underinvestment across group. We find a novel tradeoff between efficiency and equality. Both within and across groups, inefficiencies are minimized by increasing social inequality, which results in financial inequality and increasing the centrality of the most central agents. Evidence from 75 Indian village networks is congruent with our model

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; no. w20669
    Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Einkommensverteilung; Netzwerk; Verhandlungstheorie; Allokationseffizienz; Indien
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource
    Bemerkung(en):

    Hardcopy version available to institutional subscribers.
  6. Exclusive vs overlapping viewers in media markets
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Univ., Volkswirtschaftl. Fak., München

    This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers,... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 483 (2006,25)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    Universitätsbibliothek Mannheim
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/104203
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This Version: August 2006
    Schriftenreihe: Münchener wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Beiträge ; 2006-25
    Schlagworte: Werbewirtschaft; Wettbewerb; Kommunikationsmedien; Theorie
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (46 S., 392 KB)
    Bemerkung(en):

    Record-last-verified: 12-02-07
  7. How individual preferences get aggregated in groups
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben; Pathak, Parag A.
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  School of Economics, the Univ. of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Australian School of Business working paper ; 2013,24
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (37 S.)
  8. How individual preferences get aggregated in groups
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben; Pathak, Parag A.
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 158
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (36 S.)
  9. Coalitional rationalizability
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila
    Erschienen: 2003

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    B 356376
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Dissertation
    Format: Druck
    Schlagworte: Koalition; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Normalformspiel; Theorie
    Umfang: IX, 170 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Kopie, ersch. im Verl. UMI, Ann Arbor, Mich. - Enth. 2 Beitr

    Zugl.: Princeton, NJ, Univ., Dep. of Economics, Diss., 2003
  10. Rationalizing choice with multi-self models
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Rozen, Kareen
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 128
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (40 S.)
  11. Gradual bidding in ebay-like auctions
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Burns, James; Ishii, Yuhta
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 129
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (50 S.), graph. Darst.
  12. Commitment-flexibility trade-off and withdrawal penalties
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V.
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 130
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (27 S.), graph. Darst.
  13. Imperfect public monitoring with costly punishment
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben
    Erschienen: 2011
    Verlag:  School of Economics, the Univ. of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Ebook
    Format: Online
    ISBN: 9780733430800
    Schriftenreihe: School of Economics discussion paper / The University of New South Wales ; 2011,10
    Schlagworte: Öffentliche Güter; Allokationseffizienz; Soziales Verhalten; Wohlfahrtsanalyse; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (23 S.), graph. Darst.
  14. Muslim family law, prenuptial agreements and the emergence of dowry in Bangladesh
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Field, Erica Marie; Torero, Máximo
    Erschienen: 2008
    Verlag:  Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development, [S.l.]

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    Keine Speicherung
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: BREAD working paper ; 179
    Schlagworte: Ehe; Islam; Frauen; Preis; Familienökonomik; Bangladesch
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (49, [12] S.), graph. Darst.
  15. Consumption risk-sharing in social networks
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Mobius, Markus; Szeidl, Adam
    Erschienen: 2010

    "We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (15719)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe

     

    "We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured by the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community, relative to group size. Two-dimensional networks, where people have connections in multiple directions, are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. We show that social networks in Peruvian villages satisfy this dimensionality property; thus, our model can explain Townsend's (1994) puzzling observation that village communities often exhibit close to full insurance. (2) In second-best arrangements, agents organize in endogenous "risk-sharing islands" in the network, where shocks are shared fully within, but imperfectly across islands. As a result, network based risk-sharing is local: socially closer agents insure each other more"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 15719
    Schlagworte: Soziales Netzwerk; Soziale Beziehungen; Risiko; Versicherungsschutz; Ländlicher Raum; Peru
    Umfang: 39, [26] S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  16. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (Einzellizenz)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  17. Network markets and consumers coordination
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Argenziano, Rossella
    Erschienen: 2004

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 292 (1481)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: Cowles Foundation discussion paper ; 1481
    Schlagworte: Netzwerkökonomik; Verbraucher; Monopol; Duopol; Theorie; Koordination
    Umfang: 45 S
    Bemerkung(en):
  18. How individual preferences are aggregated in groups
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben; Pathak, Parag A.
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  School of Economics, the Univ. of New South Wales, Kensington, NSW

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Australian School of Business working paper ; 2014,30
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (33 S.)
  19. Exclusive vs overlapping viewers in media markets
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2006
    Verlag:  Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15, Mannheim [u.a.]

    This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers,... mehr

    Standort:
    Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 445 (161)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates competition for advertisers in media markets when viewers can subscribe to multiple channels. A central feature of the model is that channels are monopolists in selling advertising opportunities toward their exclusive viewers, but they can only obtain a competitive price for advertising opportunities to multi-homing viewers. Strategic incentives of firms in this setting are different than those in former models of media markets. If viewers can only watch one channel, then firms compete for marginal consumers by reducing the amount of advertising on their channels. In our model, channels have an incentive to increase levels of advertising, in order to reduce the overlap in viewership. We take an account of the differences between the predictions of the two types of models and find that our model is more consistent with recent developments in broadcasting markets. We also show that if channels can charge subscription fees on viewers, then symmetric firms can end up in an asymmetric equilibrium in which one collects all or most of its revenues from advertisers, while the other channel collects most of its revenues via viewer fees.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/94123
    Auflage/Ausgabe: This version: August 2006
    Schriftenreihe: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 161
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (46 S.), graph. Darst.
  20. Either or both competition
    a "two-sided" theory of advertising with overlapping viewerships ; conference paper
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2013
    Verlag:  ZBW, [Kiel

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect... mehr

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper develops a fairly general model of platform competition in media markets allowing viewers to use multiple platforms. This leads to a new form of competition between platforms, in which they do not steal viewers from each other, but affect the viewer composition and thereby the resulting value of a viewer for the other platform. We label this form of competition "either or both." A central result is that platform ownership does not affect advertising levels, despite nontrivial strategic interaction between platforms. This result holds for general viewer demand functions and is robust to allowing for viewer fees. We show that the equilibrium advertising level is inefficiently high. We also demonstrate that entry of a platform leads to an increase in the advertising level if viewers' preferences for the platforms are negatively correlated, which contrasts with predictions of standard models with either/or competition. We validate this result in an empirical analysis using panel data for the U.S. cable television industry.

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/79912
    Schriftenreihe: Array ; V2
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (48 S.), graph. Darst.
  21. Financial markets, industry dynamics, and growth
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Calvano, Emilio; Reisinger, Markus
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In media markets, consumers spread their attention to several outlets, increasingly so as consumption migrates online. The traditional framework for studying competition among media outlets rules out this behavior by assumption. We propose a new model that allows consumers to choose multiple outlets and use it to study the effect of strategic interaction on advertising levels, and the impact of entry and mergers. We show that novel forces come into play, which reflect the outlets' incentives to control the composition of the customer base in addition to its size. We link consumer preferences and advertising technologies to market outcomes. The model can explain a number of empirical regularities that are difficult to reconcile with existing models

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 170
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 170
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (41 S.), graph. Darst.
  22. Social investments, informal risk sharing, and inequality
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Elliott, Matthew
    Erschienen: November 2014

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    W 1 (20669)
    Fernleihe:
    uneingeschränkte Fernleihe, Kopie und Ausleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Druck
    Schriftenreihe: NBER working paper series ; 20669
    Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Einkommensverteilung; Netzwerk; Verhandlungstheorie; Allokationseffizienz; Indien
    Umfang: 55 S., graph. Darst.
    Bemerkung(en):

    Parallel als Online-Ausg. erschienen
  23. Social investments, informal risk sharing, and inequality
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Chandrasekhar, Arun G.; Elliott, Matthew
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    This paper investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: The most stable... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper investigates stable and efficient networks in the context of risk sharing, when it is costly to establish and maintain relationships that facilitate risk sharing. We find a novel trade-off between efficiency and equality: The most stable efficient networks also generate the most inequality. We then suppose that individuals can be split into groups, assuming that incomes across groups are less correlated than within a group but relationships across groups are more costly to form. The tension between efficiency and equality extends to these correlated income structures. More-central agents have stronger incentives to form across-group links, reaffirming the efficiency benefits of having highly central agents. Our results are robust to many extensions. In general, endogenously formed networks in the risk-sharing context tend to exhibit highly asymmetric structures, which can lead to stark inequalities in consumption levels

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 179
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 179
    Schlagworte: Soziale Ungleichheit; Einkommensverteilung; Netzwerk; Verhandlungstheorie; Allokationseffizienz; Indien
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (61 S.), graph. Darst.
  24. Democratic punishment in public good games with perfect and imperfect observability
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Greiner, Ben
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    In the context of repeated public good contribution games, we experimentally investigate the impact of democratic punishment, when members of a group decide by majority voting whether to inflict punishment on another member, relative to individual peer-to-peer punishment. Democratic punishment leads to more cooperation and higher average payoffs, both under perfect and imperfect monitoring of contributions, primarily by curbing anti-social punishment and thereby establishing a closer connection between a member's contribution decision and whether subsequently being punished by others. We also find that participating in a democratic punishment procedure makes even non-contributors' punishment intentions more pro-social

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 183
    Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper ; No. 183
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (22 S.), graph. Darst.
  25. On asynchronicity of moves and coordination
    Autor*in: Ambrus, Attila; Ishii, Yuhta
    Erschienen: 2015
    Verlag:  Duke Univ., Dep. of Economics, Durham, NC

    This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient... mehr

    Zugang:
    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    This paper shows that asynchronicity of moves can lead to a unique prediction in coordination games, in an infinite-horizon setting, under certain conditions on off-equilibrium payoffs. In two-player games we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for play ultimately being absorbed in the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium of the stage game, for every Markov perfect equilibrium. For players patient enough, the condition is that the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium is also risk dominant, but for lower levels of patience the condition departs from simple risk-dominance. For general n-player symmetric games with patient players, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium to be the unique limit outcome in all symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium is a particular generalization of risk-dominance for more than two players. We provide extensions to the unique selection results to all subgame perfect Nash equilibria, and to coordination games in which different players prefer different Nash equilibria of the stage game

     
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
      BibTeX-Format
    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    Schriftenreihe: ERID working paper ; 185
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (45 S.), graph. Darst.