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  1. The impact of fake reviews on reputation systems and efficiency
    Autor*in: Krügel, Jan Philipp; Paetzel, Fabian
    Erschienen: Sunday 28th February, 2021
    Verlag:  Verein für Socialpolitik, [Köln]

    Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however,... mehr

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    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DSM 13
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Online interactions are frequently governed by reputation systems that allow users to evaluate each other after an interaction. Effective reputation systems can increase trust and may improve efficiency in market settings. In recent years, however, fake reviews have become increasingly prevalent. Since it is difficult to clearly identify fake reviews in field studies, we design a lab10 oratory experiment. Using a repeated public good game with a reputation system, we study (i) how feedback manipulation influences the reliability of average ratings and (ii) whether the existence of manipulated ratings reduces efficiency. We find that feedback manipulation generally decreases the reliability of average ratings in comparison to a control treatment where cheating is not possible. When manipulation is possible and free, average ratings become less 15 reliable, expectations are lower and both cooperation and efficiency are significantly reduced. When there are costs of manipulation, however, average ratings are more reliable and contributions and efficiency are not impaired. Interestingly, this is the case even when costs of manipulation are comparatively low.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/242415
    Schriftenreihe: Jahrestagung 2021 / Verein für Socialpolitik ; 45
    Schlagworte: Reputation Systems; Fake Reviews; Reliability of Ratings; Efficiency
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 26 Seiten), Illustrationen
  2. The effect of losing and winning on cheating and effort in repeated competitions
    Autor*in: Necker, Sarah; Paetzel, Fabian
    Erschienen: May 2022
    Verlag:  CESifo, Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, Munich, Germany

    Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort... mehr

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    Verlag (kostenfrei)
    Resolving-System (kostenfrei)

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 63
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    Competitive rewards are often assigned on a regular basis, e.g., in annual salary negotiations or employee-of-the-month schemes. The repetition of competitions can imply that opponents are matched based on earlier outcomes. Using a real-effort experiment, we examine how cheating and effort evolve in two rounds of competitions in which subjects compete with different types of opponents in the second round (random/based on first-round outcome). We find that (i) losing causes competitors to increase cheating in the second round while winning implies a tendency to reduce cheating. A similar effect is found with regard to effort, which losers increase to a larger extent than winners. (ii) Competitor matching does not significantly affect behavior.

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/260874
    Schriftenreihe: CESifo working paper ; no. 9744 (2022)
    Schlagworte: cheating; effort; competition; competitor; social recognition; laboratory experiment
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 41 Seiten), Illustrationen
  3. Cognitive ability and in-group bias
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Paetzel, Fabian; Sausgruber, Rupert
    Erschienen: August 2018
    Verlag:  Vienna University of Economics and Business, Wien

    Standort:
    Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, Universitätsbibliothek
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 257 (265)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
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    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Volltext (kostenfrei)
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics working paper / Vienna University of Economics and Business ; no. 265
    Schlagworte: cognitive ability; group identity; entitlements; social preferences; minimal groups; punishment; social norms; social status
    Umfang: 1 Online-Ressource (circa 46 Seiten), Illustrationen
  4. The importance of knowing your own reputation
    Autor*in: Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics, Marburg

    We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 102 (2012,36)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning of the next period, participants are re-matched and, except for the two control treatments, receive information resulting from the previous period's evaluations. There are three information treatments: Participants receive information either about their own evaluation or about their partner's evaluation or both. Although participants condition their contributions on their partners' evaluations, this information alone is insufficient to raise contributions. Only if participants also know their own evaluation, we do find a significant increase in contributions relative to the control treatments. -- Conditional Cooperation ; Evaluation ; Public Good Games ; Prisoner's Dilemma ; Repeated games with varying partners ; Reputation ; Second-order beliefs

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/73092
    Schriftenreihe: Joint discussion paper series in economics ; 36-2012
    Schlagworte: Öffentliche Güter; Wiederholte Spiele; Gefangenendilemma; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 22 S., 353,46 KB)
  5. Reaching for the stars
    an experimental study of the consumption value of social approval
    Autor*in: Greiff, Matthias; Paetzel, Fabian
    Erschienen: 2012
    Verlag:  Univ., Dep. of Business Administration & Economics, Marburg

    We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have... mehr

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    DS 102 (2012,8)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

     

    We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a controlled laboratory experiment we test our model. In the experiment, subjects conduct computerized tasks that require substantial effort resulting in endowments from which contributions can be made to a linear public good. After observing others' contributions subjects express social approval. Our main hypothesis is that subjects have a preference for social approval so that the expression of social approval will increase contributions, even if reputation building is impossible. We vary the information available to subjects and investigate how this affects the expression of social approval and individual contributions. Our main finding is that the expression of social approval significantly increases contributions. However, the increase in contributions is smaller if additional information is provided, suggesting that social approval is more effective if subjects receive a noisy signal about others' contributions. -- Experimental Economics ; Linear Public Good Games ; Non-monetary Incentives ; Social Approval

     
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    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Weitere Identifier:
    hdl: 10419/56565
    Schriftenreihe: Joint discussion paper series in economics ; 08-2012
    Schlagworte: Öffentliche Güter; Nichtkooperatives Spiel; Soziale Beziehungen; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 372,78 KB), graph. Darst.
  6. Social preferences and voting on reform
    an experimental study
    Autor*in: Paetzel, Fabian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Traub, Stefan
    Erschienen: 2014
    Verlag:  Wirtschaftsuniv., Dep. of Economics, Wien

    Standort:
    Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe

    Standort:
    ZBW - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft, Standort Kiel
    Signatur:
    VS 257 (172)
    Fernleihe:
    keine Fernleihe
    Export in Literaturverwaltung   RIS-Format
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    Hinweise zum Inhalt
    Quelle: Verbundkataloge
    Sprache: Englisch
    Medientyp: Buch (Monographie)
    Format: Online
    Schriftenreihe: Department of Economics working paper / Vienna University of Economics and Business ; 172
    Schlagworte: Politische Reform; Öffentliche Meinung; Soziale Ungleichheit; Wahlverhalten; Neue politische Ökonomie; Experiment
    Umfang: Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 58 S.), graph. Darst.